ARGUMENTATION AND IDENTITY IN MAASAI AND MONGOLIAN LAND DISPUTES

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This dissertation explores the deliberative arguments stemming from protests by modern herding communities in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China. In each case, I analyze four central argument frames – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-*otor*, and disappearance – that have emerged as governments seek to settle and develop herding communities, and herders protest in support of their traditional lifestyles. The first case study, concerning the Maasai of Tanzania, investigates the ways Maasai communities confront and resist tourism at the borders of the Serengeti and Ngorongoro national parks. The second case study, addressing the Maasai of Kenya, examines the ways that Maasai communities are resisting land privatization near the Maasai Mara and how the associated controversy relates to the emergence of hate speech in modern Kenya. The third case study turns to Eurasia, concentrating on Mongolian herders and their interactions with the government's conservation and mining programs. The fourth case study considers how Inner Mongolian herders have negotiated their relationship with the People's Republic of China's cultural and environmental policies to produce a diverse body of protest tactics. The argumentative dynamics in each case are elucidated through analysis of primary source material and published artifacts, supported by explanatory tools drawn from rhetorical theory. A concluding chapter connects common threads from the case studies to isolate implications for modern herding communities and generate fresh perspective on Deleuze and Guattari's *nomadology* project.

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1.1 NOMADS IN THE MODERN WORLD

One gift item available in the west during the 2013 holiday shopping season was Jimmy Nelson's book of photography, *Before They Pass Away*.[1] The cover depicts a lone Maasai man surveying a largely empty, sepia tone landscape. Alone, separated from his family, community, and herds, this man's image sells a coffee table book based on the premise that his way of life will soon disappear. Nelson's text, as well as television programs such as the BBC's *Tribe,* and feature films such as *The Gods Must Be Crazy,* tend to portray nomadic peoples as isolated, pure, and out of time.[2] Such depictions obscure a more complex and challenging reality facing herders in today's world, where state-sponsored conservation programs and corporate mining projects increasingly come into conflict with their ways of life. These conflicts are particularly acute for herders such as the Maasai and Mongolians on which this dissertation focuses. The herding traditions of these communities require large swaths of land, frequent migrations, and the crossing of local and national borders, resulting in a plethora of conflicts with governments, development projects, and conservationists.

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[1] Jimmy Nelson, *Before They Pass Away* (New York: teNeues, 2013).

[2] A detailed analysis of the BBC2's *Tribe* can be found in Pat Caplan, "In Search of the Exotic: A Discussion of the BBC2 Series 'Tribe'," *Anthropology Today* 21, no. 2 (2005): 3-7. For an analysis of the way *The Gods Must Be Crazy* perpetuates the settlement of hunter gathers in Namibia, see Richard Lee, "The Gods Must be Crazy, But the State Has a Plan: Government Policies Towards the San in Namibia," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 20, no. 1 (1986): 91-98.

Many academics, development workers, and government officials first encounter herding peoples through tourism advertisements and mass media. For example, the Maasai live in the Serengeti ecosystem and their images are frequently coupled with displays of wild animals and pristine parklands in publications such as *National Geographic*. This presentation of herder communities alongside wildlife produces an exotic, idealized, and naturalized image of the Maasai that is at times strengthened through juxtaposition to western cultural artifacts that further emphasize the Maasais' primitivism.[3] While some articles do illustrate the changing aesthetic between tourism, consumption, and environmental preservation, they infrequently differentiate between changing western and herder aesthetics.[4] As environmental communication scholar Phaedra Pezzullo notes, through these images, herder communities have "already come to signify significant spaces in [our] personal and national imaginaries through secondary sources."[5] These imaginaries animate settlement projects, conservation zones, and mineral extraction industries that promise to bring needed capital and human services to herder communities.[6]

The dominance of these images and imaginaries in western discourse and academia create significant complications for Maasai and Mongolian communities seeking to assert claims in public argument over access to their traditional herding terrain. These claims come in many

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[3] Roderick P. Neumann, "Primitive Ideas: Protected Area Buffer Zones and the Politics of Land in Africa," *Development and Change,* no. 28 (1997): 559-582.

[4] Anne Marie Todd, "Anthropocentric Distance in National Geographic's Environmental Aesthetic," *Environmental Communication* 4, no. 2 (2010): 206-224.

[5] Phaedra Carmen Pezzullo, *Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of Pollution, Travel, and Environmental Justice* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007), 171.

[6] The connection between conservation and mining projects is outlined in Fran McShane and Luke Danielson, "The Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development Project and Indigenous Peoples," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2010), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/mining-minerals-and-sustainable-development-project-and.

forms, from stern statements that herders are not disappearing to rejection of inappropriate human services offered by western development organizations.

This dissertation explores the position of herding communities in the modern world by examining case studies from Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China. In each case, I analyze four central argument frames – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-*otor*, and disappearance – which have emerged as governments seek to settle and develop herding communities, and herders argue in support of their traditional lifestyles. The first case study, concerning the Maasai of Tanzania, investigates the ways Maasai communities confront and resist tourism at the borders of the Serengeti and Ngorongoro national parks. The second case study, addressing the Maasai of Kenya, examines the ways that Maasai communities are resisting land privatization near the Maasai Mara and how the associated controversy relates to the emergence of hate speech in modern Kenya. The third case study turns to Eurasia, concentrating on Mongolian herders and their interactions with the government's conservation and mining programs. The fourth case study considers how Inner Mongolian herders have negotiated their relationship with the People's Republic of China's cultural and environmental policies to produce a diverse body of protest tactics. The argumentative dynamics in each case are elucidated through analysis of primary source material and published artifacts, supported by explanatory tools drawn from rhetorical theory. A concluding chapter connects common threads from the case studies to isolate implications for modern herding communities and generate fresh perspective on Deleuze and Guattari's *nomadology* project.

In this opening chapter, I examine how prevailing scholarship depicts nomadic and herder communities, and how those dominant narratives contribute to the expectation that herders are disappearing from the modern world. Then, I examine the entailments of this

rhetoric, focusing on ways that western science has inspired government sponsored settlement programs and spurred herder petitions and protest movements. This introduction also presents my guiding research questions, which focus on how competing visions of nomadic identity underwrite argumentation and protests in Maasai and Mongolian land disputes. I explain how these questions will be pursued using a critical approach that blends archival research and oral history interviews with argumentative analysis, to elucidate and interpret the multiple stakeholder positions at play in my case studies. Finally, I introduce the four central argument frames used in this dissertation – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-*otor,* and disappearance – and the ways that those frames motivate the interpretive work of this project.

1.2 SPEAKING OF HERDERS AND NOMADS

Throughout this dissertation, I use the term *herder* to describe Mongolian and Maasai communities. I have chosen this term from the multiple, at times contradictory terms of herder, nomad, and pastoral-nomad used to describe these communities. This decision is based on the literal and figurative translation of the traditional phrases used by Mongolians and Maasai to describe themselves. Maasai herders use the term *kínèjì*, and the Mongolians use *malchid*; both are mass nouns that that translate to the English term "herder."

Western literature typically refers to Maasai and Mongolian communities as nomads, pastoral nomads, or pastoralists. Labeling a community as "nomads" tends to suggest that members wander through the fixed gridlines of nation-state geography as "random atoms,"

acting in a backward, uncivilized manner.[7] This misunderstanding of Maasai and Mongolian herders misses the complex, often hierarchical structures of their communities and networks of exchange. The label "nomad" also tends to reinforce a dualism that ossifies divisions between the nomadic and settled communities, between the civilized and the barbarian, between the knowable and unknown, and between right and wrong. Throughout this text, I have avoided referring to Maasai and Mongolian communities as "nomads" in an attempt to separate myself, and my work, from this discourse.

Colonial encounters with local communities created a preference for the specific, ethnographic term of "pastoral nomad" to mark communities such as the Maasai and Mongolians as separate from other types of nomads such as migrants, wanderers, and hunter-gatherers.[8] This definition is based on two factors: the keeping of domesticated herds and seasonal migrations between pasture lands. However, I have avoided using the term "pastoral nomads" as it is also used by invaders, colonizing governments, national governments, and development organizations to justify boundaries and ratify selective histories, resulting in real, lasting implications for land use, conservation, development, and tourism with little regard to the multiple, geographically diverse communities collected by the term "pastoral nomad."[9] This collective term has been legitimated through essentializing misrepresentations of herder communities that foreground the

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[7] Gabriel Lafitte, "Modern Freedoms, Nomadic Freedoms," *Rukor* weblog, accessed February 2, 2014, http://rukor.org/modern-freedoms-nomadic-freedoms/.

[8] In using the terms "colonial" and "colonizer" through out this dissertation, I am aware of the perspective of internal and external colonization, and the long histories of colonialism in each of the countries discussed in this dissertation. Maasai and Mongolian herding communities live within a complicated milieu of multiple colonialisms, which has produced new hierarchies, community standards, and practices of communication. These experiences have also cultivated a sense of determined resilience that is reflected in each case study of herder communities.

[9] Among the dense body of literature concerning colonial anthropological classifications, I have found the following three articles most helpful: Rada Dyson-Hudson and Neville Dyson-Hudson, "Nomadic Pastoralism," *Annual Review of Anthropology,* no. 9 (1980): 15-61; Allison Palmer, "Colonial and Modern Genocide: Explanations and Categories," *Ethnic and Race Studies* 21, no. 1 (1998): 89-115; and Richard D. Waller, "Interaction and Identity on the Periphery: The Trans-Mara Maasai," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 17, no. 2 (1984): 243-284.

"pure" or "essential" elements of pastoral nomadism while omitting anomalies or changes in tradition.[10] Consider that in Mongolia, the label of "pure pastoralists" is used to characterize those who identify as herders, while development organizations justify deployment of the term "absentee herders" in similar contexts because the subjects in question own but do not move with herds.[11] For example, a part-time teacher might identify equally as both a herder and teacher, but to a development organization she is identified by her mode of employment – as a teacher. The concept of "pure pastoralism" creates blind spots in development policies targeted only at visible herders. These policies may help "pure pastoralists," by providing lines of credit to buy fodder during environmental catastrophes. However, "absentee herders," such as the teacher who also keeps herds, would not be classified as a herder under this framework, and therefore is not able to access those same lines of credit to protect her herds.

Similarly, anthropological treatments of pastoral-nomads that are tied to underdevelopment discourse block understandings of how herder communities have appropriated technology and adapted to modern conditions.[12] For example, the colonial British government used ethnographic terminology such as "pastoral-nomads" to sub-divide the Maasai by defining

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[10] While Christopher Miller is concerned with Francophone Africa, his arguments regarding the essentialization of pastoral-nomadic communities also apply to Maasai and Mongolian experiences. Christopher L. Miller, *Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African Literature and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

[11] Often times these herders have moved to urban areas seeking employment, leaving their animals with younger family members. They plan to return to the countryside and a herder lifestyle upon retirement or after they have earned a predetermined amount of money in the city. For a discussion of this practice among Mongolians, see Maria Fernandez-Gimenez, "Reconsidering the Role of Absentee Herd Owners: A View from Mongolia," *Human Ecology* 27, no. 1 (1999): 1-27.

[12] Examples of anthropological texts that do not consider herder adaptations to modernization can be found in Bernhard Grzimek's text and film by the same name, *The Serengeti Shall Not Die.* A detailed analysis of these productions is provided in Chapter Two. Bernhard Grzimek and Michael Grzimek, *Serengeti Shall Not Die* (New York: Dutton, 1961), and Bernhard Grzimek and Michael Grzimek, *Serengeti Shall Not Die*, Motion Picture, Directed by Bernhard Grzimek (1960; Frankfurt: Okapia KG Kulturfilmproduktion), Video. Similarly, Christopher Evans and Caroline Humphery examine the ways that Mongolian identity has been presented in Chinese Tourist Camps in Christopher Evans and Caroline Humphery, "After Lives of the Mongolian Yurt: The 'Archaeology' of a Chinese Tourist Camp," *Journal of Material Culture* 7, no. 2 (2002): 189-210.

them as cattle herders who were both not Kikuyu and not British.[13] While this definition was effective for early colonial policy, it failed to differentiate between the Maasai and other pastoral nomadic groups such as the Barabaig, and cannot account for Maasai who have lost their herds or married Kikuyus.[14] Additionally, while we know that the Maasai are not Kikuyu, the British definition does not include the symbols, customs, and traditions used as identity markers by the Maasai. With these texts as foundational touchstones, it is difficult to assess Maasai arguments made from identity, or made about identity loss. Because of the history and modern policies based on the term "pastoral nomad," I have chosen to utilize the term herder when discussing Maasai and Mongolian communities and identities.

1.3 DISAPPEARING HERDERS

Deliberations concerning herder communities often feature rhetoric characterizing members of these communities as being primitive, barbarian, savage, underdeveloped, uneducated, and impoverished.[15] Education scholars Rowena Fong and Paul Spickard's interviews with Han Chinese university students revealed that these terms, in English, are used to make specific classifications of ethnic minorities. This report indicates a statistically significant trend amongst Han Chinese students to use "primitive" to describe Mongolians and "barbarian" to describe

[13] The Kikuyu are the largest ethnic group in Kenya. John G. Galaty, "Being 'Maasai,' Being 'People-of-Cattle': Ethnic Shifters in East Africa," *American Ethnologist* 9, no. 1 (1982): 1-20.

[14] The intricacies of ethnic relationships in Northern Tanzania and Southern Kenya, with special attention to the Maasai are outlined in Kenneth King, "Development and Education in the Narok District of Kenya: The Pastoral Maasai and Their Neighbors," *African Affairs,* 71 (October 1972): 389-401.

[15] Thomas Hall, "Civilizational Change: The Role of Nomads," *Comparative Civilizations Review* 24 (Spring 1991): 34-57.

Tibetans.[16] These labels bolster claims that herders are less evolved, less sophisticated, or a completely different species than those that live in settled communities. Social Darwinists play a critical role in much of this literature by extending arguments based on the "survival of the fittest" to assert that herders have no place in the modern world. In *Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races,* Patrick Brantlinger, James Rudy Professor Emeritus at Indiana University, Bloomington argues, "whether seen as antiquated or infantile, all savages were lost, misplaced in time . . . in contrast to the ancestors of the progressive races, modern savages were like dead branches on the tree of life, born out of their due time."[17] In Brantlinger's view, "savages," including herding communities, are discursively held in a lose/lose situation; either they uphold traditions in a losing battle with modernity or they embrace modernity at the risk of debasing herder and modern identity. To explain the effect of this discursive space, he proposes scholars utilize the term *proleptic elegy*.

An elegy, which laments the dead, is typically presented after death. Proleptic elegies also express grief, but are presented in anticipation of death or extinction.[18] This rhetorical tool is commonly used by development planners, national governments, and social scientists who understand herders to be a dying race. These statements are presented in the future perfect,

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[16] This study conducted amongst Han Chinese university students is one of the few produced by Chinese scholars that points to disharmony and apparent racism by Han Chinese towards minority ethnicities in China. Rowena Fong and Paul R. Spickard, "Ethnic Relations in the People's Republic of China: Images and Social Distance between Han Chinese and Minority and Foreign Nationalities," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* no. 13, (Spring 1994): 26-94.

[17] Patrick Brantlinger, *Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races, 1800-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2003), 168.

[18] In addition to providing a comprehensive overview of the literature on proleptic elegy as a rhetorical genre, Robert Cox shows the importance of the genre as a rhetorical tool with potential to enrich understanding of environmental controversy. Robert Cox, "The Die Is Cast: Topical and Ontological Dimensions of the *Locus of the Irreparable*," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 68, no. 3 (1982): 227-39.

speaking about the future loss of identity.[19] Theoretically, herders can respond to these proleptic elegies by contradicting the expectation of future disappearance and demanding action from the state to secure their community's livelihood. Yet, governments, international aid organizations, and development officials often drown out or ignore herder arguments, opting instead to focus their attention on settlement and development as opposed to demands to maintain or return to traditions. Unable to find traditional forums for their arguments, Maasai communities in Tanzania have turned to YouTube to present their arguments on a global stage. Similarly, Mongolians in Inner Mongolia have turned to road blockades and protests, reported via social media, to combat state-sponsored proleptic elegies.

Brantlinger tracks the use of proleptic elegies from the 1800s to 1930s when literary theorists, anthropologists, and cultural historians developed and reflected upon sentimental and scientific justifications for eliminating "savage" people. This form of speech has been used by missionaries who needed to explain why they had failed to recruit communities into their fold and by governments when they encountered pressure from their constituents to stop battling with indigenous populations.

Proleptic elegies were most commonly used as preemptive arguments. Before settlers arrived they were educated by the state or church to accept and justify the removal of populations that had previously occupied the frontier. These proleptic elegies could be presented as sentimental truths that prepared missionaries to resist the humanizing effect of living with "savages." This rhetoric was seen as necessary because before encounters "savages" could be labeled as an unknowable, less than human, other and easily dismissed. However, once an

[19] Specific proleptic elegies for the Maasai of Tanzania and Kenya, and Mongolians of Mongolia and Inner Mongolia are addressed in each case study chapter. In this introduction I am concerned with establishing a historic lineage for this rhetorical tool and continuity between multiple proleptic elegies.

encounter occurred it was necessary to prove to missionaries and colonists that although "savages" appeared just as human as settled communities, they lacked specific, scientific traits. These colonizing and exterminating projects can appear disjointed, yet Jane Stafford, Professor of English at Victoria University of Wellington, has argued that continued use of proleptic elegy ties periods of history together, allowing researchers to understand how sentimental truths became scientific, and how they are produced by both the colonizer and the colonized.[20]

The theories of Social Darwinism and the rhetoric of savagery used in modern proleptic elegies emerged from older schools of cephalic indexing, a 19th century method of measuring skulls to differentiate between races and classify racial libido. In the 1930s these theories were used to argue for inherent racial differences in intelligence. John Jackson of the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of Pennsylvania writes that the development of these studies demonstrates an argumentative move from attributes that can be observed (skull shape) to those that are only understood via essence (mental and moral characteristics).[21] Modern Social Darwinists have further developed these arguments by highlighting the lack of knowledge, education, religion, or morals of nomadic and herding communities.

While scholarship examining proleptic elegies between 1800 and 1930 informs this study, my dissertation builds on extant literature by arguing that government and development organizations have continued to use this strategy to legitimate settlement projects with proleptic elegies. The implications of modern proleptic elegies are different from historic examples. Governments have come to expect that herders will settle and become farmers rather than expecting that they will vanish or die off. Yet, many similarities in framing and presentation of

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[20] Jane Stafford, "Terminal Creeds and Native Authors," *Journal of New Zealand Literature* 24, no. 2 (2007): 153-184.

[21] John Jackson, "Whatever Happened to the Cephalic Index? The Reality of Race and the Burden of Proof," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 40, no. 5 (2010): 438-458.

these arguments remain. Today, governments, non-governmental organizations, and development projects identify herder communities by primitive, barbarian, savage, underdeveloped, uneducated, and impoverished traits and then justify their disappearance as markers of national progress. For example, Mongolian Prime Minister Enkhbayer uses a proleptic elegy when he states, "to survive we [Mongolians] have to stop being nomads."[22] This proleptic elegy does not require Enkhbayer to celebrate the loss of nomadism, but does allow him to call for international aid, development projects, and government programming to facilitate the end of nomadism. Thomas Hall, a world systems analyst, argues that these labels are used in complex arguments prefaced by the superior qualities of modern life.[23]

Calling for the end of nomadism, herding, or traditional lifestyles is a dangerous rhetorical maneuver that has real world implications for marginalized communities. Drawing from Social Darwinist classification of nomads and herders as lower humans, proleptic elegies have been coupled with metaphors of illness to support claims that nomads and herders are either terminally ill or not at all human. The experiences of Eastern European Roma demonstrate the stakes for herding communities such as Maasai and Mongolians that confront this form of discourse. For example, Dez Csete, mayor of Csur, Hungary, stated in 2000, "I believe that the Roma of Zmoly have no place among human beings. Just as in the animal world, parasites must be expelled."[24] Han Chinese residents of Inner Mongolia have used similar language to describe herders. For example, the Han Chinese truck driver who ran over and killed a protesting Inner

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[22] Andrei Marin, "Between Cash Cows and Golden Calves: Adaptations of Mongolian Pastoralism in the 'Age of the Market'" *Nomadic Peoples* 12, no. 2 (2008): 75-101.

[23] Hall, "Civilizational Change: The Role of Nomads."

[24] For a detailed analysis of sub-human classification and metaphors of illness regarding Roma communities, see Nazli Baykal, "The Discursive Construction of Ethnic Identity: Sulukule Case, Turkey," *The Linguistics Journal*, (September 2009): 120-154; and Valeriu Nicolae, "Words That Kill," *Index on Censorship,* no. 1 (2006): 138.

Mongolian herder told reporters, "my truck is fully insured, and the life of a smelly Mongolian herder costs me no more than 40,000 Yuan (approx. 8,000 USD)."[25] Similarly, at independence, Maasai in Tanzania were told by President Nyerere and government officials that they must discard their traditional clothing and "dress in something better than a dirty sheet" before participating in local and national deliberations.[26]

Communication scholars have addressed the effects of dehumanizing rhetoric, but these analyses often examine harm to mainstream communities that were recently scapegoated and/or dehumanized (such as Jewish communities in Nazi Germany) or long-term dehumanization of local ostracized communities (such as studies of slavery and lynching). Rarely has attention turned to how academics, policy makers, and activists dehumanize human herder communities as remote and often unknowable others. Throughout this dissertation, I will trace the way that proleptic elegies have been used to construct a frame of disappearance, arguing that Maasai and Mongolian herding communities will soon settle and disappear from their pasturelands. I will pay particular attention to moments when a proleptic elegy is linked to rhetoric of conservation, which claims herding lifestyles are unsustainable and must end.

1.4 LAND LOSS AND RECLAMATION OF PASTURELANDS

Herders have frequently been expelled from traditional pasturelands in an attempt to prevent or repair environmental degradation. Arguments supporting these evictions are sometimes based on

[25] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Mongolian Herder Brutally Killed by Chinese Coal Truck Driver," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website*, May 19, 2011, http://www.smhric.org/news_376.htm.

[26] "Tanzania: Dressing up the Masai," *Time*, November 24, 1967, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844158,00.html.

the logic of ecologist Garret Hardin's tragedy of the commons thesis, which holds that environmental degradation occurs when too many people share occupancy in a location and eventually overtax the land.[27] Another angle of argument advanced to justify herder expulsion is supported by a focus on the emptiness of lands on which the herding community lives.[28] This argument allows scholars, governments, and development agencies to assert that herders are not only destroying land but also destroying the purest land left on earth. These evictions are often linked to the Latin term *terra nullius* meaning "land belonging to no one," defined either as land that was never claimed by a state, or land which has been relinquished by sovereignty. While Maasai and Mongolian communities contend that their land is not empty or unclaimed, they generally lack access to the traditional evidence such as permanent structures or titles needed to substantiate land claims in modern courts.

The tragedy of the commons, juxtaposed with colonial expansion, resulted in eviction of the Maasai from their lands in 1890, 1904, 1906, and 1916. During the twenty-six years between 1890 and 1916, the Maasai were evicted from sixty percent of their land to make way for European ranches. The establishment of the Serengeti (Tanzania 1951) and Maasai Mara (Kenya 1961) created the next wave of evictions. Then at independence in 1961, Tanzania embraced President Julius Nyerere's movement of African Socialism under the philosophy of *ujamaa,* or unity, and villigization, including "livestock villages" for Maasai communities. Kenya gained independence in 1963 and followed Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta's philosophy of *harambee,* or coming together, to create self-reliance. When land redistribution occurred in Kenya, it favored

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[27] Hardin's theory was first published in 1968, but his research indicates that the basic theory was in practice long before he coined the term "tragedy of the commons." Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162, no. 3859 (1968): 1243-1248.

[28] Lioba Lenhart and Michael J. Casimir, "Environment, Property, Resources and the State: An Introduction," *Nomadic Peoples* 2, no.5 (2001): 6-20.

those who shared the prime minister's ethnic affiliation, and eventually led to privatized sub-division of grazing and farming lands.[29] Despite these policies, land disputes have continued. For example, in 2009 in the Kilosa District of Tanzania, conflict between agriculturalists and herders resulted in government seizure of all cattle and eviction of the Maasai. While international pressure eventually allowed the Maasai to return to their lands, the laws and conflicts prompting these evictions have not changed.[30] No communication-based analysis of these conflicts has yet been undertaken, perhaps because claims by ethnic groups in Kenya and Tanzania are often seen as a risk to national unity and suppressed by the government.[31]

In Mongolia, herders were first moved in 1976 to make way for the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area, a 5,311-hectare conservation area designed to stop desertification. This was and still remains the largest protected area in Mongolia, covering twenty-seven percent of the Gobi-Alti providence. Despite this and similar evictions, desertification has continued. According to Mongolia's Fourth National Report on the Implementation of [the] Convention of Biological Diversity, by 2009 seventy-one percent of Mongolia was threatened by desertification.[32] Mongolian reports differ from those in East Africa because they identify both herding practices and mining industry as causes of the threats to the environment. Since Mongolia's 1991 democratic revolution, conflicts have occurred between herders, urban communities, and international mining firms, each seeking access to shrinking pasturelands. While many of these

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[29] For a discussion of land distribution along ethnic lines, see Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo, *Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2005).

[30] Dorothy Louise Hodgson, *Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous: Postcolonial Politics in a Neoliberal World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).

[31] For a discussion of minority rights and activism in Kenya, see Makoloo, *Kenya: Minorities,* 2.

[32] Ministry of Nature, Environment and Tourism of Mongolia, *Mongolia's Fourth National Report on Implementation of Convention of Biological Diversity* (Ulaanbaatar: Government of Mongolia, 2009), 9.

clashes coalesce around the Oynun Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi mines, in 2011 herders from 18 providences protested in Ulaanbaatar against large and small mining projects.[33]

In China, the Cultural Revolution resulted in the arrest and persecution of at least 100,000 Mongolians who resisted collectivization and the cultural politics of the Chinese Communist Party. This history has been used as a reference point for divisions between Mongolian herders, farmers, and urbanites, and between Han and Mongolian citizens of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese government has attempted to smooth over these poor relations by establishing university and government position quotas for Mongolians, allowing exemption from the national birth control policies, and sponsoring specific ethnic events. Yet, these policies were not able to prevent the 1981-1982 protests by Mongolian students over "filling up Inner Mongolia" with Han Chinese.[34] More recently, conflict erupted as 650,000 herders were evicted from traditional pasturelands.[35] These evictions, which the government calls "environmentally-driven resettlement," are paid off with education, public health, and housing services. However, such policies still restrict movement of herding communities under the auspices of saving land and limiting the effects of climate change.[36]

For Maasai and Mongolian communities, pasturelands need not be demarcated by maps, and the use of fences or boundaries only serve to obstruct traditional grazing patterns. Today, herders commonly know where parkland borders begin, however the surrounding areas known as

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[33] "Protesting Herders on Horseback Replaced by People's Assembly, But They Will Return," *U.B. Post* (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia), April 26, 2011.

[34] William Jankowiak, "The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* no. 19/20 (January – July 1988): 269-288.

[35] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Complaint Against the Chinese Government's Forced Eviction of Ethnic Mongolian Herders," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website*, accessed June 20, 2013, http://www.smhric.org/Hada/Evict_1.htm.

[36] Yan Tan, "Chinese Perspectives on Climate Change and Resettlement: Background Paper to the Population-Environment Research Network (Pern) Cyberseminar" (working paper, University of Adelaide, 2011). http://www.populationenvironmentresearch.org/papers/Tan_PERNcyberseminar_2011.pdf.

"buffer zones" that are only loosely defined. Buffer zones inhabit a murky legal ground, sometimes legislated, sometimes drawn on maps by conservation organizations, and sometimes enforced by rangers who have seen neither legislation nor maps. These zones are favored by conservationists as additions to "fortress conservation" used in the Serengeti, Maasai Mara, Great Gobi, and Xilingol Grasslands. Fortress conservation prohibits all herd and herder movements within the conservation area. Rather than continually patrolling the conservation land borders, conservation organizations and rangers patrol and regulate the buffer zone. They argue that if buffer zones are properly regulated, then the designated conservation land is secure. Herders, however, argue that buffer zones are illegally and erratically enforced. As a result of these conflicts, wide divisions have emerged between herders and conservationists.

1.5 WESTERN SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The theoretical rationale for both conservation lands and buffer zones clashes with herding community approaches to conservation. For example, the Wildlife Conservation Society's president Steven Sanderson stated, "[I have] believed for some time that the entire global conservation agenda has been 'hijacked' by advocates for indigenous peoples, placing wildlife and biodiversity at peril."[37] As journalist Mark Dowie notes, these conflicts affect many more communities than Maasai and Mongolians. Since the beginning of colonialism in Africa, approximately 14 million indigenous people have been evicted from land in the name of conservation. Dowie argues that conservation refugees live unnecessarily difficult lives due to

[37] Mark Dowie, *Conservation Refugees: The Hundred-Year Conflict Between Global Conservation and Native Peoples* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), xxv.

evictions that conservationists have since admitted were unnecessary. These evicted people are not suffering from environmental challenges such as heat, drought, flood or disease. Instead, they are specifically moved from their homelands to establish conservation reserves. Dowie argues that conservation reserves have directly affected the Maasai in Kenya who are moved from independent self-sustaining communities to radically poor and needy communities, and as a result they have come to distrust conservationists: "It should be no surprise, then, that tribal peoples like the Maasai, who have seen their lands plundered for two hundred years by foreign colonizers do regard conservationists as just another colonizer, an extension of the deadening forces of economic and cultural hegemony."[38]

Similar evictions are occurring in Inner Mongolia where the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center reports that at least 168,431 herders have been evicted from their pasturelands.[39] Cambridge anthropologists Christopher Evans and Caroline Humphrey report that the Chinese government prefaced these evictions with descriptions of herders as "backward" and "unhealthy" while simultaneously arguing that herder lands could be better used for state agricultural projects.[40] The only reminder of herder communities in Inner Mongolia, as found by Evans and Humphery, is tourist camps and ethnographic parks where "Mongolian culture" is presented for international visitors (see Figure 1).

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[38] Dowie, *Conservation Refugees*, xxvi.

[39] "Complaint Against," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website.*

[40] Evans and Humphery, "After-Lives of the Mongolian Yurt," 189.

Figure 1: Beijing Chinese Ethnic Culture Park.[41]

Both Maasai and Mongolian herding communities have argued that local traditional relationships between herds, herders, and pasturelands have resulted in the world's best-preserved landscapes. However, development organizations seldom consult with herder communities, and when they do, a high threshold is set for herders to prove that their curative relationship with nature does not threaten the environment.[42] While herder communities could implement their own conservation programs that do not depend on fortress conservation or

[41] The Beijing Chinese Ethnic Culture Park displays the traditional homes, dances, and costumes of minority communities in China. The Mongolian exhibit is in a grassy field that also houses the Kazakh, Ewenki, Kirgiz, and Yugur exhibits. Primary events occur in the blue and white cement *ger* and under the banner of prayer flags. Allison Hahn, August 2013.

[42] Neumann, "Primitive Ideas," 564.

buffer zones, these international development organizations often assume that herders lack both the education and technology to understand conservation.[43] The resulting conflicts are typical of controversies in which scientists are unwilling or incapable of using local knowledge.[44] Even when herders are incorporated into conservation programs, their role is often dictated by the development organization. For example, human geographer Mara Goldman demonstrates that Maasai knowledge is included in some conservation programs by western scientists who conduct interviews with Maasai elders. However, beyond those interviews, the Maasai do not have any decision-making rights or participation roles in actual conservation projects. Further, only Maasai knowledge that can be explained in western scientific terms is included in the final reports. Often this information is filtered through conceptual metaphors in which the concrete experiences of herders, such as detailed history of grazing in a specific pasture, are indexed by abstract and simple terms such as "good." These recordings then further limit Maasai participation in future projects because the conceptual metaphors make it seem that the Maasai

[43] For a discussion of these limitations, see Andrew Warren, "Changing Understandings of African Pastoralism and the Nature of Environmental Paradigms." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 20, no. 2 (1995): 193-203. Also see Hijaba Ykhanbai, Enkhbat Bulgan, Ulipkan Beket, Ronnie Vernooy, John Graham, "Reversing Grassland Degradation and Improving Herders' Livelihoods in the Altai Mountains of Mongolia," *Mountain Research and Development* 24, no. 2 (2004): 96-100.

[44] Bryan Wynne examines division between local communities and scientists in Chernobyl by describing the ways that sheepherders and farmers were "black-boxed" in ways that were consistent with cultural idioms and how knowledge beyond which the cultural limits of science were suppressed. Communication scholars have argued that "unblack-boxing" – when community members realize that scientists misunderstood or analyzed risks and reform their relationships – can occur through public debate and intercultural communication. For example, LaFever's study of treaty negotiation between First Nations and the Canadian government articulates the success of un-black boxing to restore both ecological and community relationships. Building intercultural movements and networks of contingent relationships between stakeholders such as conservationists and herders is critical to creating successful environmental programs. Unfortunately, these relationships have not yet emerged between herders such as the Maasai and Mongolians and conservation programs. For a detailed discussion, see J. Robert Cox, "Beyond Frames: Recovering the Strategic in Climate Communication," *Environmental Communication* 4, no. 1 (March 2010): 122-133; Al Gedicks, "War on Subsistence: Mining Rights at Crandon/Mole Lake, Wisconsin," in *Life and Death Matters*, ed. Barbara Rose Johnston (Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2011), 151-180; Olga Kuchinskaya, "Twice Invisible: Formal Representations of Radiation Danger," *Social Studies of Science* 43 (2103): 78-96; Marcella LaFever, "Communication for Public Decision-Making in a Negative Historical Context: Building Intercultural Relationships in the British Columbia Treaty Process," *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication* 1, no. 2 (2008): 158-180; and Brian Wynne, "Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science," *Public Understanding of Science* 1, no. 3 (1992): 281-304.

have little to say, or have not conducted their own analysis, of conservation science.[45] Despite this power differential, studies such as Hassan Roba's dissertation from the Norwegian University of Life Sciences explicitly encourage use of conceptual metaphors by western ecologists in data collection when working with herders. In Roba's study, Ariaal and Rendille herders walk around their pastures with western ecologists. During these walks, the herder's ecological knowledge is recorded and mapped not through traditional methods or language, but through prescribed, single English language terms such as "good," "cold," and "degraded."[46] Problematically, the context, differentiation, and cultural entailments of these terms are absent from the recorded, one word descriptions.

Even when western scientists and herding communities are able to communicate without conceptual metaphors, their discussions are still bounded by culturally situated understandings of risk and value. As anthropologist Susan Crate illustrates, Northern Siberians explain climate change as a "softening" of the land. To western scientists, a softening of the climate will improve life in Northern Siberia by raising temperature and extending growing seasons for cash crops. Yet, Crate's informants see risks in flooded fields, winter ice, and shortened growing seasons for subsistence crops.[47]

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[45] Mara Goldman, "Tracking Wildebeest, Locating Knowledge: Maasai and Conservation Biology Understandings of Wildebeest Behavior in Northern Tanzania," *Environmental and Planning D: Society and Space* 25, no.2 (2007): 307-331.

[46] The Ariall and Rendille are herding communities in Eastern and Northern Kenya. Hassan G. Roba, "Global Goals, Local Actions: A Framework for Integrating Indigenous Knowledge and Ecological Methods for Rangeland Assessment and Monitoring in Northern Kenya" (doctoral thesis, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2008), 36, http://www.umb.no/statisk/noragric/publications/phdtheses/hassan_fulltext_thesis.pdf.

[47] Crate's study focuses on reindeer herders in Northeastern Siberia (Russia). These communities are frequently compared to the Tsatan reindeer herders who live in northern Mongolia. Susan Crate, "Climate Change, Culture Change, and Human Rights in Northeastern Siberia," in *Life and Death Matters*, ed. Barbara Rose Johnston (Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2011), 412-426.

1.6 MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT

Many governments and development organizations have failed to engage in equal status intercultural relationships with herding communities. Instead, herders have been encouraged by conservationists and western scientists to settle and plant crops, become democratic and non-nomadic, and utilize western health facilities.[48] Many of these programs are couched in the policy register of poverty reduction, with herders labeled as "subsistence agriculturalists" who are in need of daily income and expenditure maximization. These calculations debase community definitions of poverty and ignore the economic foundations of (partially) self-sustaining communities who do not need to buy goods from markets.[49] Despite these discrepancies, herder communities are often listed as the poorest of the poor and targeted for aggressive development campaigns.

Poverty is the metric that justifies these programs, yet education is the metric that determines when herders have learned enough to make choices for themselves. Unfortunately, this same education often destroys the community cohesion necessary to produce effective resistance.[50] Human rights education and campaigns frequently accompany these development projects. However, these programs seldom encourage compliance with a particular human right

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[48] For a detailed explanation of these projects, see Elliot Fratkin, "Pastoralism: Governance and Development Issues," *Annual Review of Anthropology,* no. 26 (1997): 235-261; Joy K. Asiema and Francis D. P. Situma, "Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: The Case of the Pastoral Maasai of Kenya," *Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy,* no. 5 (1994): 149-171; Benson P. Fraser, William J. Brown, Corey Wright, and Steven L. Kiruswa, "Facilitating Dialog About Development through Digital Photograph: Seeing through the Eyes of Maasai Women," *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication* 5, no. 1 (2012): 20-42.

[49] For a detailed analysis of the herder's rejection of rhetorics of poverty, see David M. Anderson, *Poor Are Not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism in Eastern Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).

[50] For a detailed discussion of the effect of development programs on herding communities, see Galaty, "Being "Maasai." Also see Elliott Fratkin and Robin Mearns, "Sustainability and Pastoral Livelihoods: Lessons from East African Maasai and Mongolians," *Human Organization* 62, no. 2 (2003): 112-122.

defined by documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Instead they reinforce a stereotype that creates or reifies inequalities among the members of a community.[51] For example, Human Rights development programs often emphasize the way that women are silenced by oppressive community norms but do not address the silencing of herder communities by national or international norms.[52] Finally, public health projects that target practices such as female genital mutilation/circumcision amongst Maasai communities commonly use a rhetoric of the "dark continent" and "new barbarianism" to justify new and more invasive development projects.[53] Medical and gender development discourse is less common among Mongolian communities (which do not practice female genital mutilation/circumcision) and have a "reverse gender gap" or a greater proportion of women completing university degrees then men. Yet, we can see the same effects of hegemonic assumptions regarding Human Rights and herders as organizations such as World Vision and the World Bank develop programs in response to the perceived poverty of Mongolian herders.

Development policies are often coupled with fortress conservation programs, resulting in a double pressure to evict and settle herders. Anthropologist Arturo Escobar writes that the development discourse of these agencies, "leaves behind the imagination of development."[54] As he explains further, "The emergence of powerful social movement discourse, which although still unclear about its possible directions, has quickly become a privileged arena of intellectual

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[51] Lisa Brooten, "Human Rights Discourse and Development of Democracy in a Multi-Ethnic State," *Asian Journal of Communication* 14, no. 2 (2004): 174-191.

[52] For an example of how this results in informative yet constricted scholarship, see Fraser, et al., "Facilitating Dialog."

[53] Neumann, "Primitive Ideas," 567.

[54] Arturo Escobar, "Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social Movements," *Social Text* 31/32, no. 21 (1992): 21.

inquiry and political action."[55] Privilege becomes apparent as these development organizations make decisions for herders, but herders are excluded from decision making until they have been sufficiently educated, liberated, or empowered.[56]

Communication scholars have criticized the loss of tradition that accompanies these development agencies, their agendas, and the complications of using traditional arguments in western settings.[57] Many of these studies address the loss of tradition by those who resist and are forced to the margins of society as well as by those that attempt to make changes from within development organizations. In one such study, communication scholar Richard Morris indicates that for many indigenous communities, anyone who participates in the dominant society, even when working to change that society, has "mark[ed] themselves as counterfeit in the eyes of [both] their people and members of the dominant society."[58] Maasai leaders, such as Member of Parliament Moringe ole Parkipuny, whom I interviewed in 2012, echo this concern, noting the difficult space occupied by well-educated Maasai who have the tools to assist their community but no longer hold the *ethos* necessary to rally community attention or commitments.[59]

Programs that force modernization and social development on herding communities, such as the boarding schools which almost all Maasai and Mongolian herding activists are required to attend, have had broad ranging and long term effects on community deliberation, cohesion, and stability. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argues that these programs are evidence of genocide

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[55] Escobar, "Imagining a Post-Development," 21.

[56] Lenhart and Casimir, "Environment, Property, Resources."

[57] An example of these criticisms is found Robert S. Littlefield and Jane Ball, "Factionalism as Argumentation: A Case Study of the Indigenous Communication Practices of Jemez Pueblo," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 41 (Fall (2004): 87-101.

[58] Richard Morris, "Educating Savages," *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* no. 83 (1997): 166.

[59] Moringe ole Parkipuny (First Maasai Member of Parliament), in discussion with the author, July 17, 2012.

because they deconstruct the social fiber and traditions of herding communities.[60] Similarly, Maasai and Mongolian advocates, as well as many other herding communities not analyzed in this dissertation, have spoken out against modernization and settlement programs as targeted to end their ways of life. Yet, despite these studies and arguments, I have not found any academic texts that call for reinvigorating, or even simply leaving alone, Maasai or Mongolian herder communities.

The extant analysis that comes closest to addressing these issues concerns connections between forced modernization and mobile communities by examining the fate of Roma communities in Eastern Europe. Earlier in this chapter I referenced the use of illness metaphors in anti-Roma discourse. Yet, there are many texts regarding nomads, herders, and Roma and it can be difficult to differentiate and determine which are offensive or problematic. Scholars writing about Roma communities ask their western readers to consider their texts and programs about "gypsies" by replacing gypsy with Jew and judging the acceptability of the program. A similar corrective could be used to test statements regarding the expulsion of herder communities and may garner more deliberation by calling attention to the loss of culture coupled with proleptic elegies that foreclose space for community rebuttal, to assist governments and NGOs that wish to change their arguments and rhetoric but lack clear models and guidelines. This methodology is particularly helpful when examining modern conflicts, petitions, and protests by herding communities.

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[60] Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

1.7 PETITION AND PROTEST

By describing herders as primitive nomads who need to enter "the modern technological world," reporters and policy analysts both legitimate settlement and discourage the reader from searching for evidence of herder participation in deliberations about or resistances to modernization. Yet, responses by Maasai and Mongolian communities to both proleptic elegies and evictions do exist and can be found in social media. While some communication scholars have reported on the availability of these tools and their role in altering geographical isolation and social structures of the Gobi by allowing people to move through social space, connections have not yet been drawn between those tools and herders' protest rhetoric.[61]

Communication scholars have, however, begun to investigate the context of globalization and the possibilities of unsettling or re/staging identity via social media. These scholars ask if we have entered a period of time when articulations and disarticulations (and the power inherent in these representations) can be upset by the possibility of multiple modernities.[62] Herders in the Mongolian Gobi who use the Internet to discuss protest methodology with a human rights organization in Washington D.C. present an excellent illustration of the challenges encountered in modernity. These communities are creating and discovering radically new ways to articulate their identity and engage with local, national, and international governments. While traditional studies of herding communities have been concerned with boundaries and borders, this recent turn opens space for a discussion of globalization, industrialization and land privatization

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[61] Undrahbuyan Baasanjav, "The Digital Divide in the Gobi Desert: Spatiality, the National Identity Collapse and a Language Gap," *Online Journal of Space Communication,* no. 5 (Fall 2003), http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue5/pdf/undrahbuyan.pdf.

[62] Raka Shome and Radha S. Hegde, "Culture, Communication, and the Challenge of Globalization," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 19, no. 2 (2002): 172-189.

alongside environmental risks.[63] By examining case studies in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia, this dissertation works to contribute to the study of the use of social media by herding communities to engage in local and international deliberation.

1.8 FRAME ANALYSIS

This dissertation employs frame analysis to support investigation of the controversies associated with modern herder community land disputes. Each case study features analysis of four argument frames that structure the selected controversies – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-*otor*, and disappearance. When assessing case studies in Tanzania and Kenya, I focus particularly on the frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering and disappearance, each used by the government in an attempt to compartmentalize Maasai identity and control deliberations about the Maasai community's future. Case studies from Mongolia and Inner Mongolia use the same frames, but emphasize clashes between governmental arguments made using frames of bounded land and disappearance, and herders' claims that enact an argument frame that I call movement-as-*otor*. Throughout all four case studies, similarities are drawn in the ways that governments have used frames of bounded land, which emphasize western cartography, division and sale of land parcels, and concepts of trespass to regulate and control both human and wildlife populations. I find additional similarities in the way that frames of disappearance, which employ proleptic elegies to anticipate the disappearance of herding communities, have been used to justify, promote, and expand settlement and educational

[63] Lenhart and Casimir, "Environment, Property, Resources," 15-16.

programs for herders. However, throughout this dissertation I also mark points of divergence in the way that frames of movement differ between the Maasai and Mongolian case studies. When analyzing Maasai communities I find historic entailments of the colonial frame of movement-as-wandering, which was, and still is, used to justify the need to constrain the Maasai and use their land in "more productive" ways. Regarding Mongolian herders in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, I find that the government says little about herder's migrations. Instead, herders frequently attempt to frame the argument by invoking movement-as-*otor,* the name of a traditional practice of moving herds to find the best grazing lands and avoid environmental risks, which is now used to confront governmental expectations of settlement and appropriation of herding lands for national parks and mining projects.

My analysis of these four frames is grounded in the rich body of literature addressing rhetorical frames and their use in the study of argumentation. Rhetorical frames are useful in enabling arguers to license normative leaps from "is" to "ought" in policy making. This move from "is" to "ought" commonly occurs as implicit assumptions and structures are extracted from generative metaphors or value terms that can be used to link particular positions to issues.[64] These values are then used in the production of "boundary framing" and "adversarial framing" which delineate the boundary between good and evil, and construct protagonists and antagonists for particular deliberations.[65]

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[64] A detailed analysis of linking value to issues through frames can be found in Brewer's discussion of how pro-life movements linked abstract values such as equality or traditional morality to specific policy-making deliberations. Paul R. Brewer, "Framing, Value Words, and Citizens' Explanations of Their Issue Opinions," *Political Communication,* no. 19 (2002): 303-316.

[65] For a discussion of how boundary frames have been used in Dutch and European Union deliberations, see Robert Benford and David Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology,* 26 (2000): 611-639.

Frames are found in persuasive stories, discourse regarding environmental change, and can be used to gain or change allegiances of advocacy and development groups. For example, social ecologist Oladele Ogunseitan argues that rhetorical frames act as "persuasive stories" that have been particularly useful in deliberations about climate change and vulnerability in Africa.[66] In my study, I am interested in the persuasive stories told by, for, and about herding communities, and the ways that these stories interact in argumentative contexts to imagine and mobilize new possibilities.

Sociologists Robert Benford and David Snow would label these types of narratives as "collective action frames," generated through two types of discursive processes: frame articulation and frame amplification. Frame articulation occurs when events and experiences of the stakeholder group are aligned in a unified and compelling fashion. This alignment highlights specific portions of an experience while allowing other aspects to recede to the distance. In this way, frames need not be new, but instead shed a new angle, vantage point, or interpretation on specific deliberations. Frame amplification is then used to bring a sharp focus on to a punctuated issue, belief, or event that symbolizes the larger frame. The collective action frame is used to affect not only individual attitudes and perceptions, but also assist in the negotiation of shared meanings.[67]

My study focuses on the ways collective action frames of Maasai and Mongolian communities are negotiated and the moments when revisions become possible. As Benford and Snow posit, frames can proffer, buttress, and embellish new identities by suggesting new relationships and lines of action. Articulated and amplified frames affect the construction of

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[66] Oladele Ogunseitan, "Framing Environmental Change in Africa: Cross-Scale Institutional Constraints on Progressing from Rhetoric to Action against Vulnerability," *Global Environmental Change,* no. 13, (2003): 105.

[67] Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes," 614.

message meaning, and perceptions by organizing information and constructing worldviews through reciprocal interactions among individuals, social groups, and cultural products such as new and social media.[68] Rhetorical frames become relevant to policy-making decisions and physical conflicts as they transcend individual perceptions and influence community reactions. Urban studies scholars such as Sandra Kaufman and Janet Smith have analyzed the success and failure of collective action frames in brownfield deliberations, highlighting the times when discrepancies between frame and reality result in intra and extra-group conflict.[69] Their western focus is typical in the field of communication, which has largely failed to explore ways that frame analysis can productively inform study of international and intercultural deliberations.

The following chapters assess the ways herders, conservationists, and government officials construct and use frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-*otor*, and disappearance in conflicts and deliberations. Additionally, I pay particular attention to frame alignment – when stakeholders bridge, amplify, extend, or transform a frame to bring members into a collective, and reframing in response to lost opportunities or the fostering of new agreements. Reframing is not an easy process, often requiring that adversarial stakeholders enlarge their own worldviews while considering and reevaluating arguments from their adversaries.[70]

I am intrigued by the use of frames to initiate or incite conflicts between stakeholder groups, as well as the potential for frames to be used for the management and resolution of potential conflicts. A deep body of literature has examined the ways that framing patterns have

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[68] For a detailed discussion of the way that these interactions have affected both public opinion and policy, see Robert M. Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

[69] Sanda Kaufman and Janet Smith, "Framing and Reframing in Land Use Change Conflicts," *Journal of Architectural and Planning Research* 16, no. 2 (1999): 168.

[70] Entman, *Projections of Power*, 69.

contributed to intractable conflicts. For example, communication scholar Barbara Gray argues that local communities and environmentalists often come into conflict when they construct place-based identities linked to specific lands. These local communities frame their core identities through land use and community orientation to specific locations. For example, members of the World Wildlife Foundation may construct their own identities as servants and guardians of wild lands in the Serengeti. Conflicts then occur over who can and should direct policy—the Maasai who live in and around the Serengeti, or World Wildlife members who dedicate their time and money to protecting the Serengeti? In Gray's assessment of conflicts in Northern Minnesota, local communities use frames to promote their "localness" while activists attempt to grapple with changing identities through frame negotiation.[71] Similarly, in my analysis of the Serengeti, Maasai community members clash with conservation organizations – both advocating for environmental sustainability through mutually exclusive methodologies. By assessing the construction and negotiation of arguments by multiple stakeholder groups, this dissertation asks how herding communities, such as the Maasai and Mongolians produce and use arguments in the complex milieu of environmental deliberation.

1.9 CRITICAL APPROACH AND CASE STUDY SELECTION

The Maasai and Mongolian communities, two of the largest herding populations in the world, share many characteristics. For example, both are split communities with widely different economic, political, land, agriculture, and cultural traditions. The Mongolian population is

[71] Barbara Gray, "Strong Opposition: Frame-Based Resistance to Collaboration," *Journal of Community & Applied Psychology,* no. 14 (2004):166-176.

currently split between Mongolia and China, while the Maasai population is split between Kenya and Tanzania. Beyond being split herder communities, Maasai and Mongolian herders have been selected for this study because of their burgeoning legacy of protest activity.

My research asks how competing visions of herder identity underwrite argumentation and protests in Maasai and Mongolian land disputes. Through this research, I hope to call academic attention to critical herder issues and analyze the multiple competing claims made for, by, and about herder communities. Such lines of inquiry are especially ripe for communication-based analysis for several reasons. First, herders engage in a wide array of fascinating communication practices, including the use of mass media, social media, and oral traditions as a means of formulating and communicating the interests of small communities in an effort to protest against international agents. Second, a communicative perspective positions the study to shed unique light on how the figure of the "nomad" is being mobilized metaphorically in lively academic discussions regarding the evolving nature of political agency and state power in a rapidly globalizing world.

The relationship of the Maasai and Mongolians to their respective states is complicated and varies between community, state, and nation. My dissertation's tandem analysis design is especially appropriate given the two population's similar economic structure (socialist in China and Tanzania, capitalist in Kenya and Mongolia), economic sectors (agriculture, minerals, and tourism), mining politics, political structure, cultural policies, and Maa or Mongolian linguistic resistance to government definitions of nomad, herd, state, and sovereignty. Further, the same Multinational Corporation (Monsanto), International Aid Organizations (USAID, GTZ, Qatar Foundation, and Chinese Development assistance), Multi-National Organizations (UN, UNESCO, OECD) and International NGO's (Conservation International, Mercy Corps, and

World Wildlife Foundation), are present in these nations and exert significant effects on Maasai and Mongolian communities. Throughout my analysis I ask if these similarities have created quilting points, moments when multiple identities can be connected to leverage emancipatory identity. While engaging in multiple, geographically diverse communities has required much fieldwork and travel, the resulting study avoids the risk of presenting the problems facing herder communities are isolated events. My study of the Maasai and Mongolian communities – two of the world's largest and most vocal herder communities – strives to show how we can understand herders in ways that remain meticulously aware of localities and differences while faithfully analyzing the diversity of arguments presented by herder communities.

Evidence for this analysis is drawn from oral history interviews and archival documents. Between 2010 and 2013, I conducted sixty-three interviews in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia and China.[72] Oral history interviews encourage interview participants to articulate their personal narratives in ways that accent elements most important to them. Through open-ended interview questions, I worked to establish continuity, conversion, and clash between individual interviews with herders, NGO workers, rural educators, and government officials. Further, interview questions were designed to prompt dialogue regarding participants' sense of relationship between land and herder communities before and after a land dispute.

Interviewees were identified using a snowball method, beginning with local acquaintances from my prior experiences in each country.[73] Interviews with NGOs and

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[72] Preliminary interviews, which are not included in this count, were conducted when I was a Fulbright Fellow at the National University of Mongolia (2006-2007), when I was Director of the University of Pittsburgh Mongolian Field Studies Program (2005-2010), and when I was employed as an ethnographer with the Project on Early Nomadic Pastoralism, a joint project between Indiana University of Pennsylvania and the Mongolian University of the Humanities (2004-2005).

[73] Support for these interviews was provided by the American Center for Mongolian Studies, the University of Pittsburgh Graduate Student Organization, the University of Pittsburgh International Studies Travel Fund, the African Heritage Nationality Room Summer Fellowship, and the University of Pittsburgh Arts and Sciences

government officials were conducted in both national capitals and local towns. Interviewing herders required more travel, frequently to camps inaccessible by paved roads or public transportation. To reach and interview these herders, I hired local drivers and teachers as traveling companions. These hires were critical as a single American woman appearing by herself to ask for interviews is unheard of amongst many of these communities. By working with drivers and teachers, with whom I had developed decade-long friendships, I was able to meet with herding communities on familiar terms, better understand the relationships that span the East African and Eurasian steppe, and not get lost in the process. Traveling with these companions also enabled herding communities to feel more at ease during my visit. For example, my drivers were almost always male and the teachers were almost always female, enabling me to speak with both male and female herders in a way that might not be possible if I traveled only with a female companion (and would therefore be un-chaperoned when speaking to male community members) or a male companion (a situation that would have placed herders in an uncomfortable position as they tried to determine the *exact* nature of my relationship with the driver — a determination which would implicate everything from the types of food served to sleeping arrangements). Following each interview I asked interviewees to suggest other community members I might approach to arrange an interview. I recorded each interview using a hand-held audio recorder, transcribed the interview, and when necessary, translated the interview from Mongolian or Swahili to English.

Interviewing herding communities for this dissertation presented some unique challenges. While oral historians recommend conducting private, or small group interviews in a quiet setting, I was working with herding communities who often live in one-room tents or cobb houses.

Summer Research Fellowship. Preliminary interviews were funded by a Fulbright Fellowship and a Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) grant.

During each interview, relatives, neighbors, and children wandered in and out of the family's dwelling. Sometimes those entering the home would sit down and join the conversation, recounting how their families had experienced similar or different conflicts.[74] This resulted in more nuanced and textured conversations, in which interviewees would clarify and explain their positions, with contextual information from multiple community members included as contributions. Additionally, I gained an intergenerational perspective into how land conflicts had changed as herding communities experienced a transition from colonial, socialist, and democratic governments. However, these many entries and exits from the interview also caused complications in teasing out individual voices in the audio recording and encouraging younger herders to participate in the interview rather than defer to their elders, as is expected in their communities.

In Mongolia, these interviews were very long – sometimes spanning one or two days. This length occurred because I was traveling long distances to meet with families in rural areas without any outside accommodations. Frequently I arrived at a family's camp without prior notice, was invited for tea and sharing of national and community news that my companions and I had gathered en-route. The proposed interview format was then explained and approved prior to commencement of conversation. At some point during the interview, preparations would begin for a meal and we would be invited to camp with the family for the evening. As a result of my extended visit with families, interviews would frequently conclude, only to restart a few hours later as an interviewee remembered a new detail or revision. In Kenya and Tanzania the interviews were shorter and the drives longer as families were uncertain where I - as a single

[74] The number of interviews indicated in the previous chapter, sixty-three, indicates the number of interview sessions, not the number of participants (which is much higher, given the frequent entering and exiting of interlocutors during the interview process).

American student of an age that the Maasai community expected would be married - should sleep. Despite this limitation, interviews with Maasai families were still much longer than expected by academics working with western settled communities. Often I was invited for tea, snacks, and to visit the herds and water catchments.

Many of the Maasai and Mongolian herders that I interviewed lead a self-sufficient or semi-self sufficient lifestyle. I never paid for an interview. However, I did give tea, flour, sugar, and biscuits to each family that I visited. These gifts are both an expected exchange between visitor and host, and replaced the food that my traveling companions and I consumed during our stay with each family.

I was never denied an interview, however, I was at times pointed to prior interviews that the herders had given for another researcher. For example, in the Kenyan and Tanzanian chapters I have frequently cited AgFax interviews because interviewees pointed me to specific interviews in which they or their family members participated. Each herder that I interviewed was aware of the tenuous relationship between themselves and their national governments. The effects of these difficult relationships are seen in many ways in this dissertation. Oral historians accept either verbal or written consent for interviews, but prefer a written deed of gift between interviewee and interviewer. In my case, I frequently obtained a verbal rather than written agreement. In Kenya, many interviewees read the deed-of-gift form and said, "yes I agree." However, given their experience with colonial and national governments, which have used herder signatures to take away land or herds, these community members were unwilling to sign any form.[75] Other herders, especially those in Eastern Mongolia, asked that I transcribe the interview alongside the

[75] In these instances, I asked the teacher or professor traveling with me to write a letter indicating that each interviewee was informed of my research agenda and that their answers could be used in future publications, including this dissertation.

audio recording, and then reviewed the transcription before my departure. These interviewees were attentive to ensuring that their words were recorded exactly as they intended. Because of their relationship with the state, pending court cases, or possible illegal border crossings, herders frequently provided me with pseudonyms, asked that I not record their precise geographic location, or requested that I not take photographic images of their families or herds. Following each interview I asked if the participants would like to retract their interview.[76] Because of the potential political implications of these questions, all interviewees were given the option of remaining anonymous and heads of each household approved any pictures that I took of their family, camps, and herds.

Following Fong and Spickard's example, all interviews were conducted in English, or with simultaneous translation from Maa or Mongolian to English so that the interviewee could control the ways that their words are recorded.[77] This approach ensures that terms such as nomad, barbarian, and civilized are contextualized and defined as the speaker intended. This method may be surprising to western readers who do not expect herding communities to have fluency in the English language. However, it is my experience that each family that I visited had a family member with English language training. Including discussions of how interviewee's words would be translated into English both allowed greater control for herders over the way that their interviews are recorded, helped herders to understand how the interview will be studied, and encouraged younger family members to participate in the interview.[78] Following

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[76] Retractions only occurred twice, once in Kenya and once in Mongolia. In both of these instances the participants and I decided to delete the entire interview from my recorder rather than risk that the recorded contents might be confiscated or copied before I had the opportunity to return to my office and delete a specific line or section of the interview. Those retracted interviews are not included or referenced in this dissertation.

[77] Fong and Spickard, "Ethnic Relations," 30.

[78] For example, in Eastern Mongolia I interviewed a family of three, including a mother, father, and daughter. When I first asked for an interview, the family agreed that I should interview the father. However, when

transcription, I used an inductive analytical approach to interpret the texts, complemented by a close analysis of particular moments of tension between oral histories and archival documents.

In my research, oral history interviews are juxtaposed with archival documents including government reports, ethnographic studies, photographs, news reels, educational materials, and propaganda productions to understand the multiple, historical interpretations and representations of herder identity. When using archival documents, I pay equal attention to final government documents and initial ethnographic field notes. From this diversity of sources I ask what information concerning herder identity was collected by ethnologists yet excluded from reports or academic publication. Additionally, what information was collected by local government agents and then changed or omitted before submission to higher levels of government? These questions are inspired by historian Robert Tignor's comparative study of Kenyan and British archives. He reports that materials recording colonial government failures are often held in Kenyan archives, but missing from those in England. Meanwhile, documents labeled as "state secrets" in Kenya are readily accessible in England.[79] By consulting multiple archives I hope to not only access the widest diversity of primary source material, but also to understand what information has been withheld by government administrations. This is done through document collection at national, local, and university archives in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China as well as those at the United States Library of Congress, the National Geographic Foundation Archives, the Smithsonian Institute, Harvard University's Tozzer Library, Indiana University's

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the methodology of including English translation was explained, the daughter was invited to participate. She then discussed with her mother how specific elements of the family's narrative should be told. In the middle of the interview three of her father's friends came to visit and entered the family's *ger* (tent). This resulted in myself, my traveling companion, and our driver, the mother, father, and daughter, and three new herders – a total of nine people in an eight-foot diameter tent. The visitors suggested that the mother and daughter leave the tent to make more room, but as the daughter now had a role in the discussion, and was engaging her mother to fulfill that role, both stayed and participated in the interview.

[79] Robert L. Tignor, *The Colonial Transformation of Kenya : The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 to 1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

African Studies Collection, and the Dutch International Institute of Social History. The variety of archives examined in this dissertation allows me to access historic documents purged or lost from Tanzanian, Kenyan, Mongolian, and Chinese libraries during periods of political transition.

Field visits to ethnographic museums in each nation further enrich this study's examination of how ethnographic reports about herder/nomadic communities present that information to the public. Many of these museums utilize Social Darwinist theories of racial differentiation and social evolution to explain the history and culture of herder communities. While ethnographic museums have fallen out of favor in the United States, they still contribute to public education and identity authorization in the nations considered in this dissertation. By visiting these museums and their archives I have asked how institutions construct and represent herders and herder communities. These visits helped me to better understand the complexity of herder participation and reflect on nationally sponsored ethnographic narratives.

In what follows, I present case studies of modern herder communities in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China. Each case study assesses the government and herder's use of the central frames of land, movement-as-wandering or movement-as-*otor*, and disappearance. I then trace the historic and modern trajectory of frame use and shifts to understand how these frames are constructed and negotiated. These analyses are couched in a historical understanding of frame construction and negotiation that begins in the colonial period for each community. The case studies then draw from collected oral history interviews and archival research to explicate the dominant and regressive frames of deliberation. I conclude each chapter with an examination of emergent conflicts, protests, and the use of new-media by herding communities. Chapters Two and Three examine the Maasai of Tanzania and Kenya, while chapters Four and Five address Mongolians in Mongolia and China. I have chosen this order as it reflects the historic creation of

state sponsored conservation zones predicated on the eviction of herder communities that began in Tanzania and was then replicated in Kenya. While Mongolian and Inner Mongolian conservation zones were not directly linked to the Serengeti or Maasai Mara, many of the same nonprofit and international aid organizations, such as the German GTZ and Frankfurt Zoological Society, utilize the Serengeti as a model for their work in Mongolia. Chapter Six connects these intrinsic studies of Maasai and Mongolian communities to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's metaphors of *nomadology* and the war machine. In this chapter I examine the accusation that Deleuze and Guattari have romanticized nomadic communities to produce their metaphor of *nomadology.* Then I ask if this metaphor has functioned as a mechanism to silence or exclude herder communities, or if the metaphor illustrates rhetorical tools that herder communities can use to leverage acts of resistance against the state. I argue that because the Maasai and Mongolians are among the specific people that Deleuze and Guattari have referenced when establishing the metaphor, modern Maasai and Mongolian experiences are one of the best places to evaluate the application of *nomadology.* I conclude this study with a discussion of the need for greater analysis and representation of herder communities in academic study and the ways Maasai and Mongolian herders can offer critical insights to academics examining the applicability and utility of *nomadology* to understand both the general struggle against late modern capitalism and the utility of *nomadology* to understand the plight of modern nomadic and herding communities.

2.0 TANZANIA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Northern Tanzania's rich and complicated history is reflected in the multitude of names ascribed to the same geographic space. This is Maasailand, home to fierce warriors and their herds of cattle. This is also the land where Bernard Grzimek filmed vast herds for his film *The Serengeti Shall Not Die*, and the colony where first the Germans and then the British established sisal and cattle plantations. The Maasai, along with many other herder and hunter-gatherer communities, have been evicted and resettled in this area by German imperialists, British colonialists, and the independent Tanzanian government. In this chapter I investigate the arguments made to justify these evictions, modernizations, and development programs, as well as explore the patterns of counter-arguments advanced by herder communities.

My study begins by foregrounding the history of colonial governance and development of the Serengeti National Park. From this context, I find three argument frames emerging - bounded land, movement-as-wandering and disappearance. I examine the way that the colonial government utilized the frame of bounded land to explain the demarcation, parceling, and sale Maasai grazing lands to create private hunting reserves and farms. This frame, which spoke to the sensibilities of European settlers, encouraged rhetorics of ownership and trespass that were misaligned with Maasai community interpretations of space and the relationships between

human and animal populations. However, the Maasai communities' arguments garnered minimal attention at this time because the colonial government used a second frame, that of movement-as-wandering, to explain that Maasai herders were moving aimlessly across northern Tanzania. This frame of movement-as-wandering allowed colonial officials to depict the Maasai as an inferior race, which did not have the right to land or deliberation. Finally, building on the expectation of Maasai inferiority, the government used a frame of disappearance, through the production of proleptic elegies that explained that Maasai communities would soon develop, give up their herds, and join in the modernization of Tanzania.

After examining the government's arguments, I turn my attention to the ways that Maasai community members have responded to the frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance. Drawing from academic, juridical, and protest literatures, this analysis points to the complexity of Maasai argumentation and emergent divisions between community members who have obtained college educations and those who have focused on enlarging their herds.

In the final portion of this chapter I examine the interaction between the government's frames, Maasai resistance, and private tour company investment in Northern Tanzania. Specifically, I am concerned with the ongoing conflict between Maasai communities and Thomson Safaris over the Sukenya Farm Enashiva Reserve, a private nature reserve located in Loliondo division along the eastern edge of the Serengeti National Park. Leased and regulated by an American tour company, this space is advertised to tourists as "the Serengeti without rules" where tourists can hunt otherwise protected animals and the company can hire security guards

alongside park rangers.[80] The 12,617-acre plot has been the subject of multinational protests, fact-finding missions, presidential statements, and UN declarations.

In my analysis of Thomson Safaris' lease of land in the Loliondo valley I argue that while the frames of bounded land and movement-as-wandering are still used in Tanzanian deliberation, it is the frame of disappearance that has gained a dominant position. Through the examination of Maasai protests movements, recorded and distributed via YouTube, I investigate the entailments of the dominance of the frame of disappearance and resulting Maasai protest tactics that employ social media to place pressure on the government of Tanzania aiming to preserve Maasai herding traditions.

2.2 WANDERING HERDERS

In 1885 the Society for German Colonization and German East Africa Company began colonizing East Africa in search of natural resources, new markets, and hunting grounds. The company quickly dissolved and signed its land claims over to the Imperial German government in 1891. While many coastal communities signed treaties with both the German East African Company and the German imperial government, the Maasai participated in revolts and attacks, recorded in government reports and traveler's diaries that depict the Maasai as fierce warriors, not to be crossed or trusted.[81] Despite Maasai resistance to colonial projects, colonial

[80] "Loliondo, Tanzania," *Natural High Safaris*, accessed on November 29, 2012, http://www.naturalhighsafaris.com/explore/tanzania/serengeti-loliondo.

[81] For a discussion of Maasai resistance see historian Lotte Hughes' work, "Malice in Maasailand: The Historical Roots of Current Political Struggles," *African Affairs* 104, no. 415 (2005): 207-224; and *Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Also see Navaya ole Ndaskoi, *The Roots*

administrators began regulating hunting and sale of animal products by Europeans and Bores through permit and taxation schemes. The colonial administration's rationale for these policies was explained by Imperial Governor Hermann von Wissmann's 1896 Wildlife Ordnance:

> I felt obliged to issue this Ordinance in order to conserve wildlife and to avoid that many species become extinct which can be expected for the not all that distant future, if the present conditions prevail ... We are obliged to think also of future generations and we should secure them the chance to find leisure and recreation in African hunting in future times. I am also planning to create Hunting Reserves in game rich areas in order that wildlife can find their refuge and recovery. In such areas hunting of game will be permitted only with the explicit prior permission of the Imperial Government. Their establishment should also serve science, in order to conserve such game species that have already become rare in East Africa.[82]

Von Wissmann's method of combining parks and permitting schemes has remained popular since 1896. However the warrant for these policies has shifted from European hunting and agriculture, to local hunting, and then from local hunters to local herding.

Von Wissmann worried about the threat of wildlife extinction as a result of European hunting and justified his permitting scheme as a way to regulate European tourists and hunters. Yet, his contemporaries argued that it was local communities, not European hunters, who were decimating wildlife populations.[83] Through local and international publications, this view of local communities as over-hunters took hold and began to influence scientific deliberation about wildlife populations. Although reports emerged in 1911 indicating that European agricultural projects posed the primary threat to wildlife populations, these findings were ignored by European colonists who continued to blame local communities for over-hunting wildlife

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Causes of the Maasai Predicament (Oslo, Norway: Resource Center for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2006), http://www.galdu.org/govat/doc/maasai_fi.pdf.

[82] Maasai were only required to obtain a permit if they were exporting meat or animal products for profit. Rolf D. Baldus, "Wildlife Conservation in Tanganyika under German Colonial Rule," (unpublished manuscript, accessed on November 24, 2012), http://www.wildlife-baldus.com/download/colonial.pdf.

[83] Baldus, "Wildlife Conservation," 2.

populations.[84] At this time, European colonialists claimed Maasai pasturelands and violently evicted herders and their herds.[85] The combined desire to preserve wildlife for future hunting campaigns, and to confine herders to specific locations, resulted in the colonial administration's early support for fortress conservation.[86]

While agriculturalists had already begun the eviction of herders, fortress conservation policies intensified these programs, now sponsored and directed by the colonial state. The Maasai were not consulted regarding the location or boundaries of these parks. While they were compensated for eviction and resettlement, those calculations were based on agricultural rather than herder needs. The resulting policies regulated herders to living in too-small lands with herds that could not follow traditional pathways. The colonial administration justified these evictions and constraints through a frame of "movement-as-wandering" and *terra nullius,* explaining that the Maasai move across, and therefore waste, too much land. This argumentative strategy was explained by Sr. Charles Eliot, Governor of the British East African Protectorate.

> I cannot admit that wandering tribes have a right to keep other and superior races [sic] out of large tracts merely because they have acquired the habit of straggling over far more land than they can utilize.[87]

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[84] For example, the Ngorongoro Crater was claimed by Aldof and Friedrich Siedentopf as a sheep farm. These European farmers then tried, unsuccessfully to exterminate all wildlife and communities living in the area. For a discussion of these evictions, see Ndaskoi, " Roots Causes," 10. Similar narratives of expulsion and mass-hunting exist for the regions around Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru are found in Baldus, "Wildlife Conservation," 4-5.

[85] A history of these evictions, court cases adjudicating eviction, and attention to eviction from international organizations was presented at the United Nations Human Rights' 2005 Working Group on Minorities. A report of these findings is available at Commission on Human Rights, *Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities* (Geneva: United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/11WGMinorities.aspx.

[86] Detailed discussions of fortress conservation can be found in Dan Brockington and Katherine Homewood, "Degradation Debates and Data Deficiencies: The Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 71, no. 3 (2001): 449-480. Also see Dan Brockington, Rosaleen Duffy, and Jim Igoe, *Nature Unbound* (London: EarthScan, 2008).

[87] Sr. Charles Eliot is quoted by University of Exeter Professor of African studies, John Markakis. John Markakis, *Pastoralism on the Margin* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2004), 7, http://www.minorityrights.org/1054/reports/pastoralism-on-the-margin.html

Here, Eliot uses the frame of movement-as-wandering to negatively describe the Maasai's lifestyle. His argumentative move is an example of how colonial powers use the frame of movement-as-wandering to justify colonialism as a project that teaches, advances, and develops communities such as the Maasai. By describing the Maasai as an inferior community, Eliot makes it difficult for the reader to assess, or even acknowledge the Maasai communities' arguments. From this line of reasoning, the acquisition of Maasai lands by colonial administrations is a win-win scenario, the land is better used by other communities, and the Maasai are encouraged to stop wandering and settle on lands that they can utilize properly.

The implications of arguments such as Eliot's are seen in the divisions of Maasai lands and forced settlement projects that began during German control of Tanganyika between 1891 and 1919 and continued after the reassignment of Tanganyika to British East Africa by the Treaty of Versailles. During this twenty-nine year period, the Maasai were evicted from sixty percent of their land.[88] Additional land was lost during the independence movement in 1962 and continues today as fortress conservation remains the most popular method of conservation in East Africa.

As a result of these evictions, the Maasai community had to radically alter their traditions of moving across wide swaths of land between modern Tanzania and Kenya. The colonial government created new boundaries and told the Maasai where they could, and could not live. Then, when the Maasai resisted the construction of these boundaries, they were accused of trespassing on already-claimed land. Additionally, not only were the Maasai removed from specific lands, their movements across land were constrained by railways and fences built

[88] Hughes, *Moving the Maasai,* 23-50.

through grazing lands. The impact of these boundaries was two fold, as the Maasai were confined to smaller and smaller spaces, the government used the frame of movement-as-wandering less frequently because the Maasai were indeed no longer moving across wide distances. Instead, the Maasai communities were confined to small parcels of land, and had many difficulties reconciling the desire to maintain large herds and the government's enforcement of land divisions.

Western scientific studies of Maasai living conditions and lands argue that the Maasai hold too many cattle for their land, resulting in over-grazing. These studies seldom account for evictions that forced the Maasai into too-small spaces, nor do they assess the Maasai's traditional remedy for overgrazing, moving between multiple pastures.[89] While the frame of movement-as-wandering had created conditions of over-crowding and over-grazing, the frame of bounded land was used to make arguments by analogy between Maasai communities and European pastoralists. These arguments contend that land is degraded because it is not owned by individual shepherds.[90] While the analogy between Maasai herders and European shepherds is precarious, German and British colonial administrations and the independent nation of Tanzania have continued to utilize the argument. Negative aspects of Maasai communities, such as overcrowding, poor public health, animal welfare, and land degradation, are commonly presented as symptoms of the tragedy of the commons. In these deliberations, land ownership, occupation, and rights, are all negotiated through the frame of bounded land. When Maasai communities are considered, attention is always paid to negative descriptions of the community,

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[89] This criticism of policy making is advanced by Brockington and Homewood, "Degradation Debates"; Hughes, *Moving the Maasai*; and Katherine Homewood and W. A. Rodgers, *Maasailand Ecology: Pastoralist Development and Wildlife Conservation in Ngorongoro, Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[90] While the term *tragedy of the commons* was coined by Garrett Hardin in 1968, this form of argument was advanced much earlier in both African and European debates. For an early example of this type of argumentation, see Charles Allsopp Hindlip, *British East Africa, Past, Present, and Future* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905).

which are then used as warrants to further limit access to land. For example, recall Eliot's description of the Maasai which I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the "habit of straggling over far more land than they can utilize," which used the frame of movement-as-wandering to subdivision and sale of land in northern Tanzania.

To justify constraint of Maasai communities onto smaller parcels of land, the colonial government of Tanzania had to change its descriptions of Maasai identity, from that of wandering to an attachment to one particular location. The resulting demarcation of "Maasailand" is apparent in early colonial projects through mapping, treaties, and land allotments to theorize and legislate where the Maasai should and should not live.[91] Documentation of Maasai lands were based on two, not always mutually exclusive, assumptions, (a) the Maasai had come from elsewhere and were interlopers, and (b) the Maasai were the dominant tribe in the area.[92] These arguments assume the frame of movement-as-wandering, but also indicate the higher status of the frame of bounded land. At this time, maps indicating "Maasailand" produced a demarcation and constraint of residence. The resulting maps were then used to plan and develop colonial farms, railways, conservation areas, and parks as well as calculate restitution for Maasai land loss due to these projects. Communities not indicated on the original map lost all bargaining power in future treaties and negotiations.

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[91] Prior to this period the Maasai moved to Tanzania from Kenya and were portrayed in the literature as in a space of flux and war. For an example of "Maasailand," see Mohamed Amin, John Eames, and Duncan Willetts, *Last of the Maasai* (London: Bodley Head Ltd, 1987), 16.

[92] A colonial interpretation of the Maasai's position in this region is based on ethnographic methodology which was used to divide tribes for census taking. This resulted in questions such as the division between the Maasai and the Samburu who are sometimes also called Maasai, or a Maasai sub-group, or Maasai-like, or a totally different tribe. This differentiation has extensive effects on who can claim access to "Maasailand." The background for these deliberations is compellingly presented in anthropologist Susan Kent's collected volume of essays, Susan Kent, "Interethnic Encounters of the First Kind: An Introduction," in *Ethnicity: Hunter-Gatherers and the "Other;" Association or Assimilation in Africa*, ed. Susan Kent (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2002).

It is unclear if the Maasai participated in the creation of these colonial maps. Even when consultation is alluded to in historic documents, it is unclear who was specifically consulted, what was their authority within the Maasai community, and if those same consultants were also signatories on the final maps. What is at stake in these maps is not boundaries, but the determination to connect the Maasai with a set of boundaries. If, as colonial administrations reasoned through a frame of movement-as-wandering, "nomads" simply roam, then Maasailand is a meaningless demarcation – Maasailand would simply be wherever the Maasai are currently living. However, if the Maasai interpretation of the land - of Maasailand as a unique, culturally significant place - is accepted, then the sale of Maasailand to international companies is an appropriation of both Maasai land and culture. While the British Colonial office grappled with the difference between these interpretations, today's Tanzanian government has skirted the question of "Maasailand" by relying on the frame of disappearance. As I will discuss below, the Tanzanian government argues that because the Maasai will modernize and join the ethnic unity of Tanzania, questions of ethnic lands and boundaries are no longer necessary or relevant.

Today, the frames of both bounded land and movement-as-wandering continue to appear in government discourse. However, both of these frames have taken secondary positions to the frame of disappearance. In these arguments, Maasai herding is presented as an activity out of the past, one that has no place in the modern world. The frame of disappearance echoes prior arguments about wildlife populations. However, while deliberations about wildlife disappearance prompted fortress conservation, deliberations about Maasai disappearance have been met with praise as a step toward modernity that also preserves wildlife communities. While the expectation that the Maasai would disappear was in use during early colonial discourse, the use

of the frame of disappearance and proleptic elegies did not come into a prominent position until wildlife tourism to East Africa increased after World War II.[93]

The significant increases in tourism to Tanzanian after World War II have been linked to the 1958 release of zoologist Bernhard Grzimek's *The Serengeti Shall Not Die.* This film presents the frame of disappearance to European and American audiences through aerial filmography that captured and displayed panoramic, Technicolor images of African wildlife and wilderness. This film was used by Grzimek to argue that the preservation of East African herds was just as necessary as preserving European cultural heritage cites.[94] While the German censorship board rejected Grzimek's original text because it made "impermissible equation[s]" between man-made and natural cites, no limitation was placed on visual images. Modern analysts have argued that Grzimek's visual presentation was an equally, if not more effective, argument than the verbal text.[95] Beyond persuading international organizations to support conservation in Tanzania, Grzimek's film had an impact on the desire of European tourists to visit and experience this "last living cultural treasure of Africa."

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[93] For a detailed discussion of late British colonial policy, including the differences between investment in urban development in Kenya and reliance on agricultural projects in Tanganyika, see John Iliffe, "Tanzania under German and British Rule" in *Socialism in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader Vol. 1 Politics*, eds. Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), 8-16.

[94] This goal is explained by Boes' examination of the film, "encouraging a long-view of the land, which eschews individualism, and often even people. From this distance, when Tanzanians are seen, they look much like wild animals to be counted, surveyed, and controlled by Europeans." Tobias Boes, "Political Animals: Serengeti Shall Not Die and the Cultural Heritage of Mankind," *German Studies Review* 36, no. 1 (2013): 48.

[95] The redacted text from Grzimek's film was as follows: "These last remaining herds of African game are a cultural heritage (*Kultureller Gemeinbesitz*) of all mankind, just like our cathedrals and ancient monuments: the Acropolis, St. Peter's, and the Louvre in Paris. Only a few centuries ago, the Roman temples were being wantonly torn down for the sake of building materials. If today any government of whatever political shade dared to pull down the Acropolis in Athens in order to build worker's flats, the whole civilized world would cry out furiously against such outrage. Similarly, no man- black or white- should ever be allowed to endanger the future of these last living cultural treasures of Africa. God made the earth subject to the will of man. But surely not so that he might completely destroy his creations!" Quotation and translation found in Boes, "Political Animals," 42.

International tourism to Tanzania increased from 400 in 1956 to 52,000 in 1972.[96] Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere reflected on this increase of tourism, and began to construct policies and parks to attend to tourists' expectations and needs.[97] One of the primary requirements was that tourists encounter an expected landscape, a pristine – human free – land like that in the film. Problematically for President Nyerere, tourists arrived not to the savannas of Grzimek's film, but to lands filled with communities such as the Maasai who did not agree with or support government conservation projects.[98] Grzimek reflected on the conflicts that he experienced during filming and their effect on the film project while placing blame on Maasai communities.

> The Masai were the cause of all our hard work…Because of them we had to learn to fly. They were the reason why we were so far from Frankfurt and why we had been counting, marking and dyeing animals for the past weeks and months…A national park must remain a piece of primordial wilderness to be effective. No men, not even native ones should live inside its borders.[99]

In this argument, Grzimek utilizes a frame of bounded land justified by expected wildlife disappearance. His statement, published in 1958 at the creation of the Serengeti National Park, resulted in new evictions for the Maasai and a re-emergence of the frame of movement-as-wandering. However, this time the frame of movement-as-wandering was applied to wildlife

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[96] Thomas Lekan, "Serengeti Shall Not Die: Bernhard Grzimek, Wildlife Film, and the Making of a Tourist Landscape in East Africa," German History 29, no. 2 (June 2011): 4.

[97] In 1961, President Nyerere stated, "I personally am not very interested in animals. I do not want to spend my holidays watching crocodiles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favor of their survival. I believe that after diamonds and sisal, wild animals will provide Tanganyika with its greatest source of income. Thousands of Americans and Europeans have the strange urge to see these animals." Quoted in Roderick Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind*, 3 ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982): 382.

[98] While reports as early as 1931 had indicated that the Maasai did not interfere with conservation efforts, and Maasai community members argued that they were the original, and best conservationists, the government was persuaded by Grzimek's argument, human populations and wildlife conservation were mutually exclusive. This argument was advanced in the frame of movement-as-wandering, first to prove that the Maasai were causing some sort of damage, then to prove that evictions would not harm the Maasai, because the community in motion.

[99] Note that Grzimek uses the spelling "Masai" rather than the modern spelling "Maasai." Although I have used the modern spelling throughout this dissertation, I have not changed the spelling found in historical documents, such as Grzimek and Grzimek, *Serengeti Shall Not Die*, 245.

populations, not the Maasai. Conservationists argued that herds must be permitted to migrate between the Tanganyikan Serengeti and the Kenyan Maasai Mara and the best way to do this was constrain herders such as the Maasai.[100] The interplay of the frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance demonstrates the government's deft division and hierarchy of human and wildlife arguments. When discussing human communities, attention was given to the frame of land. For example, the eviction of 10,000 Maasai and their herds to create the Serengeti received little public attention. To an international public, these evictions were non-events because the land either already was, or already should be, without human residents. When asked about human residents in the Serengeti, policy makers highlighted land agreements between government officials and Maasai elders that exchanged Serengeti lands for eternal access to the Ngorongoro.[101] Speaking at the completion of these agreements the British Governor of the Legislative Council said:

> On all grounds of equity and good faith no government could contemplate excluding the Maasai from the whole of the great game areas...the policy was altered to establishing the Park in the plains to the west, leaving the conservation of the Ngorongoro area to be built around the interests of its inhabitants.[102]

In this agreement, the government outlines specific spaces – bounded lands – where Maasai interests are to be accounted for during park planning and development. At the same time, a hierarchy between human and wildlife arguments was created by the government in an attempt to

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[100] There is no substantive evidence to indicate that the Serengeti National Park was built using fortress conservation because of Grzimek's work. Rather, I am indicating a commonality of European conservationist thought in 1958.

[101] The binding nature of an agreement signed by the elders is contentious. Ole Ndaskoi contradicts the European assumption of a organized Maasai military machine under a single command implementing a national policy in her report "The Roots Causes of Maasai Predicament." In this report, she references ole Parkipuny's 1975 Master's Thesis to argue that the Maasai have never had a "chief" nor an "apex of the pyramid." While, Europeans frequently assumed that medicine-men and rain-makers lead the community, according to both ole Ndaskoi and ole Parkipuny, these men did not have political power or leadership positions. Ole Ndaskoi, "The Roots Causes," 5.

[102] James Bellini, *Ngorongoro: Broken Promises - What Price Our Heritage?* (Arusha, Tanzania: Pastoralists Indigenous Non-Governmental Organizations Forum, 2008), 8.

calm Maasai resistance to the Serengeti. A year later, the British Governor of Tanganyika explained the government's intentions for the Ngorongoro, including the government's decision-making criteria to regulate human/wildlife conflicts, to the Maasai Federal Council. He said, "the government intends to protect the game animals in the area, but should there be any conflict between the interests of the game and the human inhabitants, those of the latter must take precedent."[103] This agreement clearly indicates that Maasai community needs will always come first in Ngorongoro policy making. However, this guarantee was made through a frame of bounded land – the Maasai are not an ethnic group with a right to the Ngorongoro, instead they are "human inhabitants." This phrase indicates that the Maasai only have a right to protest if they currently inhabit the Ngorongoro. As such, Maasai outside of the government-determined Ngorongoro boundaries will not have the right to speak on Ngorongoro matters. This distinction, between decision making by an ethnic group and decision making by inhabitants, is critical to understanding modern conflicts between Maasai communities and the government in this region.

Following independence in 1961, the Tanzanian Games Parks Law of 1975 authorized the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA) to "safeguard and promote the interest of the Maasai citizens of the United Republic engaged in cattle ranching and the dairy industry within the Conservation Area."[104] The text of this agreement further removes the Maasai from decision-making roles in determining the future use of lands in northern Tanzania. While the British described the Maasai as "human inhabitants," the independent Tanzanian government described the Maasai as "Maasai citizens" who were engaged in activities within the park. The second part of this statement may appear to be a return to the frame of movement-as-wandering –

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[103] Bellini, *Ngorongoro: Broken Promises,* 9.
[104] Bellini, *Ngorongoro: Broken Promises,* 8.

today the Maasai are engaged in activities in the Ngorongoro but tomorrow they may be engaged elsewhere. However, it is critical that the Maasai are named as citizens of Tanzania – this broadens the frame of bounded land to include all national land, while allowing all other Tanzanian citizens to make an equal claim to traditionally Maasai lands. This re-articulation of identity foreclosed the government's use of a frame of movement-as-wandering while undercutting the power of Maasai land claims. The Ngorongoro, a land now owned and controlled by the government through the NCAA, was presented as a commodity in Tanzania's tourist industry. At this time, the government and its office, the NCAA, reinterpreted the Ngorongoro not as a Maasailand but as a moneymaking tourist destination.[105] This shift in government interpretation resulted in changes in national deliberations regarding Maasai rights to traditional culture within the Ngorongoro.

Figure 2: Maasai herders on the road to the Serengeti.[106]

[105] The Maasai's agreement with the British Colonial Office is absent from this discussion, as are any indications that the Maasai left the Serengeti only with the assurance of continued access to the Ngorongoro. For a detailed narrative of this process, see, Joshua Hammer, "Last Days of the Masai?," *Conde Nast Traveler,* November 2010, http://www.cntraveler.com/features/2010/11/Last-Days-of-the-Masai.

[106] Images such as this, of Maasai herders in traditional clothing moving across Tanzanian pasturelands are what the government of Tanzania is attempting to block from the view of tourists. Allison Hahn, July 2012.

The visual prominence of traditional Maasai culture in the Serengeti tourist region frustrated Tanzanian government officials who continually used proleptic elegies to describe the Maasai as a savage people out of time. Frustrations mounted as tourist attention was drawn to the pre-modern Maasai who provided evidence of either resistance to or failure of modernization in Tanzania. The Maasai were seen as challenging national discourses that presented Tanzania as the first African Socialist State, a model of modernization and civilization for emergent post-colonial African nations. In an attempt to control both these discourses and images captured by tourists, the government designed projects to "civilize" the Maasai and appointed officials like Mkwang'ata to direct policies to Maasai communities. Time Magazine reported on Mkwang'ata's success in an article titled "Dressing up the Maasai,"

> [Mkwang'ata who] instructed tribesmen to throw away their animal skins and skimpy loincloths and "dress in something better than a dirty sheet or a meager yard of cloth that exhibits your buttocks," has also warned them against allowing tourists to "take your naked pictures." He has backed up his crusade with penalties. In the past few weeks, about 250 Masai caught disobeying the new regulations have been locked up briefly in cells in the regional center... If necessary, says Mkwang'ata, police are prepared to herd the Masai into mass baths, burn their ceremonial garb in public and shave off their ochered hair."[107]

The same report indicates that the Maasai "seem resigned to ultimately becoming more Westernized."[108] In this statement, the government utilizes a frame of disappearance to support the successful westernization of Maasai communities. Arguments regarding Maasai lands, herds, and migrations are absent from these deliberations – the Maasai are presented as a people out of time, a dehumanized community that must be quarantined until they accept the government's modernization efforts. When they are modernized, the Maasai will no longer identify as an ethnic group, but as citizens of Tanzania. In this newfound national identity, deliberation about lands

[107] Nyerere's appointment of Mkwang'ata to civilize the Maasai was reported in Time Magazine. See, "Tanzania: Dressing," *Time,* 40.

[108] "Tanzania: Dressing," *Time,* 40

and herds will be irrelevant because the Maasai which required these spaces will no longer exist in Tanzania.

Today, the Tanzanian government continues this rhetoric of modernization through a two-part argument – that the Maasai must modernize, and that those who do not modernize are not truly Tanzanian. The first part of this argument was made by President Jakaya Kikwete in his 2005 inaugural address. Two translations of his speech are found in the literature and the differing translations of his statement provide us a window into both the frame of disappearance in Tanzania and the way that frame is moderated for an international stage. Each of these quotations has been translated from Swahili to English in the source documents. Joshua Hammer a journalist writing for CondeNast Magazine quoted Kikwete as stating:

> Mr. Speaker, we must abandon altogether nomadic pastoralism which makes the whole country pastureland...The cattle are bony and the pastoralists are sacks of skeletons. We cannot move forward with this type of pastoralism in the twenty first century.[109]

While the official government publication of Kikwete's speech states:

> We will take deliberate measures to improve the livestock sector. Our people must change from being nomadic cattle herders to being settled modern livestock keepers. We will take measures to improve pastures, veterinary care, cattle dips and auctions.[110]

The first statement was translated by a reporter attending the inaugural address. The second is a *hansard*, a British term for a transcript that is not verbatim, but rather has been edited to remove grammatical mistakes, repetitions, and redundancies. Comparison of these translations shows radical differences, from that of "abandon" to "change," and from "nomadic-pastoralists" to "the

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[109] Hammer, "Last Days of the Masai?."

[110] Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, "Speech by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, on Inaugurating the Fourth Phase Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania, Parliament Buildings, Dodoma," December 30, 2005, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/hotuba1/hotuba/051230_bunge_eng.htm.

livestock sector." A generous interpretation could account for these differences as a problem of translation and determine that the second translation – that by the Tanzanian government – is the most accurate. A less generous interpretation would be that after initial international pressure, the Tanzanian government edited the text to soften the official statement. The confusion created by these changes has broad reaching implications – the Tanzanian government claims that Kikwete never specifically addressed herders in his inaugural address, and herders claim that they heard him do exactly that. For my analysis, however, each of these translations is sufficient evidence of the frame of disappearance. Kikwete is creating the rhetorical possibility that soon Maasai communities will stop living in traditional ways. Later in the same speech Kikwete states "national unity is the unity among citizens, who like to consider themselves Tanzanians first, before identifying themselves by tribe, race, religion, gender or region of origin."[111] Analysis of Kikwete's syllogism indicates that the Maasai must disappear: if all Tanzanians are modernized, and the Maasai are not modernized, then the Maasai are not Tanzanians.

Kikwete's reasoning is reflected in public speeches by his officers, such as Prime Minister Peter Pinda's 2009 answer to MP John Cheyo's demand for an explanation of the persecution of herders in the Kilosa district. Previously, the national government provided long warrants for government policy towards the Maasai. However, in this questioning period, PM Pinda responded, "If you ask me where will pastoralists go I will ask you where did they come from?"[112]

PM Pinda's speech lasted for two hours, yet only this line has been extracted and replicated in international media and NGO reports. PM Pinda's statement references the historic

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[111] Kikwete, "Speech by the President."

[112] Quoted by Maasai activist Navaya ole Ndaskoi, *Inconvenient Pastoralists of Gwata and Kongwa* (Arusha, Tanzania: Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization Forum, 2011), 4.

frame of movement-as-wandering and the Maasai's migration from elsewhere, often presumed to be in Northern Africa - Egypt, Ethiopia, or at least Kenya.[113] PM Pinda's implicit argument is that the Maasai are not from Tanzania and therefore do not deserve protection from the state. On face, this appears to be a return to the frame of movement-as-wandering that was used by the colonial administration to appropriate Maasai lands. However, I suggest that PM Pinda is actually using a frame of disappearance. The existence of traditional Maasai in Tanzania is no longer possible – due to colonial and early independence policies, all Tanzanian Maasai have been westernized and are no different from any other ethnic group. According to this logic, anyone that still acts as a traditional Maasai must not be Tanzanian. To be clear, I am not arguing that the Tanzanian government in general or PM Pinda specifically is unaware that some Tanzanian citizen-Maasai still live in traditional ways. Rather, I am suggesting that the government of Tanzania has produced a body of rhetoric and argumentation that limits the state's view of traditional Maasai.

The effect of these blinders, articulated through the frame of disappearance, are apparent not only in state discourse, but in private tourist corporations' promotion of Tanzania. I began this chapter with a quotation from Natural High Safaris, "Loliondo could perhaps be described as

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[113] A detailed discussion of the Maasai's migration from the north to Tanzania can be found in Sonia Bleeker, *The Masai, Herders of East Africa* (New York: Morrow, 1963). Also see Ahmend Mohiddin, "Ujamaa Na Kujitegemaa." In *Socialism in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader Vol. 1 Politics*, ed. Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (Nairobi:3 East African Publishing House, 1972), 165-177. However, the critical point here is not to deliberate about where the Maasai came from, but rather that Pinda is arguing that they encroached on Tanzanian land from elsewhere. This argument is not made against Indian landholders, who arrived as subjects of the British Empire, long after the Maasai. Nor is it made against the corporations currently using land that the Maasai are trying to reclaim. By referencing this history of Maasai migration Pinda successfully sidetracks the attention of deliberators to determine where the Maasai are really from, while advancing the frame of movement-as-wandering by reminding the audience that the Maasai are always, already, in movement.

the Serengeti with fewer rules."[114] These types of statements and publications reveal the tourist industry's relationship with and understanding of traditional land rights,

> Loliondo is actually a huge Maasai community area but in our opinion is worth treating as a separate park because the range of safari activities on offer here is significantly greater than those within the Serengeti National Park boundaries.[115]

In this promotional literature, the government's frame of disappearance and hierarchy of the frame of disappearance over the frame of land is transferred from government to industry. Loliondo is actually a huge Maasai Community area – frame of land, but in our opinion is worth treating as a separate park – frame of disappearance. The Maasai have disappeared from view and the Loliondo is just like the Serengeti, free of human inhabitants.

2.3 MAASAILAND

Maasai communities have responded to colonial and government frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance by combining anthropological terminology, juridical procedures, and street protests that reveal the complexity and intricacies of modern Maasai communities and identity. The arguments surveyed in this section explore both stabilizing and disturbing effects of intra-Maasai deliberation on community cohesion and the ability to articulate Maasai needs and demands to national and international publics by bending received argument frames.

For example, in response to the depiction of the Maasai as a wandering, homeless tribe, Tanzanian Maasai communities have produced explicit, English language publications that

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[114] "Loliondo, Tanzania," *Natural High Safaris*.

[115] "Loliondo, Tanzania," *Natural High Safaris*.

clarify their lifestyle.[116] One of the best-known Maasai advocates is Moringe ole Parkipuny, who earned a Ph.D. at the University in Dar es Salaam and was elected as the first Maasai Member of Parliament representing the Ngorongoro district. From his multiple positions as a Maasai elder, Tanzanian statesman, and Professor of Political Science, ole Parkipuny has access to the complexity of Maasai argumentation and has become a leader in Maasai deliberation. He defines the Maasai's lifestyle using the anthropological term "transhumance," whereby families move utilizing a pattern that "involves regular cyclical movements of livestock over substantial distances, up to 20 kilometers at times, between two or three places in response to seasonal climatic changes."[117] According to Parkipuny, these movements are necessary to find supplies, pastureland, and water. By extension, the community's herding patterns are also necessary to preserve the natural balance and ecological stability of the Maasai's community, herds, and surroundings.

Ole Parkipuny's use of "transhumance" responds to the government's arguments discussed earlier in this chapter. Specifically, in response to Eliot's use of the frame of movement-as-wandering, which used a description of "wandering" and "habit of straggling," ole Parkipuny responds that Maasai migration is a directed, cultural link to Maasai identity. In this response, he specifies why and how herders keep their herds. Ole Parkipuny's response to the government's division and sale of land is less direct, he addresses only "places," and he does not claim individual or collective ownership to those lands. At first, it may seem that ole Parkipuny is accepting the government's demarcation of "Maasailand" to indicate a specific location – indeed ole Parkipuny goes so far as to indicate a specific geographic range for Maasai places.

[116] The use of English here is critical because it cuts out any misinterpretations and broader literature. Additionally, both Swahili and English are second – and colonial – languages for the Maasai.

[117] Moringe ole Parkipuny, "Some Crucial Aspects of the Maasai Predicament," in *African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience*, ed. Andrew Coulson (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979), 138.

However, further investigation demonstrates the work of Maasai scholars to respond to the government's definition of Maasailand. For example Eliamani Laltaika, Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Tumaini University, Iringa (Tanzania) defined Maasailand in 2009.

> I think Maasai land goes much beyond what you can see. I think it really goes towards Kenya. Our ancestors used to roam freely, including the Serengeti and all these parks in the northern highlands, but then the colonial government started introducing different game reserves, game controlled areas, and all this was a deliberate way of taking land from the Maasai. We are constrained; everywhere around this village belongs to the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority, and the current general management plan criminalizes grazing animals in any part of this forest. And while I was growing up, we used to graze animals freely in any of these places.[118]

In this interview, Laltaika recalls the historic lifestyle of Maasai communities, and seems to accept the government's frame of movement-as-wandering when he states, "we used to graze animals freely…[now] we are constrained."[119] While he reproduces the government's frame of movement-as-wandering, Laltaika does not accept the modern implications of this frame, that the Maasai will settle and soon disappear. If he had accepted settlement, or if he had accepted environmental arguments about human-less nature reserves, he would not be describing these constraints, he would not even be identifying as Maasai before identifying as Tanzanian. While it could be argued that the government has not yet completed the integration of the Maasai, the remainder of Laltaika's interview indicates the Maasai's resistance to both governmental and colonial arguments. Speaking to his Maasai community, Laltaika supports juridical resistance.

> The Maasai must just go ahead and claim your rights, because if you don't do so, nobody will. So we do not have to fight using any other means than using law… I think there is no other way to achieve this goal apart from hammering the right

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[118] By claiming "some of them more than sixty years old," Laltaika is referring to both Tanzanian and colonial land divisions, and their illegitimacy according to Maasai cultural arguments. Eliamani Laltaika, interview by Lazarus Laisar, *Agfax: Reporting Science in Africa: Defending the Rights of Livestock Keepers*, April 2009, http://www.agfax.net/transcript/agfax241.pdf.

[119] Neither in this interview, nor in his other texts, does Laltaika engage in a definitional deliberation concerning Maasai pastoralism. However, his later texts cite ole Parkipuny's 1979 publication and definition.

> nail, and this means lobbying and advocating for the change of these draconian laws, some of them more than sixty years old.[120]

While Laltaika has reached a wide and well-educated audience, his suggestions have been met with resistance by local Maasai community members who have not achieved the same levels of education or do not have access to government processes. Laltaika and ole Parkipuny, who speak English and Swahili fluently, are able to approach courts and legislative bodies to demand changes. Yet their community members, who often lack such fluencies and have only experienced punishment and repression from the courts, are unlikely to claim their rights in the ways suggested by Laltaika. The differences in these resistances do not indicate that one is more legitimate than the other. Rather, they point to a complexity of Maasai communities and identities that is lacking in governmental rhetoric that legitimates a singular, hegemonic Maasai identity.

When the Tanzanian government confronts multiple articulations of Maasai identity, it responds by arguing that anyone presenting an unexpected Maasai identity must not be from Tanzania. For example, when Maasai women protested in Arusha, Thomson Safaris suggested that it was Kenyan Maasai that initiated the protests.[121] From these reactions, it is apparent that a womens' protest was beyond the state-definition of Maasai identity.

Laltaika is optimistic that the Maasai will be able to access the Tanzanian legal system to claim their right of movement; "I can predict a lot of changes in policy, a lot of changes in legal

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[120] Laltaika, *Agfax: Reporting Science*.

[121] Susan Nordlund reported in 2012 that blame for protests against Thomson Safaris was attributed to Kenyan women, "A business associate of the company chimed in that the whole problem was *'a local Kenyan Maasai woman that encouraged all locals to squat on the land and use it for their benefit'* and this chiming in made me less likely to forget. Much later did I hear of the Tanzanian government's habit of accusing 'troublemakers' of being from the nearest neighboring country." Susanna Nordlund, "The Sukenya Farm Conflict – What Thomson Safaris Are Up to in Loliondo and How I Became a Prohibited Immigrant in Tanzania," *View from the Termite Mound* weblog, March 18, 2010, http://termitemoundview.blogspot.com/2010/03/sukenya-farm-conflict-what-thomson.html.

aspects, and I'm positive that where we are heading, pastoralism will be recognized and pastoralists will be given their rights."[122] Earlier in 2008 he stated "these challenges need a rethink of governmental approaches and indeed a review of a myriad of legal and policy instruments related to pastoralism."[123] Yet, despite his optimism, Laltaika indicates a limitation to juridical activism when he states, "some of them [Maasai] are aware of their rights, some of them are not."[124] Further, my 2012 interview with ole Parkipuny indicated an even deeper division - none of the Ngorongoro residents will listen to their Parliamentary representatives. All they care about now is cows, having larger and larger herds.[125] As a result of under-education about Maasai rights, both Laltaika and ole Parkipuny have begun rights education programs for their communities. While international examples prove the potential of these projects, they have also received much resistance in Tanzania by non-Maasai who wonder whether the Maasai have the right to continue traditional movements across large swaths of land.

Maasai communities are not controlled or directed by Laltaika or ole Parkipuny. Instead, many communities maintain traditional methods of governance through panels of elders and divisions between genders and age group sets. These Maasai community members respond to Tanzanian government policies and programs with a complex blend of arguments ranging from those that challenge the legitimacy of the Tanzanian nation-state, the reasoning behind nature reserves, and sale of local lands. These arguments frequently reference an oral history that predates the nation of Tanzania and European colonization, and extends before and beyond the nation boundaries of Tanzania. These arguments indicate that while the Maasai have the same

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[122] Laltaika, *Agfax: Reporting Science*.

[123] Elaimani Laltaika, "Jatropha in Maasailand: Why, How and for Whose Benefit?." Paper presented at the Climate Law Confrence in Developing Countries Post 2012: North and South Perspective, Ottawa, Canada, September 2008., 11.

[124] Laltaika, *Agfax: Reporting Science*.

[125] Ole Parkipuny, in discussion with the author, July 17, 2012

rights as other Tanzanian citizens, Tanzania has no right to constrain the Maasai within Tanzania or to limit Maasai herds via fortress conservation. One of the most quoted arguments is advanced by Edward ole Mbarnoit in "Last of the Maasai," a photographic text co-authored by Mohamed Amin, Duncan Willetts, John Eame.[126]

> It is we Maasai who have preserved this priceless heritage in our land. We were sharing it with the wild animals long before the arrival of those who use game only as a means of making money. So please do not tell us that we must be pushed off our land for the financial convenience of commercial hunters and hotel-keepers. Nor tell us that we must live only by the rules and regulations of zoologists...If Uhuru [freedom / independence] means anything at all, it means that we are to be treated like humans, not animals.[127]

In this statement, ole Mbarnoit does not need to reference a specific location – not a tree, or a border, or a village – but rather the attachment and ownership of the land by the Maasai. "Our land" describes Maasai land as communal, as opposed to "my land" or government land. Similarly, the government's frame of bounded land is referenced by the appeal, "please do not tell us." In this statement, ole Mbarnoit produces an argument that is inaccessible to both ole Parkipuny and Laltaika. Ole Mbarnoit questions the motivations, training, and credibility of the government and its scientific reports. By highlighting the tensions between the government's focus on making money from parklands and the Maasai's traditions of land conservation, ole Mbarnoit questions the validity of the government's policies in Northern Tanzania. Ole

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[126] Since the original publication, this quotation has been re-quoted in Raphael B.B. Mwalyosi, *Human Ecology and Sustainable Development with Special Emphasis on Africa* (Dar es Salaam: *University of Dar es Salaam Institute for Resource Assessment,* 1993). Later quotation appeared in Julie Narimatsu, "Environmental Justice Case Study: Maasai Land Rights in Kenya and Tanzania," *University of Michigan,* accessed October 27, 2012, http://www.umich.edu/~snre492/Jones/maasai.htm. This quotation has also been paraphrased by Oziniel T. Kibwana and Richard C. Masandika, "Wildlife First, People Last: The Maasai Experience with Wildlife Conservation in Tanzania." Paper presented at the Endogenous Development and Bio-Cultural Diversity Confrence, Geneva, Switzerland, 2006. These multiple quotations and rephrasings are referenced to indicate the way that Amin et al.'s text has been used to create a collective action frame by Maasai communities that confronts government arguments made with a frame of bounded land. Mohamed Amin, John Eames, and Duncan Willetts. *The Last of the Maasai* (London: Bodley Head Ltd, 1987).

[127] Amin et al., *The Last of the Maasai,* 181.

Parkipuny and Laltaika encourage equal-part deliberation between Maasai communities and other citizens of Tanzania. Yet ole Mbarnoit interprets these discourses differently, arguing that the Maasai are only included in one-way dialogues through which the Maasai are told what they may and may not do.

Further, ole Mbarnoit argues that the Maasai are unable to obtain *uhuru.* The term *uhuru*, which in Swahili means freedom, was appropriated by President Nyerere to signify freedom for the East Africans through African Socialism. Ole Mbarnoit's reference to *uhuru* is important to this analysis for two reasons. First, by using *uhuru*, a Swahili term in an English language interview by a traditional Maa speaker, ole Mbarnoit points to the way that Tanzanian policy making and language is swayed towards coastal communities who use Swahili as their first language. Second, ole Mbarnoit uses *uhuru* to place his argument in the government's terms– if the Maasai were part of Tanzanian nationalism then they would be treated as humans, not animals. In his argument about *uhuru,* ole Mbarnoit points to the paternalism implicit in Tanzanian policy, one that declares freedom for all citizens while controlling some of its people's actions, traditions, and lifestyles.

Responding to, or arguing against the term *uhuru* places Maasai activists in a difficult position. Realzing that to resist *uhuru* can be interpreted as a resistance to freedom, Maasai community groups, such as the Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition (MERC), carefully crafted the Maasai definition of *uhuru* within the national conception of freedom from colonialists.[128] In the May 2002 report, *The Killing Fields of Loliondo*, the Maasai Environmental Resource Council argued:

[128] MERC defines itself as a "a grassroots network of Maasai organizations advocating for the protection of traditional land rights of the Maasai people, and for conservation, management, and sustainable use of the great

> The Maasai have been conservationists since time immemorial. They do not believe in commercial hunting, for it leads to greed, over-exploitation of wildlife resources, and often-irreversible damage to delicate ecosystems. What they do believe is that today's generation holds all natural resources in trust for future generations. Over the centuries they have developed a very special relationship with wild animals, so that they and their cattle can share water and grass with them…it is largely thanks to the Maasai way of life - pastoral and pacifist - that the Kenya/Tanzania cross-border region continues to have such an abundance of wild animals, not only helping to maintain one of the most important ecosystems in Africa, but also guaranteeing a future for the region's strongest industry, tourism.[129]

MERC's report is consistent with ole Mbarnoit's identification of three enemies, commercial hunters, hotel keepers, and zoologists. Both MERC and ole Mbarnoit effectively argue that the Maasai are uninterested in, and do not consent to, modern conservation projects along the Kenyan/Tanzanian border. These explicit statements, made in English language publications produced by western presses, are easily available to western tourists and place pressure on tour operators to both sell their tours as superior to other operators and explain why their tours have been specifically approved by Maasai communities.

The effects of Maasai community argumentation in response to the government's frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance are apparent when considering status quo debates surrounding land leases. In this dissertation, I am most interested in leases issued for land in the Loliondo valley that borders both the Serengeti National Park and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. An analysis of these conflicts illuminates the clash between governmental acts of division and the effect of argumentative frames on our understanding of herder conflicts in northern Tanzania.

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ecosystems of East Africa." *Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition,* "MERC." *Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition*, accessed October 12, 2012, http://www.maasaierc.org.

[129] Ted Botha, "Killing the Killing Fields of Loliondo," *Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition*, accessed October 12, 2012, http://www.maasaierc.org/killingthekilling.html.

2.4 CASE STUDY: THE LOLIONDO VALLEY

In 1984, 10,000 acres of land in the Loliondo valley were leased by the Tanzanian government to Tanzanian Breweries LTD (TBL), a governmental parastal.[130] Only 700 acres were ever farmed by Tanzanian Breweries and it is unclear if Maasai communities living on the other 9,300 acres were aware of the land lease. However, the Tanzanian government allowed TBL to expand its lease to a 96 year holding of 12,617 acres. Then, in 2006 TBL was permitted to lease the land to Thomson Safaris.

Thomson Safaris assumed control of this land and began evicting Maasai communities from its new holding to create a private conservation and hunting reserve. Maasai communities responded in protest, indicating that they had not been aware of the lease, did not accept the legitimacy of the lease, and had nowhere else to go if evicted from their traditional lands. These protests gained international attention, resulting in a Tanzanian governmental investigation in 2010. In the report, government officials find that Thomson Safaris' lease is legal, though there have been problems in the transmission of information about the lease to local communities.[131] In this statement, the government affirms the frame of bounded land, and uses that frame to justify the sale, transfer, and appropriation of land in the Loliondo valley. Maasai communities, however, reject this claim and have launched protests ranging from street marches to on-line discussion boards calling for international attention to their land loss.

In response to Maasai protests, Thomson Safaris claim that they have consulted with

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[130] Parastatal organizations and industries are common in Tanzania. They have limited political authority of their own and serve the state indirectly by providing goods or services.

[131] Thomson Safaris reviewed the 2010 report prepared by the Office of the Prime Minister of Tanzania which assessed the Sukenya Farm sale. Thomson's summary is only a bulleted list of findings, the investigation and the report have not been made public. "Investigative Report Summary," *Thomson Safaris* weblog, February 2, 2010, http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2010/02/23/investigative-report-summary/.

local Maasai elders, partnered with international conservationist organizations such as the Jane Goodall Institute, and won tourism awards from organizations such as the National Geographic. These credentials bolster Thomson Safaris' international credibility.[132] Amongst Maasai activists, however, these credentials increase suspicions about Thomson Safaris. In 2010, Maasai activist Navaya ole Ndaskoi reflected these suspicions on the Tanzanian message board *Wanazuoni*.

> Thomson Safaris will never stop to amaze me. The notorious Boston-based land grabber, posing as a tour operator company, will band together, like poisonous worms, with Jane Goodall Institute of the famous British primatologist in efforts to clean its image. This year marks the 50th anniversary of when Jane Goodall first began studies of chimpanzees at Gombe Stream National Park in Kigoma Western Tanzania. Why, in Africa, should these domains be dominated by the people of European stock? Welcome to racism; nothing else explains it. It is racism which is driving Rick Thomson and his wife Judith Wineland, the owners of Thomson Safaris, to band with Jane Goodall. In South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Tanzania wildlife conservation was and often still is dominated by descendants of white settlers who did not, and to some extent do not admit black Africans easily. As it was in the past, so it is now.[133]

In this statement, ole Ndaskoi directly links Thomson Safaris and western conservation organizations with colonial projects, the very same colonial projects which the government of Tanzania has staked its reputation on opposing.

In response to protests like ole Ndaskoi's, Thomson Safaris re-appropriates the frames of bounded land and movement-as-wandering to argue that the Maasai are no longer moving between multiple spaces. Based on government arguments and policies, Thomson Safaris reasons that only those Maasai living on or near the land leased by Thomson Safaris needs to be consulted in conservation projects. Thomson Safaris then leverages this interpretation of Maasai

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[132] I have not found any analysis or research indicating how tourists respond to these claims. However, Thomson has received lucrative contracts, including presidential visits, which indicate that they have a firmly established international reputation.

[133] Navaya ole Ndaskoi, "Jane Goodall Bands with Thomson Safaris against Maasai." *Wanazuoni: Tanzania's Intellectuals* weblog, May 4, 2010, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wanazuoni/message/6176.

herding traditions to explain why ole Ndaskoi's protest is either unwarranted and can therefore be ignored, or is an example of intra-Maasai colonialism that proves why an organization such as Thomson Safaris is necessary to free local Maasai communities. Thomson Safaris explains this position by narrating a meeting between owners Rick Thomson and Judi Wineland, and Maasai community members.

> Recent meetings with Rick and Judi and other Thomson representatives have only reaffirmed their support. In the following footage, a highly respected elder, Simat Loong'ung, speaks on behalf of the leaders and communities. Rick and Judi later met with more than 25 elders and leaders. Simat has also explained how, throughout greater Loliondo, the people of Sukenya happen to be a political minority and the least educated group. They have not received benefits from tourism. They do not have any NGOs representing them. Their voice is often undermined in local politics.[134]

This quote uses the government's maps and policies that divide land in northern Tanzania to justify Thomson Safaris' projects and methodology. First, the reader is informed that consultation occurred with a highly respected Maasai elder who speaks for the community. Second, the frame of land is localized, zooming in on the greater Loliondo valley to focus on the Sukenya region. This specificity allows the reader to identify with a specific place and then understand the pressures faced by that community. Previously in this chapter I examined the ways that Maasai herding requires community members to cross wide swaths of land, encouraging identification with multiple locations. However, when we follow Thomson Safaris' logic, Maasai from elsewhere might have moved into Sukenya to voice opposition to Thomson Safaris, but these acts of opposition are illegitimated because those Maasai protesters do not hold a government certified residence in Sukenya.

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[134] "The People of Sukenya." *Thomson Safaris* weblog, February 2, 2010, http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/the-people-of-sukenya/.

The hyper-specificity of Thomson Safaris' claims caused much confusion amongst international reporters. While the Loliondo Valley is easily found on a map, Sukenya is difficult to locate. By specifying Sukenya, Thomson Safaris has moved beyond the government's demarcation of land in Tanzania. If this argument were made by a Tanzanian official, the location of the Thomson Safari lease would be in the Arusha District, Ngorongoro Division, Soit Sambu Ward. In 2002, this ward had 13,147 residents. Thomson Safaris does not claim to have consulted with or gained support from all 13,147 Soit Sambu ward residents. Indeed, the company argues that it should not have to do so in the following 2010 statement.[135]

> The people of Sukenya have had their voice of support for Enashiva Nature Refuge undermined and ignored due to their status as a political minority. Four of the seven communities of Soit Sambu are not even relatively close to Sukenya and Enashiva. Throughout Loliondo, no other villages have as many sub-villages as Soit Sambu."[136]

Here, Thomson Safaris' specificity of Enashiva Nature Refuge and Sukenya village works to eschew all other arguments by all other Maasai and local communities. Although the alliances and locations of those Maasai, such as ole Ndaskoi, are never provided, the reader is lead to believe that enough Maasai have been consulted by Thomson Safaris. Additionally, these consultations are more reliable than those by activists because Thomson Safaris engaged more local, more authentic, and more oppressed Maasai communities then the Maasai activists.[137]

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[135] This quotation directly responds to resistance to the Enashiva Nature Refuge, Thomson Safaris' name for its privately held land.

[136] "Sukenya Leaders Support TCL," *Thomson Safaris* weblog, March 11, 2010, http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2010/03/11/sukenya_leaders_support_tcl/.

[137] In this way, Thomson identifies itself as part of the Loliondo machine, a critical apparatus that controls the region. In his 1992 Postscript on Societies of Control, Deleuze discusses this unique position; "In the societies of control…what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the other hand disciplinary societies are recalculated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information or reject it. We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become "individuals," and masses, samples, data, markets, or "banks." Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on Societies of Control," *October* no.59 (1992): 6.

Thomson Safaris' attention to Maasai oppression might seem in line with Maasai responses to the government's frame of disappearance. However, Thomson Safaris provides a radically different narrative then that explored previously. Rather than label the government or colonists as oppressors, Thomson Safaris indicates that local communities have been oppressed by other Maasai communities. Then, building upon this history of oppression, Thomson Safaris explains that their actions, such as community development projects, education campaigns, establishment of women's cooperatives, and conservation projects have worked to liberate and modernize local Maasai.[138] In this way, Thomson Safaris is rearticulating the frame of disappearance expressed by President Kikwete – the Maasai must be modernized, and after modernization they will not be distinct from other Tanzanian citizens.

This appropriation of the frame of disappearance prompted investigative reports by Tanzanian NGOs and international reporters. In her discussion of two international journalists' visit to the Ngorongoro in 2009, blogger Susan Nordlund reports,

> In Soit Sambu they met the then Village Chairman James Lembikas who had expressed some support for Thomson [Safaris], which must be the reason that the company, that had never had a meeting with the Village Council, for a long time boasted about their excellent relations with the village government. Detractors of Lembikas say that he was paid by Thomson [Safaris] while he himself, according to people who know him, says he was intimidated by the District Commissioner…he was the chairman for some 20 years, but no longer.[139]

This report indicates the layers of complexity in Thomson Safaris' quest to consult with

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[138] "Since purchasing the property, TCL has met regularly with the village council of Soit Sambu, which represents all of the villages that directly border Enashiva. The council has officially voiced its support for Thomson Safaris and TCL and actively collaborates with them on Enashiva initiatives. Working closely with the council, TCL has already helped develop numerous local projects for the benefit of the community. These projects have included drilling a borehole and water well on the property and establishing a controlled grazing program. TCL also provides ongoing support to several local schools and a women's collaborative near the nature refuge. Future projects will include significant improvements to education and medical care, and increasing employment and entrepreneurship opportunities, especially among women." "The Enashiva Nature Refuge," *Thomson Safaris* weblog, August 21, 2009, http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2009/08/21/ena_nat_ref/.

[139] Nordlund, "The Sukenya Farm Conflict."

the most local Maasai, and by doing so not consult with the Village Council. It also raises questions regarding the nature of relationships with local Maasai elders. This report was posted in 2009, a year before the previously analyzed statements by Thomson Safaris. I have provided the quotation because it contextualizes the need for and questionability of Thomson Safaris' later consultative success. On June 15, 2010 Thomson Safaris posted an article to its blog titled "Sukenya: Freedom at Last" narrating radical changes to local government in the Ngorongoro District.

> Supported by a decades-long grassroots effort, the recognition of Sukenya as a village is part of a government-led process to reorganize several villages and wards in Ngorongoro District and in other districts across Tanzania. Sukenya, Soit Sambu, and several other villages and wards will hold new elections later this year. The people of Sukenya are the largest population of Maasai around the Enashiva Nature Refuge, and they have lived in the area longer than any other Maasai clan or community. Tanzania Conservation Limited congratulates Sukenya on becoming a village and gaining its local freedom.[140]

It is not my argument that this new district is illegitimate; rather, I am pointing to both the complexity of deliberations in this region, and to Thomson Safaris' use the frame of bounded land to always hold a more local position than its retractors. Frequently, Thomson Safaris has preferred a frame of bounded land, supported by a frame of disappearance to respond to criticism.

> It is easy to understand how foreign NGOs and those who lack local language skills and long-term on-the-ground presence in Loliondo, could be misled by some groups with their own political agenda. Similarly, misinformation spreads easily in communities lacking education and infrastructure.[141]

The exchange of hierarchies between the frames of bounded land and disappearance has driven a wedge between government and corporate rhetoric. The government is deeply invested in

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[140] "Sukenya: Freedom at Last," *Thomson Safaris* weblog, June 15, 2010, http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2010/06/15/sukenya_freedom/.

[141] "Sukenya Leaders Support," *Thomson Safaris.*

modernizing Tanzania, which includes Maasai communities. Corporations like Thomson Safaris are interested in some of these modernizations, such as the lease of land to create private nature reserves. However, as evidenced by their projects with local Maasai communities, they are also interested in a presence of Maasai communities to authenticate or enrich tourists' experiences in the Serengeti region.

Maasai responses to these shifts in frame hierarchy demonstrate a complex understanding of government and corporate rhetoric, as well as the inability of those rhetorics to understand the Maasai perspective. In this case study I have assessed the arguments made by Thomson Safaris regarding the legitimacy of its lease and conservation projects as supported by the government's frame of bounded land. It has always been Thomson Safaris' position that they are more local than the national government, international conservation organizations, or other Maasai organizations. An extrapolation of this position might be that foreigners do not know enough to speak on the question of Thomson Safaris, and locals are too under educated to know what is actually happening. As such, Thomson Safaris might be the only credible participant in deliberations concerning the Loliondo Valley.

The hyper-compartmentalization of land in northern Tanzania, juxtaposed to the broader body of arguments concerning the Maasai in Tanzania illustrates a corporate attempt to control public discourse. However, as the following section indicates, Thomson Safaris' hyper-compartmentalization opens new spaces for Maasai resistance.

2.5 WE ARE NOT LYING: SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE NGORONGORO

International NGOs such as the Kenyan Feminist Activist Coalition (FEMACT) have launched

fact-finding missions to Loliondo and the Ngorongoro to determine and document the "realness" of Maasai community accusations and protests. In their 2009 meetings with Arusha District Commissioner Elias Lali, FEMACT was assured that there were no conflicts between the Maasai, the government, and private corporations. Instead, Lali alleged that Maasai community members were misinforming both the media and their own communities in an attempt to create political turmoil and gain parliamentary seats in the next election. Further, Lali suggested that the Maasai community was burning its own homes to make more dramatic images and perpetuate their claims of turmoil.[142]

What FEMACT found, however, was radically different from Lali's allegations. FEMACT's report indicates:

> The team came across women who had undergone miscarriages, rape, loss of children and other properties including food and shelter. Men who were chained beaten and humiliated in front of their families, those who had lost thousands of livestock among other properties and those who were imprisoned for no apparent reasons. Generally speaking, the Maasai communities in the Loliondo villages are internally displaced persons. They have no land to settle, no shelter, no food, no water for even their livestock, no clothing or any other form of social services.[143]

FEMACT's findings directly contradict the Tanzanian government's report. The problem for both FEMACT and Maasai communities, however, is how to authenticate these claims in national and international deliberations. While visual images have had some affect on international reception of Maasai arguments, Lali's allegation that Maasai communities are burning their own houses points to the limitation of images that must be narrated for outside audiences.

The need to present both evidence to international audiences has been met by Maasai

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[142] Feminist Action Coalition, "Tanzania: Loliondo Report of Findings," *Pambazuak News: Pan African Voices for Freedom and Justice*, no. 449 (2009), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/58956/print.

[143] Feminist Action Coalition, "Tanzania"

protest strategies that have begun using social media to produce and distribute protest images. For example, Ngorongoro Conservation Area currently refuses to allow Maasai herders to tend subsistence crops that will be used to feed their children and herds. Finding that petitions and protests to the local government were not leading to changes in Ngorongoro Conservation Area policy, Maasai activists turned to social media to record and distribute the 2012 NCA Endulen Residents Food Crisis protest on an international stage. During this protest, filmed and made accessible via YouTube, Maasai activist Noolasho Nakuta of the Endulen Village of Ngorongoro stated:

> We are treated as if we are not Tanzanians, this is why we are prohibited to cultivate. There is a foodstuff called bran, which is normally given to livestock. This is now what our children are eating. Even my children eat this bran; there is no need to hide the truth, when they eat it they can die. They are forced to eat it because of the drought in which our cattle died. We are not lying, we are telling the truth, let that woman from Sing'ida bring the bran for you to see.[144]

As Nakuta makes this statement, another woman enters the screen carrying a plastic bag containing cooked bran from which she and her children have been eating during the protest. The video footage of this protest reflects the way that Maasai communities are simultaneously adapting to a Maasai audience (who presumably already knows about eating bran) and an extended social media audience, which is convinced of the realness of the bran through Sing'ida's display. Additionally, Nakuta's speech directly responds to government officials, such as District Commissioner Lali, who claim, "the pastoralists are lying" with a verbal statement "we are not lying," and evidence of what her family is eating.

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[144] "Ngorongoro Conservation Area Food Crisis 2012," YouTube Video, 15:05, from a protest held in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area on December 11, 2012, posted by "NCA Ncaresidents," December 11, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xJYP2-x_Uik.

Figure 3: 2012 NCA Endulen Residents Food Crisis 1.[145]

The imagery in this video is striking. At the center of the screen is a Maasai woman, dressed in a manner that simultaneously indicates her position as a married Maasai woman and modern Tanzanian. She is not the Maasai conceptualized by President Kikwete as out of time and soon disappearing. Wearing a watch, holding multiple microphones, and speaking confidently to both present audience and camera, Nakuta is rooted in her location, in control of this image and its production.

She is speaking with and to her community. In the background of this image are Maasai men of various ages dressed in a range of western business attire and traditional clothes. In the image, and in the title screen of the protest video, Ngorongoro and Loliondo are displayed as occupied spaces. There are people living here – many people who will be displaced and harmed

[145] NCA Ncaresidents, "Ngorongoro Conservation Area Food Crisis."

by the proposed land sales. The title screen for the protest gives us an image of Nakuta's audience, and allows the on-line viewer to place herself at the back of the audience.

Figure 4: 2012 NCA Endulen Residents Food Crisis 2.[146]

In these emergent protests, we see a multiple contextualization of Maasai situated arguments. Unlike the government's compartmentalization of Maasai identity into elements of land ownership, herd movement, and community traditions, this video shows the ways that Maasai communities blend complex markers of identity by utilizing social media to respond to orthodox discourses. In this video, a Maasai woman speaks directly to her community. She also speaks to me, a member of the intended, international online audience. I am still gazing at a Maasai community, but Nakuta has responded to the government's explanations of Maasai identity and through her speech and accompanying English translation, articulates the Maasai

[146] NCA Ncaresidents, "Ngorongoro Conservation Area Food Crisis."

community's rejection of the frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance.

In this video, the viewer experiences the other as doing something – she is speaking, protesting, pleading for her children, and challenging the government's reports. The FEMACT reports, actions by the Tanzanian government, and speech by Nakuta indicate mutual awareness of each stakeholder's position and online presence. The 2012 Ngorongoro Conservation Area Food Crisis video displays the Maasai community's attempt to argue in support of land, food security, and their children's future.

The choice of video medium to display Maasai argumentative processes allows for a contextualization through multiple images, words, and music that cannot be captured by a singular image. Future research is needed to investigate the persuasive effects of still photography as opposed to video imagery in online campaigns as well as the ways that herder communities such as the Maasai are intervening in online protests and conflicts to make their own positions heard and understood by outside audiences.

In this chapter, I have assessed the arguments concerning Maasai identity through the frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance during both colonial and independence periods. Then, I analyzed Maasai juridical arguments and social media productions in an attempt to understand how Maasai communities have produced and responded to land conflicts. As a stand-alone analysis, this examination points to the ways that Maasai communities are opening space for new arguments about Maasai identity that embrace the complexities of tradition and modernity. As part of a multi-sited situated argumentative analysis, this examination points to potential quilting points between Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai who have used social media to find spaces which government frames of bounded land, movement-as-

wandering, and disappearance cannot touch. These quilting points will be examined in the next chapter, regarding Maasai communities in Kenya.

3.0 KENYA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Maasai communities in Kenya have a long and complex history of interaction with the Maasai of Tanzania. Before the arrival of British colonists in 1888 these were a joined community that shared herding practices, languages, and traditions setting them apart from other herders, hunter-gathers, and agriculturalists in the Great Rift Valley. The Maasai of Tanzania and Kenya were split between the late 1880's, when modern Tanzania was held by German East Africa and Kenya by British East Africa, and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 when modern Tanzania came under British control. During this period, different argumentative strategies, development polices, and modern entailments emerged between the Maasai of Tanzania and Kenya.

In this chapter I highlight the Kenyan government's use of frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance. Because the British invested more effort and funding into development projects in modern Kenya than Tanzania, I have found and will utilize a larger body of juridical documents to assess the division of Maasai lands and resulting court cases regarding both eviction and trespass. Then I analyze the ways that Maasai community members resisted colonial projects by redefining community terms, restructuring traditional age

groups, and producing arguments explaining the connections between Maasai identity and the ownership of large herds.

To assess the argumentative clash between both the colonial and modern independent governments of Kenya and Maasai communities, I focus on allegations of hate speech which were made in 2012 when MP Ferdinand Waititu argued that the Maasai should be evicted from his district. My analysis of this incident examines the entailments of colonial frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance to understand both MP Waititu's arguments and the Maasai response. Finally, I assess how this history of argumentation has influenced continuing conflicts regarding the establishment of the Maasai Mara, land grabs, demarcation of specific lands for humans and animals, and "human wildlife conflicts" between Maasai communities and lion prides. In this analysis I find that as divisions of lands increase, the frame of movement-as-wandering is used less frequently. Additionally, while the frame of bounded land is still used frequently in Kenyan discourse, it often takes a secondary position to the frame of disappearance which is used to explain how the Maasai will soon settle and give up their herding traditions

3.2 A BLOODY, BEASTLY SYSTEM FOUNDED ON IMMORALITY

The Imperial British East Africa Company claimed Kenya as a territory of the Imperial British Empire in 1888 following a long struggle between both British and German land claims. Immediately following this claim, work on the Kenya-Uganda railway began with the aim of connecting the British East African Empire. This railway displaced thousands of Maasai and other herder communities while encouraging the emigration of British colonists to East Africa.

By the 1930s railway development had encouraged approximately 30,000 white settlers to resettle in Kenya. This community soon began placing demands on the British colonial administration to provide security services that would protect colonial farms from local communities such as the Maasai. As a result, the railways gained a new function, they brought colonial troops to the East African interior.

One area of contention was the Rift Valley, also known as the Maasai Highlands. European farmers were attracted to this region by the geographically protected valley and desirable climatic conditions that limited the number of malaria carrying mosquitoes. This is the traditional grazing land of a Maasai communities that moved with their herds over seven hundred miles of pasturelands from northern Kenya to Central Tanzania, and four hundred miles east to west including part of modern Nairobi. These Maasai communities were first moved in 1895 to make way for the railway. Then, they lost more land when the British established their capital in Nairobi, which today retains its Maa name that translates to "place of cool water," signifying its importance to herding communities.[147] According to the British, each of these relocations was made through agreement with community elders.

Agreements were necessary as the British colonial law defined the Kenyan protectorates as a sovereign entities. Based on this definition, the British "imperial power [held] little more than *political jurisdiction* over the territory."[148] As a result, all land acquisitions had to be made by conquest, agreement, treaty, or sale between locals and colonial officials. Regarding communally held land, colonial officials were advised, "for treaties to be anything more than an

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[147] Meitamei Olol-Dapash, Mary Poole, and Kaitlin Noss, "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok: A Century of Maasai Land Rights Denied," (unpublished manuscript, May 2010) Microsoft Word file. http://maasaicpp.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/final-paper-mau-narok-may-2010.doc.

[148] Emphasis in the original document. A detailed study of these laws is found in legal scholar H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, *Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya* (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1991): 12-13.

empty mockery, it [is] necessary that they should be signed by several thousand petty chiefs and headmen."[149] While the requirement for local agreement regarding occupied land was maintained throughout the colonial period, revisions were made in the 1890's regarding empty spaces. Two decrees, the 1897 Indian Land Acquisition Act and 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act, allowed colonial officials to dispose of "waste and unoccupied land in protectorates where there was no settled form of government and where land had not been appropriated either to the local sovereign or to individuals."[150] Proof of appropriation was based on agricultural use, permanent settlements and roads. Because the Maasai did commonly tend agricultural crops, build permanent homes, or construct roads, the land on which they were living was frequently classified as *terra nullius* or empty land.

Using *terra nullius*, the British Government claimed much of the Rift Valley without the need for consent of Maasai herders. As a result of these claims, in 1904 forty-eight Europeans were able to acquire land in the Rift Valley that was already occupied by approximately 11,200 Maasai and their two million cattle. Later, the 1911 Agreement resulted in the eviction of 20,000 Maasai and 2.5 million cattle from lands on which the Maasai had been able to substantiate a claim. The colonial government demarcated a specific piece of land, the "Southern Reserve," for the resettlement of these displaced Maasai communities.

The forced resettlement of Maasai communities to the Southern Reserve movement was justified by Charles Eliot, governor of the (British) East African Protectorate, when he wrote,

> I cannot admit that wandering tribes have a right to keep other and superior races out of large tracts merely because they have acquired the habit of straggling over far more land than they can utilize.[151]

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[149] Okoth-Ogendo, *Tenants of the Crown.*

[150] Okoth-Ogendo, *Tenants of the Crown.*

[151] John Markakis, *Pastoralism on the Margin* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2004), 9, http://www.minorityrights.org/1054/reports/pastoralism-on-the-margin.html.

In Eliot's texts, the description of the Maasai as wanderers is coupled with growing division between Kenyan ethnic groups. When he separates the Maasai from surrounding communities, Eliot refers to "other and superior" races. This includes the Maasai's traditional neighbors such as the Kikuyu and Wakamba as well as recently arriving colonists that were establishing farms in the Maasai Highlands. This division integrates concepts from Social Darwinism that are not present in Tanzanian deliberations while simultaneously extracting the Maasai from historically complex exchanges with neighboring ethnic groups.[152] Further, in addition to Eliot's use of the frame of movement-as-wandering, early British documents demonstrate a frame of bounded land and disappearance.

The political entailments of Eliot's frame are explained in his letter to Lord Lansdowne where he explained his intention to quickly end the Maasai way of life.

> I have no desire to protect Masaidom. It is a beastly, bloody system, founded on raiding and immorality, disastrous to both the Masai and their neighbors. The sooner it disappears and is unknown, except in books of anthropology, the better.[153]

In this letter, Eliot uses the frame of disappearance to legitimate his policies that will quickly end the Maasai way of life. Prompted by this and similar letters, the British East African administration began a program of settlement and Europeanization of Maasai communities. Children were sent to schools, herders were settled into smaller plots of land, and land was sold, granted, or appropriated by other communities.

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[152] For example, Jomo Kenyatta's family included members of the Maasai community and he speaks at length of the exchanges that occurred between Kikuyu and Maasai communities in Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (New York: Vintage, 1962).

[153] A copy of the letter from Sir Charles Eliot to Lord Lansdowne, dated April 19, 1904, is found in Peter Rigby, "Ideology, Religion, and Ilparakuyo-Maasai Resistance to Capitalist Penetration," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 23, no. 3 (1989): 416-440.

While the 1904 and 1911 Agreements were considered by the British Colonial administration as legal and binding documents, Maasai activist Olol-Dapash Meitamei indicates that these moves were never agreed to by the Maasai, and many community members were evicted at gun point.[154] In addition to protests against land evictions, the Maasai began legal proceedings in 1913 against the 1911 evictions.[155] While these protests and proceedings did not result in the return of Maasai lands, they may have prompted the clarifying language found in the 1911 agreement that allowed Maasai access to cultural sites. For example,

> Nothing in this agreement contained shall be deemed to deprive the Masai tribe of the rights reserved to it under the agreement of August ninth one thousand nine hundred and four aforesaid to the land on the slopes of Kinopop [sic] whereon the circumcision rites and ceremonies may be held.[156]

Access to ceremonial grounds was welcomed by the Maasai community, but did not meet the full demand for residence or grazing on traditional lands. Additionally, even these small concessions were often overlooked by settlers who accused the Maasai traveling to ceremonial grounds of illegally trespassing on settler lands.

Beyond the text of the 1904 and 1911 Agreements, the Maasai lost land when the boundaries of these agreements were adjudicated via colonial maps. For example, a British settler named Powys Cobb occupied part of the Maasai Highlands years before he was officially granted a land holding by the Colonial Administration. Then, once he was granted a land claim, he maintained two sets of maps, one shown to the Maasai and one shown to government officials. By showing a map with a small land holding to Maasai elders, Cobb was able to

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[154] Olol-Dapash Meitamei, "Maasai Autonomy and Sovereignty in Kenya and Tanzania," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (Spring 2001), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/maasai-autonomy-and-sovereignty-kenya-and-tanzania.

[155] For a discussion of the 1913 challenge, see Norman Maclean Leys, *Kenya* (London: Hogarth Press, 1924).

[156] Copy of the 1911 Agreement is located in the Ukamba Province Report on the Boundary of the Masai and Kikuyu Reserves from 1912-1915, DC/MKS10A/5/1, Kenya National Archive.

prevent protests from herding communities while building his case for the larger land claim demarcated on the map shown to government officials.[157] The conflicts sparked by Cobb's dual map system are recorded in the 1916-1917 Narok District Annual Report:

> During the year the land on Mau Narok promised to Mr. Cobb was surveyed, and the Masai were again told that it was to be a farm and excluded from the reserve. This caused a good deal of dissatisfaction, Masikondi and other elders maintaining that they had been promised the whole of Mau Narok at the time of the move and making allegations against the government of a breach of faith.[158]

An official survey was conducted of Cobb's land claim, yet Olol-Dapash indicates that Cobb may have moved the survey markers to further expand his land holdings.[159] While Cobb did admit in the 1920's that part of the land he occupied was not legally his, he continued using his own maps to press trespassing charges against Maasai herders. One such charge resulted in the 1926 arrest of six Maasai herders. The accused Maasai were first convicted of trespass and then acquitted on the basis of "illegal and incompetent evidence." At this time, colonial officials indicated that "the boundary is a purely artificial one – a demarcated line with beacons hidden by the grass – it is not surprising that trespass at least takes place."[160] Later, in 1953, colonial administrators stated "the boundary with the Masai Land Unit is badly overgrown and consequently not readily visible on the ground."[161] Additionally, Commissioner Hosking stated

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[157] Olol-Dapash et al., "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok."

[158] Colonial spelling of Maasai as "Masai" has not been changed in this or the following historic documents. Quoted by Olol-Dapash, "Maasai Autonomy." Original found in Narok District Annual Report, 1916-1917, DC/NRK/1/1/1, Kenya National Archive.

[159] Even if Cobb was not involved in this survey, the accusation made by Olol-Dapash indicates the distrust between Maasai community members and the British administration.

[160] Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok," 10. Letter from the District Commissioner to the Officer in Charge, Masai October 12th 1950, PC/NKU/2/16/3, Kenya National Archive.

[161] Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok," 10. Letter from District Commissioner Hosking to the Director of Surveys, Nairobi and Provincial Commissioner, Ngong. November 23rd 1953, PC/NKU/2/16/3, Kenya National Archive.

"here is nothing to indicate the exact position of the boundary."[162] Disputes concerning the legality of these borders, the location of borders, and questions of trespass continued until all Maasai herders were driven off of the Maasai Highlands. In this way, the British colonial government produced arguments using a frame of bounded land, which eventually resulted in the disappearance of Maasai herders from their traditional grazing lands.

Between 1904 and 1913, Kenyan Maasai lost seventy percent of their land. Then, more land was lost with the creation of the Amboseli, Tsavo, Maasai Mara, Kitengela, and Samburu parks.[163] The Maasai Mara National Park was created only two years before Kenya's independence and was a point of contention during the decolonization meetings between the British and Kenyan African Democratic Union. The Maasai United Front (MUF), a constituent organization of the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) led by Justus ole Tipis, represented the Maasai in these negotiations.[164] The MUF demanded that the British regard the 1904 and 1911 Agreements as binding treaties between the Maasai and British. This interpretation, based on a frame of bounded land, would recognize Maasailand as a separate nation from Kenya, and allow the Maasai to bargain directly with the British government pursuant of an independent Maasai nation. The Maasai continually pressed this interpretation, including an attempt to bring the case to the UN International Court of Justice.[165] However, MUF's case was never accepted by the British who preferred to use a frame of disappearance,

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[162] Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok," 10. Letter from District Commissioner Hosking.

[163] George M. Ogendi, Rose K. Morara, and Nicholas Olekaikai, "The Influence of Westernization on Water Resources Use and Conservation among the Maasai People of Kenya," in *Water, Cultural Diversity, and Global Environmental Change: Emerging Trends, Sustainable Futures?*, eds. Barbara Rose Johnson, Lisa Hiwaski, Irene J. Klaver, Ameyali Ramos Castillo, and Veronia Strang, (New York: Springer, 2012), 137-47.

[164] The inclusion of MUF in these deliberations points to the radically different position of Maasai community leaders in Tanzanian and Kenyan politics.

[165] Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok," 12. "Masai 'Let Down' by British: Dismay at Governor's Advise," *African*, July 18, 1960, CO/822/1997, Kenya National Archive.

arguing that the Maasai were no longer a unique or important ethnic group that required separate negotiations.

Maasai analysts such as George Ogendi have interpreted this refusal by the British and Kenyan governments to adhere to the 1904 and 1911 Agreements as extraction and tricks; "[T]hese two Governments have relentlessly pursued a policy of extraction towards what was left of the Masai lands through the parceling out of land and legal tricks."[166] According to Tipis, the governments of England and Kenya used a frame of bounded land to divide and rule Maasai communities until they became minorities in their own lands.

The MUF introduced a new strategy in 1962 at the Kenyan Constitutional Congress. Still using a frame of bounded land, they presented evidence of land rights violations, fraudulent maps, agreements, and evictions to support their demands for independent Maasailand. Despite these petitions and protests, most of the land in question remained part of the Maasai Mara, or was given to Kikuyu farmers. The government emphasized that its decision, in accordance with the new constitution, was "non-racial and non-tribal," yet the Maasai saw it as a preference for agricultural over herder communities.[167] Statements made by the British government supporting the Kenyan government's decision reflect Eliot's earlier statements regarding Maasai under-use of their lands.

> [I]t would be contrary to public policy for the Masai, who have not developed their own land, to be given the right to carry their primitive agricultural practices to other land in Kenya, which is urgently required for re-settlement and which

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[166] Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok," 13. Appendix A: A Memorandum on the Masai Treaties and the Masai Lands, Presented to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, at Government House, Nairobi, on Monday the 27th of November, 1961," CO/822/2000, 115261, Kenya National Archive.

[167] Quoted by Olol Dapash et al., "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok," 14. "Secretary of State's Visit to Kenya, November, 1961: The Masai Problem," CO/822/2000, 115261 Kenya National Archive.

> ought in the general interest of Kenya to be utilized to the maximum possible extent.[168]

Here the frame of disappearance re-emerges as the reader is informed what would be in the "general interest of Kenya," a collectivist argument which assumes that the Maasai are already part of Kenya and should give up their ethnic distinctiveness. This statement is similar to that made by Tanzanian President Kikwete, "national unity is the unity among citizens, who like to consider themselves Tanzanians first, before identifying themselves by tribe, race, religion, gender or region of origin."[169] These arguments by the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments attempt to bring Maasai communities under the umbrella of national identity, which would discount arguments made by Maasai communities regarding the uniqueness of their herding traditions.

Further complicating the relationship between the Kenyan government and Maasai communities is the Kenyan government's support for wildlife migrations across the borders of Tanzania and Kenya. At the center of this conflict is the Maasai Mara, established in 1961 to connect to the Tanzanian Serengeti. The park's name references the Maasai and their description for the land – *mara* – that describes the way grasses, bush, and scrub spot the landscape. Beyond naming the Maasai Mara after its traditional residents, the Kenyan government has experimented with multiple forms of park governance and boundary setting in an attempt to improve both community relations and conservation policy. These experiments have included the 1974 reduction of the borders of the Maasai Mara from 1,821 square kilometers to 1,510 square kilometers, which allowed some land to be returned to the Maasai. In other experiments, governance of the park was transferred from the Narok County Council, to the TransMara

[168] Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., "Historical Injustice at Mau Narok," 16. "Brief No. 11, The Masai: Official Eyes Only," Kenya Constitutional Conference 1962, CO/822/2000, 115261, Kenya National Archive.

[169] Kikwete, "Speech by the President."

County Council to today's Mara Conservancy.[170] Today, as a result of these experiments, there is much confusion amongst local communities regarding the ownership of specific plots of land.

Kenya is the only nation analyzed in this dissertation without a socialist past, and the Kenyan government has never claimed to own all of the land in the nation. As such, the use of the frame of bounded land by the Kenyan government has produced both a richer body of documents and more frequent deliberations regarding specific land claims. For example, each of my interviewees outside of the Maasai Mara presented a significantly different narrative of land ownership, demarcation, and loss. These narratives were more personal than those in the other case studies, but also prevented the collective identity apparent in Tanzania, Mongolia, and China.

Today, conflicts between the Maasai community and Kenyan government center around the management of land and revenue in the Maasai Mara region. For example, Maasai community members claim that government expenditures are so small that the road from Narok city to the Maasai Mara is in terrible disrepair and many tourists choose to fly into the Maasai Mara rather than make the short drive from Nairobi. As such the entire tourist industry, from gas stations to hotels to art shops in southern Kenya have fallen into depression. During my interviews in 2012, I met with Maasai shop owners, museum directors, and community leaders, all who indicated that while the government evidently cared greatly about the Maasai Mara, little attention was paid to surrounding communities or their livelihoods.

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[170] Mara Triangle, "Ecosystem Sustainability in the Mara River Basin," *The Mara Conservancy*, accessed June 2012, http://maratriangle.org/about-us/research/ecosystem-sustainability/.



Figure 5: Francis in his shop in the road to the Maasai Mara.[171]

As a result of losing their grazing lands, and now their access to a second economy in road-side tourist economies, many Maasai men of the *moran* age group have moved to Nairobi where they work as night guards. Dressed in traditional attire and employed based on the ethos of Maasai warriors, these guards occupy a unique position of authority and otherness in the bustling metropolis of Nairobi. The intersectionality of Maasai warriors in the city was illuminated in 2012 when a Maasai guard was accused of killing a street child that he had caught stealing a chicken in the Kayole suburb of Nairobi. In response to these charges, MP Waititu stated,

> From today I want all Maasais chased away from here. They should go back to where they came from. They are not welcome in Kayole. And [I want] all people who employed Maasai, to sack them with immediate effect.[172]

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[171] I spent a full day with Francis in his shop alongside the road to the Maasai Mara. He told me that before the road fell into disrepair he could make several hundred dollars in one day. That money supported his family, as well as the family of Maasai craftswomen who made many of the goods that he sells in his shop. However, on the day that I sat with him there were no customers. Francis indicated that he now only expects one or two each day because tourists are paying to fly into the Maasai Mara rather than travel the bumpy road from Narok to the Maasai Mara. Allison Hahn, August 2012.

[172] Dominic Wabala, "Kenya: Uhuru Disowns Waititu," *The Star* (Nairobi), September 26 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201209261353.html.

Only minutes after Waititu's comments, one Maasai guard was killed and another seriously injured. Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta quickly responded, indicating that Waititu's speech was divisive against national unity.[173] He demanded an apology:

> If Waititu believes in the values and beliefs of TNA, I demand that he apologizes to the people of Kenya and the concerned community for the comments attributed to him yesterday.[174]

At the same time, Heritage Minister William ole Ntimama called for MP Waititu to be arrested for inciting the murder and injury of Maasai guardsmen. MP Waititu did eventually apologize. Yet before in doing so, he defended himself in the Kenyan Parliament by claiming that he had been speaking about "foreigners who were threatening law and order in Embakasi."[175] Discourse surrounding MP Waititu's statement illustrated the position of Maasai communities in modern Kenya. For MP Waititu, the Maasai living in Nairobi are foreigners, and should be returned to wherever they came from. While this statement might seem to make the frame of movement-as-wandering primary, MP Waititu is only able to use a frame of movement-as-wandering because he believes in the disappearance of traditional Maasai near Nairobi. In these statements, MP Waititu mimics the statements made by Tanzanian PM Telele when in 2005 he called for the Maasai to be returned to wherever they have come from. PM Kenyatta's response supported the Maasai victims, but he is careful not to name them as Maasai, instead referring to the "the people of Kenya" and "concerned community." While this response builds upon the unity of Kenya, and allows many citizens to express grievances towards MP Waititu, it also utilizes the frame of

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[173] Uhru Kenyatta is the son of Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta and the great-grandson of a Maasai woman. Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya,* 17.

[174] Wabala, "Kenya: Uhuru Disowns Waititu."

[175] Wabala, "Kenya: Uhuru Disowns Waititu."

disappearance; the Maasai are equal citizens of Kenya, not the unique nation with whom the British signed the 1904 and 1911 Agreements.

3.3 YOU HAVE TO KEEP CATTLE

Maasai communities have developed a diverse body of violent and nonviolent tactics to resist British and Kenyan arguments and policies regarding Maasai culture and identity. For example, in 1918 men of the *moran* age group were conscripted into the British army and children were sent to boarding schools. While Maasai elders agreed to military and school enrollment, those of *moran* age protested and began a series of confrontations with the Kenyan African Rifles. The *moran* quickly burned and looted colonial offices, cut telegraph lines, killed fourteen people, and wounded sixty. By the end of the resistance not one Maasai *moran* reported for military service.[176] While the British explained the *moran's* protest as a refusal to serve in the military, the *moran* indicated that they were resisting the enrollment of Maasai children in boarding schools.

> They felt that if children went to school they would be lost forever to the Maasai society. The children involved were not *moran*, being of pre-circumcision age, but the *moran* felt compelled to protect them from what the regarded as exploitation by the state.[177]

Later attempts by the British to conscript the *moran* were resisted by Maasai communities that radically redefined traditional age groups. These communities advanced the pace of age-based ceremonies so that young men that should have been *moran* became junior-elders, and those still

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[176] Robert L. Tignor, *The Colonial Transformation of Kenya : The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 to 1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[177] Tignor, *Colonial Transformation of Kenya*, 79.

regarded as children became *moran.* Because the British had conscripted the age-set of *moran* rather than a specific age-range, they had little recourse when groups of young boys reported for military service.[178]

When military conscription failed, the British government shifted tactics by confining Maasai children to boarding schools and Maasai adults to group ranches. These policies restricted Maasai communities by demarcating the spaces where the Maasai could, and could not live. British reports indicate that Maasai children were eager to attend school. However, Maasai park ranger Tepilit ole Saitoti narrates his own boarding school enrollment as a product of coercion - his father warned that he must not run away from school otherwise his family would be fined five oxen by the colonial authority.[179]

Today, Maasai children still attend boarding schools and communities are still confined to group ranches. While modern group ranches are designed to mimic traditional practices of communal grazing, conflicts have emerged as the government allows group ranches to privatize. During privatization, conflicts occur over which members have authenticated claims to communal lands, and if communal lands can be sold to non-Maasai purchasers, such as tour companies. Additional conflicts occur when tour companies drive through group ranches and individually held Maasai lands to avoid the poor roads en-route to the Maasai Mara. The Kenyan government has used a frame of bounded-land to justify both the establishment of group ranches and privatized land holdings. Then, when conflict occurs, the government refers to the frame of bounded land in its adjudications.

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[178] Tignor, *Colonial Transformation of Kenya,* 80-85. Tignor indicates a series of resistances to British colonial polices which resulted in immediate success. However, he also notes the long-term effects of these resistances that upset age and gender dynamics and created the foundation for a Maasai class-based society.

[179] Tepilit ole Saitoti, *The Worlds of a Maasai Warrior: An Autobiography* (New York: Random House, 1986), 53 .

Maasai herder Salaon ole Parsinande reflected on the government's preference for the frames of bounded land and disappearance, and the effects of the government's compartmentalization on Maasai identity in his 2012 interview with Maasai journalist Michael ole Tiampati.

> As pastoralists, we get hit hardest when there is drought because unlike the olden days when our forefathers had vast grasslands and the [Osupuko] highlands, where they moved the herds during hard times, the highlands are long gone, not owned by the community but by individuals. This hinders our free movement to these important buffer zones and as a result, my son-in-law had to undergo the humiliating process of having to beg due to the loss of livestock, as we can no longer access the highlands.[180]

Grazing in the highlands is critical to Maasai community members as they are able to find grass during the dry seasons, and by moving to a cooler temperate region, are able to avoid malarial mosquitoes. Ole Parsinande indicates that a lack of access to these lands has prevented traditional adaptations to climate change, such as herd migrations and cattle raiding which would have allowed his family to regain the minimum number of cattle necessary to begin a new herd.

The holding of a herd of cattle and the number of cattle held is of critical importance to Maasai communities. It is these cattle that determine a family's status, that insure food supplies, and that are traded or given as gifts during life events. Yet, the Kenyan government has had difficulty reconciling the importance that Maasai families place on cattle. As a result of shrinking landholdings, Maasai community members are faced with either holding smaller herds, or overgrazing their lands (which in the long run will also result in smaller herds). Noah ole Matiek, a Maasai farmer, explains his personal experience with these conditions:

> About 20 years ago I can describe how the Maasai are living in that time. At that time we had a lot of cattle, so many of them, and a lot of land. So when you have

[180] Michael ole Tiampati, "Hard Times Affect Vital Apsects of Maasai Culture," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (2012), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/voices/michael-ole-tiampati/hard-times-affect-vital-aspects-maasai-culture?page=1.

> a lot of cattle you graze in community land of which there is nobody who can stop you. So, and also in type of food they used to eat, our community because we are Maasai we use meat and milk only and our people they are so healthy. When you see the children growing, so you can see them, they are healthy.[181]

Today, ole Matiek has turned from herding to small-scale agriculture, a transition that he narrates as "we do not have land, land has gone. So the small land you have it, just utilize it." For ole Matiek, grazing on large community lands is not possible and his family is reliant on a small number of cattle and a small plot of crops. Many development workers have referenced these circumstances using a frame of disappearance, arguing that it is time for the Maasai to give up their cattle. Yet, herders respond to these arguments by claiming that even when land is scarce, Maasai families will keep the cattle which are integrally tied to their identity.

In his AgFax interview, Jeremiah Atetei, a Maasai leader from *Isinya* indicated that it was the ability to keep and grow these herds that determined Maasai policy and identity.

> We just feel that we just want to own them [cattle] but we do not usually sell. Because if a Maasai has no cows you will never be recognized by your community. So you have to keep cattle even if it is one or more, you have to have them.[182]

This intrinsic value of cattle advanced by Atetei is absent from most government deliberations. The only instances that I have found where the Kenyan government engages in discussions of Maasai cattle herding are from human wildlife conflicts, in which either the Maasai are accused of herding in park lands, or wildlife are accused of crossing into Maasai grazing lands.[183] These

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[181] Noah ole Matiek, Jeremiah Atetei, Margaret Noah, Benson Mwangi, and Peter Mula, interview by Noah Lusaka *Agfax: Reporting Science in Africa: Climate Change Brings Cultural Change,* June 2012. http://www.agfax.net/transcript/agfax503.pdf

[182] Matiek et al, *Agfax: Reporting Science*.

[183] These discourses echo the colonial accusations of trespass. However here it is elephants or lions that have trespassed on Maasai ground. This utilization of a historic claim structure reflects a living history of court proceedings where Maasai community members were persecuted for trespass and critically, the expectation that the state will prosecute the trespassing wild animals just as it prosecutes trespassing Maasai herders.

conflicts have become increasingly common as families, herds, and wildlife compete for increasingly small water and pasture resources.

3.4 CASE STUDY: HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICTS

"Human-wildlife conflicts" have increased as the space between parks where the animals officially live, and Maasai land holdings where the animals are trespassing, are in no way marked. When reported by media and government agencies, the frame of bounded land is used to argue that park borders are clearly set, and seldom questioned by locals. While on paper this is an accurate description – the Maasai Mara practices fortress conservation – in reality the park's wall consists only of a large gate complex and a short length of perimeter walls. Approaching tourists might be given the illusion that the entire park is encased, but a quick drive along the wall quickly indicates the opposite. Further, recalling the experimentation with the Maasai Mara park boundaries presented in the last subsection, and Maasai's experience with colonial boundary shifting presented in the first subsection, it is understandable that for Maasai communities, the park's boundaries might be difficult to discern.

The borders between park land and grazing land are frequently crossed by both herds and wildlife. In my meetings with a local game commissioner in Narok I learned that many local herders continue to use the Maasai Mara for grazing. However, unlike traditional herding that occurs during the day, these Maasai Mara herders have become nocturnal, grazing cattle only at night.[184] This new practice reconciles the spirit of tourism driven fortress conservation – do not

[184] This practice was presented to me as a secret community adaptation, unknown to conservationists. However, I was also told about Maasai practices of night grazing during interviews with local conservationists in

let the tourists see grazing in the park – with Maasai herder's desires to use some of the best grazing land in the area. This ad-hoc resolution has prevented many debates between conservation groups that would press for less-porous park boundaries. By grazing in the Maasai Mara at night, Maasai communities have produced non-violent resistance to policies supported by the government's frame of bounded land. However, this act of resistance has only percolated within Maasai communities. To Kenyans and international stakeholders, the Maasai Mara's boundaries are very real, and crossing those boundaries is considered illegal trespass. These conflicting interpretations of Maasai Mara boundaries have resulted in continued conflict between Maasai communities, government officials, and conservation organizations.

One point of conflict is between Maasai herders and lions. Traditional herders would frequent Maasai Mara pasturelands and as a result keep the grasses at a sustainable-but-short height. Because they would leave those pastures in the evening, and could see over the grasses during the day, unplanned encounters with lions were rare. Today, fewer herders utilize the Maasai Mara pasturelands, and those that do so must graze at night. As such, these herders are in tall grasses, in the dark, using the same spaces as nocturnal hunters such as lions. Because of the dark and tall grasses, it is very difficult for these herders to see approaching lions until conflict has become inevitable.

When faced with a kill-or-be-killed decision, Maasai herders will injure or kill a lion. The Maasai community views this as an acceptable act of self-defense because if the herders did nothing they or their herds would be killed by the approaching lion. These communities maintain that they have no interest in hunting or killing lions except for self-defense. Journalists and conservation organizations, however, often describe exotic Maasai warriors who must kill a lion

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Narok, Kenya. The practice seems to be an open secret, technically illegal, but accepted by herders and conservationists who recognize that the Maasai must herd their cattle and the best pastures are in the Maasai Mara.

to obtain community status as a warrior. Then, these organizations use a frame of disappearance, often disguised by development rhetoric, to call for steep fines or imprisonment for the offending Maasai. In this argument, organizations claim that the Maasai tradition of lion hunting is both a historic relic and a significant threat to future conservation efforts. Claims made by Maasai community members that they have no interest in hunting lions are not presented in these reports. Nor have Maasai complaints gained traction for their complaints that while Maasai herders are sued for killing or injuring lions, the government takes no action when a herder is killed by a lion.[185]

The complex intersection of Maasai, conservationist, and government interpretations of human-wildlife conflicts is illustrated by reports from the summer of 2012 when six lions were killed outside of the Nairobi National Park.[186] The initial reports indicate the lions' deaths, but places little blame on the Maasai community. Fredrick Nzwili, East Africa Correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* reported,

> Masai warriors speared to death six lions in Ilkeek-Lemedung'i village in Kitengela area on the southern side of the park. The predators had killed 13 goats and sheep, and mauled one person in an attack, according to members of the community. Three other lions were killed in December 2011 and January 2012 near Nairobi Park. Although killing lions is illegal here and the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) has promised to arrest the killers, no one has been arrested or charged.[187]

This report indicates that KWS has not pressed charges, and includes an interview with local NGO members who explain why the killings occurred.

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[185] These tensions are exasperated by the division in management between the Maasai Mara (largely community run) and the surrounding lands which are under the purview of the Kenyan Wildlife Service.

[186] This park is different from the Maasai Mara, but those distinctions seldom enter public discourse. Distinctions between Maasai and other herder communities are similarly absent.

[187] Fredrick Nzwili, "Lions in Nairobi? A New Suburban Problem," *Christian Science Monitor,* July 31, 2012.

> The killings are regrettable, but this was a reaction of the community which feels frustrated and threatened. The situation has gone from bad to worse," says Sidney Quntai, the chairman of Kenya Coalition for Wildlife Conservation and Management, a civil society organization. "It is difficult to sleep peacefully at night, since one has to keep ears and eyes open. In case of noise one creeps out to see if the animals are safe"[188]

Sidney Quntai's interview points to the government's frame of bounded land and conceptions of trespass of lions creeping into paddocks at night. The community's actions are excused by fear, and by the inability of the park to confine or control wildlife. In this report, Nzwili indicates the increased exit of lions from local parks, and the Kenyan Wildlife Service's inability or unwillingness to protect local communities.

Nzwili's metered report of these encounters did not, however, set a standard for international reporting on wildlife conflict. In mid-July, 12 elephants, 10 African buffalo, and a lion were attacked by Maasai herders in Amboseli National Park. The narration of these attacks by Brian Jackman's report for *The Telegraph* (UK) and James Clarke's report for the *Independent Online* (South Africa), demonstrate the international attempt to make sense of and respond to Maasai protests. Jackman reported,

> The trouble started last week when a Maasai boy was killed by a buffalo and an officer from the KWS blamed the killing on the Maasai. Outraged Maasai warriors vented their fury by spearing an elephant and a buffalo before order was restored and the officer in question departed...To make their feelings known, hundreds of warriors from villages around Amboseli were instructed to go and spear all elephants, buffaloes and lions they could find in the rangelands surrounding the park.[189]

Three days later, James Clarke, a journalist for the South African *Independent Online* reported,

> Ten days ago, 200 Maasai "warriors", in an act of vengeance, randomly speared a dozen elephants, 10 buffalo and a lion from Kenya's Amboseli National Park –

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[188] Nzwili, "Lions in Nairobi?."

[189] Brian Jackman, "Elephants Killed by Maasai in Row with Wildlife Services," Telegraph (UK), June 26, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/9428438/Elephants-killed-by-Maasai-in-row-with-wildlife-services.html.

> East Africa's second most popular reserve. They complained they received too little spin-off from the park, yet had to put up with elephants damaging their crops and taking lives. A month before, six lions from Nairobi National Park were speared to death by disgruntled locals.[190]

The different tone of these reports indicates the authors' predispositions towards Maasai communities. Jackman leads with the death of a Maasai boy, while Clarke presents the Maasai's acts as vengeance without a specific prompt. Additionally, while Nzwili and Jackman both use "warrior" in reference to the age group of Maasai men, Clarke's report begins with sarcasm regarding Maasai communities. His assertion that these attacks were random also supports the frame of disappearance, of a community so far out of touch that they sneak up and attack elephants. Clarke does note the causes of these tensions, spanning financial gains from park entry fees, to elephants that damage crops, to herder's deaths, and contextualizes the attacks with the death of lions reported by Nzwili. However, while Nzwili and Jackman indicate that the lions were killed only after animals and humans were attacked, Clarke merely states that locals were disgruntled. Clarke's report concludes with the statement, "African communities are becoming fed-up with wildlife – elephants in particular. And elephants are showing increasing signs of being fed-up with humans."[191] In this argument, Clarke references chronic stress experienced by elephants due to abuse, constraint, and translocation as legitimating factors in elephant attacks on human communities. Yet, he makes no mention of those same pressures experienced by Maasai herders. Instead, Clarke concludes that if human communities can simply learn to live alongside elephants, preferably through eco-tourism schemes, human-wildlife conflicts will end.

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[190] James Clarke, "Elephants, Humans Die as Hostility Soars," *Independent Online*, July 31, 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/science/environment/elephants-humans-die-as-hostility-soars-1.1352961#.UyREof3fZuY

[191] Clarke, "Elephants, Humans Die."

Maasai communities have a radically different proposal to end human-wildlife conflicts. They contend that these conflicts did not occur until the government began advancing arguments and policies through a frame of bounded land. During my interviews with Maasai community members, I was told about traditional grazing patterns, settlement cites, and herder patrols that kept human-wildlife conflicts at a minimum. These interviewees indicated that human-wildlife conflicts are increasing because humans, herds, and wildlife have been pressed into too small of spaces.

Figure 6: Interview with Maasai herders, August 2012.[192]

[192] Oral History interviews in Narok, Kenya. Allison Hahn, 2012.

The juxtaposition of journalist and herder reports of human-wildlife conflicts illuminate critical points of conflict in southern Kenya. Clarke and Jackman interpret the killings as vengeance by Maasai men. Nzwili takes a different approach, suggesting that the kilings are an undesireable but understandable act of protest. Maasai community members reflect on these killings as acts of desperation. At play in these conflicts are questions of Maasai identity, the boundaries between human and wildlife communities, and concepts of wildlife conservation.

Maasai communities contend that identity, human wildlife relationships, and conservation are all bound together. They insist that because Maasai communities do not eat the meat of wildlife, and the Maasai not celebrate random hunting, their communities have a long history of what the west would term "wildlife conservation." They then extend this argument, contending that the Maasai Mara and Serengeti had to be established on Maasai lands because the Maasai were the only community that had protected and maintained wildlife. For example, my driver, who was born in the Maasai Mara suggested that I find Kikuyu community members and ask them where their wildlife where. The implied joke was that the Kikuyu don't have wildlife, they had eaten all of theirs.

While Maasai activists have frequently highlighted traditional connections between identity, wildlife, and conservation, these arguments have gained little traction among international analysts who maintain that wildlife can only be protected by divisions between conservation land and grazing land. Writing in *Le Monde*, Alain Zecchini, *Administrateur de la Society de la Nature,* responded to the Maasai community's arguments by referencing the recent lion killings to prove that the Maasai cannot peacefully coexist with wild animals.

> There's still a widely held romantic idea that the Maasai and other tribesmen live in perfect harmony with the animal world…The truth, of course, is rather different. This is not peaceful coexistence. The herdsmen simply lack the capital and know-how to change the status quo. In the past, when there were fewer

> people, the herdsmen may have been able to overlook these natural intruders. But now, as populations expand, financial needs increase and the economic stakes rise, it's absolutely essential to make the most of the land. Quite simply, the herdsman can no longer bear the additional costs associated with the presence of wildlife.[193]

In this essay, Zecchini reflects on the government's frame of bounded land which specifies and differentiates the spaces where humans and animals should live. Referring to lions and elephants as "natural intruders" he assumes that the Maasai have always thought of these animals as trespassers onto their lands. According to Zecchini, the position of Maasai herders in late modern capitalism is one of desperation – "they can no longer bear the additional costs associated with the presence of wildlife." This argument reflects same desperation expressed to me by Maasai herders during my interviews in 2012. However, while Maasai interviewees told me that they would prefer better access to park lands and including interactions with wildlife, Zecchini assumes that Maasai communities would prefer an firm park border and absence of wildlife from their pasturelands.

Zecchini also reproduces the government's frame of disappearance when he presents the Maasai as people out of time – unable to adapt in the status quo. To be clear, Zeechini does not call for the disappearance of the Maasai, but he does reproduce a proleptic elegy that explains how the Maasai cannot live in this time. He continues his report, indicating how the Maasai feel about wild animals,

> From the point of view of the Maasai, these animals consume scarce resources, spread disease and may injure or even kill. So the men build protective fences round their cob houses and keep permanent watch over their fields and herds. All wildlife is owned by the state, however, and the Maasai are only allowed to eliminate this particular form of competition if they are under personal threat. So, rather than killing a few on the quiet, they take the more devious and ultimately more radical course of clearing land for cultivation, putting up fences, limiting

[193] Alain Zecchini, "Kenya's Battle for Biodiversity," *Le Monde Diplomatique,* November 11, 2000, English Edition, http://mondediplo.com/2000/11/21masai.

> access to water holes, and burning stubble. As a result, these animals are rapidly dying out, not just in the Mara but also in Kenya as a whole. Between 1977 and 1994, the country lost 44% of its wildlife.[194]

This essay emphasizes the increase in human-wildlife conflicts, and the Maasai's desperate need, or perception of a need, to protect themselves.[195] While Zecchini does not directly blame the Maasai for confronting wildlife, he does produce a compelling narrative of how the Maasai are endangering wildlife. The roots of these problems are not considered, nor does the Maasai community's reframing of conservation enter the discussion.[196] Indeed, the Maasai community's arguments are silenced by writers such as Zecchini who relate the "Maasai point of view" to the reader with no indication of where or how he gained this information.

Zecchini's narration is very different from Sharon Looremeta, a member of the Maasai community and Umuro Godana, a conflict resolution program officer for Practical Action, who described the conflicts in southern Kenya.

> [Settlers] are buying land, cultivating, fencing them off, and therefore the pastoralist person cannot now move around with his animals. The new settlers, I would say, are coming to cultivate land that is not even suitable for cultivation. So the communities themselves who have sold the land cannot even be able to drive away their animals. You find them cutting other peoples fences, grazing in other people's land, and this has always caused conflict between the two groups.[197]

In this description, Godana describes situations opposing those narrated by Zecchini in *Le Monde*. Zecchini argued that the Maasai are creating confined spaces and destroying lands where that wildlife might live in an attempt to adapt to the pressures of modernity. Godana, however, argues that the Maasai are attempting to open spaces – literally cutting through fences to graze

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[194] Zecchini, "Kenya's Battle for Biodiversity."

[195] For an example of these narratives, see Wildlife Travel, "Elephants Relocated to the Maasai Mara," *Wildlife Extra.com,* September 2012, http://www.wildlifeextra.com/go/news/mara-elephants.html#cr.

[196] Michael Gachanja, "Kenya: Urgently Revise the Wildife Law," *The Star* (Nairobi), September 5, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201209051336.html.

[197] Sharon Looremeta and Umuro Godana, interview by Winnie Onyimbo, *Agfax: Reporting Science in Africa: Healing Pastoral Conflict*, September, 2007, http://www.agfax.net/radio/detail.php?i=1&s=t.

their herds. The conflict, according to Godana, is created by new settlers who are restricting the herding patterns of Maasai communities, not by Maasai herders attempting to adapt pasturelands for agricultural cultivation.

The final layer of differentiation concerns the Maasai and their willingness to live near wildlife. Zucchini indicates that historically the Maasai have tolerated wildlife because they "lack the know-how" to get rid of them. This argument is produces an expectation that the Maasai wish to modernize and gain the capabilities to change their environment. Zucchini's arguments are called into question by Maasai community members who choose to live near wild animals. For example, Moses Kaleku, a Maasai herder who also works as a game keeper told journalist Kipchumba Kemei,

> "We are the ones who really know this habitat and the animals," says Moses Kaleku one of the graduates of Koyaki Guiding School in Masai Mara Game Reserve, Kenya's first school that is training the Maasai to become safari guides. "All through my life I have been with wild animals. I have survived the risks of living with them," says Kaleku who now works as a tour guide at Encounter Mara Camp as a tour guide. Known for their red clothes and diet of milk and meat, the Maasai by tradition are cattle herders and their decision to become safari guides illustrates it now wants to move on.[198]

It is important to note that the frame of disappearance entered Kemei's text after the interview quotation ended. Moses Kaleku did not indicate that he is now a game keeper because he wanted to identify in a non-Maasai way, but because he had grown up with these animals. Following from the analysis provided in this chapter, it is possible to interpret Kaleku's motivations to be a gamekeeper as a young man who both identifies as a traditional Maasai herder *and* works in the Maasai Mara. Yet, for a writer who is not privy to the complexities of Maasai argumentation and identity, division between traditional herd and wildlife keeper maybe too great and texts such as

[198] Kipchumba Kemei, "Maasais Will No Longer Just Be a Tourism Spectacle," *Standard Digital News* (Nairobi), August 25, 2012, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000064720&story_title=-Maasais-will-no-longer-just-be-a-tourism-spectacle.

Kemei's produce an expectation amongst policy makers, international tourists, and development organizations that Maasai youth are moving away from herding towards westernized wildlife management careers.

3.5 WE DO NOT HAVE LAND: BUREAUCRACY IN KENYA

In response to the lack of progress gained by non-violent resistance, and limited acceptance of Maasai produced arguments, many Maasai community members in Kenya have turned to direct – at times violent – resistance. Many of these acts of resistance are prefaced on desperation, such as that expressed by Peter Mula a Maasai farmer from Isinya who stated, "We do not have land, land has gone. So the small land you have it, just utilize it."[199] In this description, Isinya seems to both claim that he has no land, and that he must use the land that he has. The reason for this inconsistency may be a reflection of land which is lost – Maasailand – and current land which is part of, but not fully recognized as Maasailand.

Much of this recent land loss has occurred as group ranches are privatized to create individual land holdings. Conflict occurs when decedents of the original group ranch members make overlapping claims for pasturelands. The Kenyan land grants office is charged adjudicating these claims and providing certificates for individual land holdings. However, the land grants office does not always verify the ancestral ties of individuals to a group ranch, an oversight that allows almost anyone to claim group ranch lands. Additionally, while the specific borders of an individualized claim may be marked at the intersection between the claim and road, it is common

[199] Matiek et al, *Agfax: Reporting Science*.

for no one – not the titleholder, or her neighbors, or the land office – to know the precise location of the other three boundaries.[200] Finally, even when the land claims office is able to determine and ancestral connection to the group ranch, and mark all of the boundaries for the land claim, problems may occur because many large families have practiced home birth and their children do not have birth certificates to substantiate their ancestry.

The intricacies of substantiating an individual land claim were explained to me during an interview with Kiara, a Maasai man in his mid-forty's with eighteen children and four wives. He told me that all of his children were born at home and only a few of them had birth certificates. He similarly lacked a certificate, which had created problems when he attempted to claim his family portion of a group ranch.

> My father died and I should have inherited the land, 110 acres, but it is also claimed by someone else. The problem is still in court, but I don't expect it to be resolved. Just this week I was supposed to be in court to discuss this but the lawyer from the other family said that they were bereaved and so asked for a delay in the court date…We have given up and have worked with the other people assigned the land to negotiate the subdivided between ourselves. We keep going to court but don't expect to have a result.[201]

Later, when I interviewed the district commissioner of the local land grants office I was told that appeals processes were possible and that Kiara's family could easily regain its traditional

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[200] Mengi, interview by Allison Hahn, August 3, 2012.

[201] Kiara, interview by Allison Hahn August 2, 2012. The interview ended at this point, and in the car ride to the next family's compound Professor Saitoti and I discussed the problem with this line of questioning. In the other side of Narok, land subdivisions happened a long time ago, but the people were still experiencing problems verifying their land claims. In that region, many families have been accused of having too much land or illegally registered for the land. There are people that stole land, or that are registered for 30 acres but occupy 100 acres. Because of all of these things, some community members did not want to be on record discussing their land use or rights. Further, some community members were suspicious of foreigners asking about land policy. They expressed concern that my report would be read by the Kenyan government, which would then hold them responsible for giving a foreigner a bad impression of Kenyan policy.

These suspicions were justified later that afternoon when I met with an official from the land registry office who tried to find out specifically who I had spoken with and what they had said. Fortunately, Kiara had not told us his last name nor the names of his family members.

holding. The current landholders and the challengers simply need to meet in the office to deliberate over the land holding. Yet, I was also told that the office lacked enforcement mechanisms to compel the landholders to attend such a meeting, and the officer that I interviewed conceded that there was no reason for the current landholders to attend such a meeting. Additionally, while Kiara's family is working to acquire the necessary documents to present their claim, the current landholders are building permanent structures which they can use in future deliberations to prove their merit as superior land owners.[202] Recall the discussion of *terra nullis* presented at the beginning of this chapter by which Maasai communities were unable to prove their land use. Following the British standard of land use, which has been adopted by the modern Kenyan state, these permanent structures may very well count for more than a birth certificate in adjudicating a land claim.[203]

Today, Maasai community members are still arguing against the government's use of frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance. In each of my interviews in Kenya I was told that the Maasai are not going anywhere – they, their herds, and their children would continue to live in southern Kenya and northern Tanzania. Although conflicts are mounting between herders, development projects, conservationists, and government officials,

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[202] This reflects a colonial method of land appropriation as poof of superior land use. Among the many narratives of this process, I prefer Jomo Kenyatta's allegory of land loss during the colonial period that can be found in Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya,* 47-48.

[203] This skepticism regarding the lands office and land claims runs deep and throughout the community. New settlers are not only other Kenyans, but also international organizations seeking to develop massive farms or tourist complexes. As an outsider asking questions about land policy and tenure I was frequently regarded with a mixture of skepticism and desire to tell the family story of loss and injustice. Traveling with a Professor Saitoti from Narok College, who had grown up in this community gave a level of trust that would not otherwise have been possible. Even still, families refused to sign any paper for any reason. Often Professor Saitoti would read the Oral History agreement to the head of the household in Maa. He would tell me, yes, they agree, you may speak to them, but they will not sign this. Additionally, only Professor Saitoti's family and their closest neighbors agreed to my requests for photographs that the families then approved or deleted from my camera.

these community members are confident that their traditions and lands are both unique and lasting.

In this chapter I have investigated the ways that colonial and modern governments of Kenya have used frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering and disappearance to put pressure on Maasai communities to settle and give up their herding traditions. I highlighted the ways that hate speech has become a feature in these deliberations by focusing on MP Waititu's statement, "from today I want all Maasais chased away from here. They should go back to where they came from," to illustrate the pressures faced by Maasai communities.[204] And I assessed the entailments of these combined frames for Maasai communities determined to continue their herding traditions.

While Kenyan Maasai communities have not turned to social media in the same way as communities in Tanzania, quilting points are still evident in cross-border identification and deliberation made possible by increased access to information and communication technologies. The pressures created by MP Waititu mimic those of PM Kikwete in Tanzania, indicating the shared stresses of Maasai communities as they confront government frames of disappearance. In the next two chapters I will examine the ways that Mongols in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia have faced similar pressures. Through this multi-sited analysis, I hope to better understand the ways that herders have confronted arguments such as those advanced by MP Waititu and PM Kikwete to negotiate their places in our quickly developing world.

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[204] Wabala, "Kenya: Uhuru Disowns Waititu."

4.0 MONGOLIA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapters Two and Three I looked at how the colonial and modern governments of Tanzania and Kenya have used frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance in an attempt to define and compartmentalize herding communities. In this chapter I will turn my attention to Eurasia where I will examine how the historic and modern governments of Mongolia have used frames of bounded land and disappearance in similar ways to the governments of Tanzania and Kenya. Difference, however, emerges regarding the frame of movement that is articulated as "movement-as-wandering" in the Tanzanian and Kenyan chapters, but in this chapter emerges as "movement-as-*otor,*" and is used by herders in response to government frames of bounded land and disappearance. In chapters Two and Three "movement-as-wandering" was assessed as a negative articulation of Maasai communities used by colonists to justify settlement and development projects. In this chapter "movement-as-*otor"* is a positive articulation, used by herders to describe their traditions of *otor,* or migrations to find the best pasturelands and while simultaneously avoid environmental pressures.

This twist in the frame of movement takes on a new character because herders in Mongolia are in a more empowered position than Maasai herders and as such have more forums

to articulate the frame of movement-as-*otor*.[205] As a result, this chapter will investigate the ways that the government's frames of bounded land and disappearance compete with the herder's frame of movement-as-*otor*.

In what follows, I present a historical analysis of the government's frames of bounded land and disappearance. Then, I examine the ways that herders have use the frame of movement-as-*otor* to present their traditions as an ideal alternative to settlement, adaptation to modernity, and the best way to contend with climate change. Next I turn to an assessment of Eastern Mongolia and ask how international conservation organizations have attempted to incorporate the frame of movement-as-*otor* into their program planning. I assess clashes between government and herder argument frames and investigate the entailments of those clashes for the creation of conservation and mining policy. Finally I turn my attention to emergent deliberative forums. Focusing on the nationally televised Open Society Forum, I ask if public forum deliberations between herders and the government are possible, or if the government's frames of bounded land and disappearance have become so dominant that herders are not included in policy deliberations.

4.2 LAND OF CHINGHIS KHAN

Mongolian herders use the *Secret History of the Mongols* to trace their history to a time before Chinghis Khan. Using this text as a quilting-point, the Mongolian people in general, and the

[205] My determination of empowerment is based on Mongolian herder's ethnic connections to ruling parties in the Mongolian government and the history of herding shared by settled and herding communities in Mongolia. These relationships are radically different than those of the Maasai and their respective governments with whom they infrequently share ethnicity or histories of herding.

Khalk majority in particular, have a long history of herding, pastoral lifestyles, and relationships with other nomadic communities. Traditionally, Mongolians worked within "hierarchical pastoral networks," groups associated by family or geographic ties that allowed access to land, water, and grazing spaces.[206] Ecologist Dennis Ojima and biophysicist Togtohyn Chuluun have traced the basis of these relationships, focusing on three linguistic terms which reveal the way that Mongolian identity and social networks were understood by the early Mongolian state through a frame of bounded land.

> the *hot ail* (a network of households sharing resources within a particular region), *neg golynhon* (people from one river area), and *neg nutgiinhan* (people from one living place) existed in the traditional Mongolian nomadic pastoral system.[207]

In these descriptions of Mongolian traditions, the frame of bounded land is used to describe community locations, based loosely on geographic features and community agreements. As far back as Chinghis Khan's Empire, local communities regulated grazing on Mongolian pasturelands. It was not until 1644 when the Qing Dynasty claimed Mongolia as a colony that Mongolian herders were regulated by a central bureaucracy. At this time, the military advantage of mobile horsemen, which the Mongolians had enjoyed since the twelfth century, was threatened by radical changes in Russian and Chinese demography, technology, and military strategy.[208] This shift in power signaled a rejection of Mongolian community-negotiated migrations to Qing bureaucratic migration policies presented by the frame of bounded land. For example, the Qing officiated their claim over Mongolia through a frame of bounded land

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[206] Dennis Ojima and Togtohyn Chuluun, "Policy Changes in Mongolia: Implications for Land Use and Landscapes," in *Fragmentation in Semi-Arid and Arid Landscapes: Consequences for Human and Natural Systems*, eds. Kathleen Galvin, Robin S. Reig, Roy H. Behnke Jr., and N. Thompson Hobbs (New York: Springer 2008), 180.

[207] Ojima and Chuluun, "Policy Changes," 180.

[208] Alexander Diener, "Will New Mobilities Beget New (Im)Mobilities? Prospects for Change Resulting from Mongolia's Trans-State Highway," in *Engineering Earth*, ed. Stanley D. Brunn (New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2011), 629.

demarcated specific lands rather than ethnic communities. Laws were then created to further divide and maintain a complex system of eighty-six county-level administrative units, accompanied by land holding by nobles and Buddhist monasteries that held power over Mongolian herders. While many Mongolians continued to identify as herders, Qing policies encouraged single species herding and often transferred ownership of herds away from herders to land-based elites. The ownership of herds by land-based elites supported the frame of bounded land by tying herders and herds to specific lands rather than migration patterns. As a result of these policies, even if herders maintained traditional lifestyles, their migrations and herds were entrenched in the Qing's bureaucracy.[209]

Qing policies not only divided herds, they also divided the Eurasian steppe into Inner and Outer Mongolia. This chapter investigates "Outer Mongolia," a region that the Qing considered to have less political and economic importance than "Inner Mongolia" which is considered in Chapter Five. The division of Outer and Inner Mongolia entrenched the Qing's preference for specifically divided and owned land. Additionally, as I will explore in Chapter Five, the demarcation of "Outer Mongolia" encouraged rhetorics of barbarianism to describe communities controlled by, but not part of, the Qing Empire.

The Qing Empire fell in 1912, resulting in fierce competition for power, lands, and control in Eurasia. A year before, Mongolian revolutionaries took advantage of the weakening Qing Empire to claim independence, preventing the Chinese Communist Party from claiming the region when it came to power in 1949. To further insure national independence, Mongolian revolutionaries sought the aid of Russian Bolsheviks and persuaded them that Mongolia was a strategic ally against Chinese and Japanese encroachment into Manchuria and Siberia. With the

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[209] Ojima and Chuluun, "Policy Changes," 180-81.

help of the emergent Soviet Union, Mongolia declared itself a Socialist People's Republic in 1924.[210] All of these political transitions were negotiated through a frame of bounded land bolstered by a frame of disappearance that proposed both Mongolian herders and lands were at risk of succumbing to the Chinese state. The independent government of Mongolia encouraged herding traditions as a mechanism to preserve the uniqueness of Mongolian identity as opposed to the quickly settling Chinese and Russian herding communities. These policies continued until the late 1920's when the Mongolian socialist government first tried to collectivize herders.

Today, the collective memory of Mongolia's historic relationships with China and Russia tempers many international trade discussions and political engagements. Gregory Delaplace, an anthropologist at the Université Paris-Ouest Nanterre La Défense, argues that these memories "act as a border – a device that separates and connects at the same time, that is open to some relations and closed to others, that is programmed to let some things go, and to retain others."[211] In his research, Delaplace indicates the prominence of the frame of bounded land in Mongolian political deliberation. He finds that in modern Mongolia, borders are used to control memories of freedom, reflecting the Qing's frames of bounded land that have reappeared in modern Mongolian political deliberation. To understand what is included and excluded in these borders, it is necessary to understand how the independent government of Outer Mongolia, which supported traditional herding, became the Mongolian People's Republic, which tried to collectivize herders.

The Mongolian People's Republic was never part of the USSR. However, Soviet influence is apparent in the influx of politicians and academics that argued in support of

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[210] Gregory Delaplace, "Neighbours and Their Ruins: Remembering Foreign Presences in Mongolia," in *Frontier Encounters: Knowledge and Practice at the Russian, Chinese, and Mongolian Border*, eds. Franck Bilee, Gregory Delaplace, and Caroline Humphery (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2012), 228.

[211] Delaplace, "Neighbours and Their Ruins," 233.

modernizing and settling herding communities. Alongside ideological influences, Mongolia received large provisions of machinery and transportation equipment from the USSR and East Germany to carry out collectivization schemes. This technological aid had immediate effects on herders. For example, as haymaking machinery became available, herders were able to stay in winter pastures longer. Trucks became available and roads were paved making traditional migrations known as *otor* quicker and more precise. At this time of fast paced modernization, wells were dug, telephone lines connected, and schools built.[212] Each of these modernizations supported the government polices made with the frame of bounded land by linking families to specific pastures, communities, and utilities in ways not previously experienced. Additionally, each modernization was accompanied by development rhetoric that used a frame of disappearance to encourage Mongolian herders to live in settled communities.

Mongolia declared independence in 1911, yet it was not until the Yalta Conference of 1945 that China and the USSR officially recognized Mongolia as an independent nation with set borders. Before these borders were internationally recognized, Mongolian academics and policy makers began differentiating the independent Outer Mongolia from the Chinese controlled Inner Mongolia. Historical narratives used during the socialist period illuminate the role of ethnicity and borders in establishing a history of herder impoverishment and need to settle herding communities.

According to the Mongolian national narrative, the People's Republic of China was absolved of any responsibility of harms inflicted on Mongolians during the colonization of Mongolia by the Qing Empire. Along with this absolution of guilt, Mongolia asserted that the People's Republic of China had no claim to Mongolian lands. This claim was based on

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[212] Ojima and Chuluun, "Policy Changes," 182.

Mongolia's status as a colony of the Manchurian ethnicity's Qing Empire, which Mongolians claimed was a distinct governing body from the Han ethnicity's Chinese Communist Party that formed the People's Republic of China.[213] Having substantiated their independence through a combined frame of bounded land and fine-tuned division of ethnicities, the Mongolian government turned its attention to agents of the Qing Empire - Han Chinese merchants.

The socialist government of Mongolia argued that Han Chinese merchants operating in Mongolia had utilized lines of credit at exorbitant rates to impoverish Mongolian herders.[214] By focusing on trade between Han merchants and Mongolian herders during the Qing Empire, the socialist government of Mongolia established limits to deliberations about the future of herders living on the Eurasian steppe. The history of wealth and prosperity amongst Mongolian herders experienced during Chinghis Khan's empire were regarded as historic events rather than possible futures. Using a frame of disappearance, the government highlighted the current poverty of herders and used that poverty to justify collectivization and settlement of herder communities. During this period, alternative narratives that recalled herder wealth and sustainability were regulated by censorship regimes that banned all discussion and images of Chinghis Khan.[215] By creating and limiting this national narrative, the socialist government created a frame of disappearance that could be used to erode local narratives and replace multiple historic interpretations with a single narrative of socialist – settled prosperity.

This narrative was met with resistance from religious communities and elites that had forged advantageous relationships with the Qing Empire. The resulting tensions between the

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[213] Delaplace, "Neighbours and Their Ruins," 229.

[214] Delaplace, "Neighbours and Their Ruins," 229.

[215] For a detailed discussion of these repressions, see Christopher Kaplonski, *Truth, History, and Politics in Mongolia: Memory of Heroes* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

government and religious arguments lead to strict censorship. When this censorship also failed, and religious communities began to threaten state authority, the socialist government began the *Great Purge*. In the three years between 1937 and 1939, at least 22,000 Mongolians were killed by Mongolian and Soviet troops. Christopher Kaplonski, historian at Indiana University Bloomington, estimates that at the beginning of these purges the adult population of Mongolia was 800,000. This means that thirty-three percent of the Mongolian population was killed in three years.[216] While these deaths did occur in all sectors of Mongolian society, they were disproportionally targeted at Buddhist Lamas who had served as key nodes in Mongolian information networks. As monasteries were destroyed, state sponsored media and informal networks became the primary sources of news for Mongolia's herders.

Mongolian media was controlled by the state, but informal networks were controlled by their group classification: familial, classmates or alumni, co-workers and *neg nutgiinhan* (people from the same homeland). These networks functioned similar to the Russian *blat,* enforcing personal obligations and the norms of informal networks in formal contexts.[217] While scholars have highlighted the ways that these networks allowed information to travel across long spaces, it is important to note that the use of *neg nutgiinhan* partitioned communities and created the expectation that members would identify with a singular location, rather than set of locations visited during annual herd migrations. In this way, even though informal communication

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[216] Kaplonski notes that these are low-ball figures, and that numbers as high as 100,000 have been reported, though it is unclear if those numbers indicate only deaths or deaths and missing persons including lamas who left monasteries but were not killed during the purge. Although this number rivals modern genocides, a rhetoric of genocide has not yet emerged in Mongolia. For a discussion of the effect of the *Great Purge* on Mongolian history and modern politics, see Christopher Kaplonski, "Thirty Thousand Bullets: Remembering Political Repression in Mongolia," in *Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe: Ghosts at the Table of Democracy*, eds. Kenneth Christie and Robert Cribb (London: Rutledge Curzon, 2002) 155-168.

[217] Alena Ledeneva, "Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 1 (2008): 118-144. Also see Jargalsaikhan Mendee, "Civil Society in Non-Western Setting: Mongolian Civil Society" (master's thesis, University of British Columbia, 2012), https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/42779/ubc_2012_fall_jargalsaikhan_mendee.pdf?sequence=1.

networks were beyond, and at times opposed to, the socialist government, they reinforced the government's preference for bounded land.

By the late 1950s the government's preference and use of arguments made from a frame of bounded land began to take a secondary position to settlement policies advanced through frames of disappearance. For example, in 1959 the Third General Assembly of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party approved the Virgin Lands Campaign. This project, modeled after a similar initiative in Kazakhstan, aimed at "cultivating the uncultivated land in order to increase production of crops, especially cereals."[218] The conceptualization of Mongolia's land as "virgin" eschewed traditional herding practices, evoking *terra nullius* by conceptualizing this land as empty and ready for development. The goal of producing cereal crops to feed Mongolia's herds presumed that those herds did not yet have food, which is an obvious misnomer as the same herds were already eating grasses. However, dividing land into specific cultivation and livestock zones – as opposed to open grazing lands – allowed the government to regulate herder's movements. Then once the state controlled the production of animal fodder, it could successfully implement the final regulation of movement, collectivization projects.

In 1960, the collectivization campaign called *negdel kolhoz* began when animals were forcibly seized from herders. At this time, members of local communities – *negdel,* were joined together to create brigades –*kolhoz*. These *negdel kolhoz* were connected to specific locations and used bureaucratic mechanisms to control herds and grazing patterns. While *negdel* members might maintain herder lifestyles, they now received wages, holidays and pensions from the state.

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[218] Yuki Konagaya, "The Impact of Agricultural Development on Nomadic Pastoralism in Mongolia," in *The Mongolian Ecosystem Network*, eds. Norio Yamamura, Norboru Fujita, and Ai Maekawa (Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2013), 257-58.

These changes in herd ownership forced herders to accept a cash economy in place of traditional barter and trade. Payments in cash tied herders to the *negdel kolhoz* and other state systems such as banks and stores to provide goods previously gained from individually owned herds. Each of these changes reinforced the government's preference for frames of bounded land.

Herders were encouraged to identify as part of the *negdel kolhoz* while simultaneously imagining the modernized, settled Mongolian state. The government encouraged herders to desire settled communities through schemes such as setting pensions for herders at lower rates than urban factory workers to incentivize herder settlement.[219] Damba Gantemur of the Mongolian Sustainable Tourism Development Center indicates that the socialist Mongolian government frequently produced policies and speeches that utilized proleptic elegies to encourage herder settlement. According to Gantemur's review of archival documents and interviews with government officials, *negdel kolhoz* were designed to advance the idea of *Homo Sovieticus.* Articulated as a process of human development based on Social Darwinism, *Homo Sovieticus* was presented as the next evolutionary step for Mongolia's herders.

> Mongolian mentality which a herdsmen can be a proprietor and decider of his own life, live in surrounded *ger* that always encourage a concession instead of tension, into a "Homo Sovieticus" thinking and a characteristics which is always subsidized by others, depended on others. However, during the socialist time, there were three well-organized cultural attacks on health and education. Especially skin and venereal diseases were eliminated, illiteracy was abolished and an urban way of life was introduced.[220]

While the eradication of skin and venereal diseases during the *negdel kolhoz* campaigns benefited herder campaigns, the emphasis on this achievement indicates worrying connections

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[219] Ai Maekawa, "The Cash in Cashmere: Herders' Incentives and Strategies to Increase the Goat Population in Post-Socialist Mongolia," in *The Mongolian Ecosystem Network*, eds. Norio Yamamura, Norboru Fujita, and Ai Maekawa (Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2013), 235.

[220] Damba Gantemur, "Mongol Passion: History and Challenges – Can Tourism Be a Tool to Empower It?," in *Trends and Issues in Global Tourism 2012,* eds. Roland Conrady and Martin Buck (Berlin: Springer - Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2012), 53.

with the metaphors of disease and illness identified in Chapter One by government officials who are determined to settle or exterminate Roma communities. As a result of these "cultural attacks on health and education," the socialist government further tied citizens to government units containing schools, hospitals, government offices, and veterinarian clinics.

Bureaucratic controls of movement were refined at this time as the movements of *negdel kolhoz* members were regulated by the local *soum* (district) administration, resulting in a much closer bureaucracy than that experienced under the Qing Empire. Herders became increasingly attached to their *soum* during winter droughts, known as *dzuds.*[221] Historically, herders faced with a *dzud* would have to migrate in the middle of winter hoping to find accessible pastures. Now, the socialist government encouraged herders to move towards *soum* centers to state stockpiles of wheat, barley, and bran. In this way, herder's traditional migrations used to adapt to *dzud* were offset by a reliance on government facilities that encouraged herders to permanently settle.[222]

The connections between herders, *negdel kolhoz,* and Mongolian bureaucracy established during the socialist period illuminates the strength and promotion of the Mongolian government's frame of bounded land that tied herders to specific geographic locations. Additionally, tracking the history of Mongolian cooperatives reveals the process whereby the frame of bounded land took a secondary position to the frames of disappearance concerning Mongolian herders. As herders were assigned to *negdel kolhoz* and their pensions arrived via state banks, it became difficult for herders to resist state determined boundaries. Additionally,

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[221] A *dzud* is a winter storm in which snow or ice pack covers the grasses, preventing animals from eating. Additionally, it frequently arrives in a flash freeze or blizzard. While *dzud* has occurred historically in Mongolia, there is some debate if they are becoming more frequent due to climate change.

[222] Yuki Konagaya and Ai Maekawa, "Characteristics and Transformation of the Pastoral System in Mongolia," in *The Mongolian Ecosystem Network*, eds. Norio Yamamura, Norboru Fujita, and Ai Maekawa (Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2013), 16.

once they had joined a *negdel kolhoz,* herders were encouraged to identify as collective members, rather than members of traditional kinship networks and religious groups.[223] The government, using a frame of bounded land and then disappearance utilized these the informational networks established amongst *negdel kolhoz* members to influence community decision making bodies and continually pressure herders to embrace sedentarization.[224]

Encouragement that herders identify with a *negdel kolhoz, soum* (district)*, aimag (*providence), and nation went so far as to ban the use of last names and thereby cut apart kinship networks that could be used to resist the state. Simultaneously, Soviet aid was directed at developing the Mongolian capital Ulaan Baatar into an urban mecca that would encourage settlement. The resulting influx of visitors to Ulaan Baatar resulted in new migration patterns that included herders and students spending time in both pasturelands and cities. Even herders that could not travel to Ulaan Baatar were encouraged by radio stories, school lessons, and printed images to accept the city as a symbol for Mongolia's future.

This symbol of modern Mongolia was prefaced on the settlement of herding communities. Yet geographers such as Alexander Diener argue that even though some Mongolian herders accepted settlement, it was herding lifestyles that continued to exemplify the ideal Mongolian lifestyle.

> Through this practice, much of the society's "pastoralist" distinctiveness was retained. Despite large housing projects and the aforementioned industrialization

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[223] For a history of the transition from traditional to Socialist networks, see Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath, *The End of Nomadism? Society, State, and the Environment in Inner Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). Also see, Robin Mearns, "Horses for Courses: The Making and Remaking of Pastoral Land Policy in Mongolia," Paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, March 2000.

[224] While some authors have argued that traditional decision-making completely disappeared at this time, Ojima and Chuluun make a persuasive argument that these customary institutions disappeared from the view of the state, as evidenced by their reappearance after the 1991 democratic revolution. Ojima and Chuluun, "Policy Changes," 183.

> of the urban centers, felt tents (known as *gers* or yurts) and large herds remained points of pride and clear markers of Mongolian uniqueness in northeast Asia.[225]

The importance of the ideal Mongolian lifestyle was apparent after the 1991 democratic transition when herders were no longer bound by the state to *negdel kolhoz.*

Mongolia's transition from socialism to democracy was coupled with the emergence of capitalism and rapid privatization of state holdings. Problems quickly emerged as herds that had been seized in the 1960's were redistributed to once-*negdel kolhoz* members. Some *negdel kolhoz* herders had specialized in single-species herding and were well prepared to own their own animals. Others had been members of collectives, but because they were assigned to non-herding jobs, these members had little training or competency in herding. These families could have immediately moved to cities. However, following the ideal Mongolian lifestyle identified by Diener, many chose to stay in the countryside and became herders. These so called "new nomads," lacked knowledge of grazing practices that could preserve grasslands and maintain herds during *dzud.* As a result, in a few years many "new nomads" had lost their entire herds.[226] Even experienced herders faced difficulties during this time as public services for migration, water access, and veterinarian care were discontinued. Families coped by moving closer to *soum* centers, which created even more land degradation.

Herders that lost their herds during the democratic transition have been labeled as "idle herders," by international development organizations. These Mongolians are no longer classified by outside organizations as herders because they do not own any animals. However, they also

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[225] Diener, "Will New Mobilities," 629.

[226] Janzen intentionally calls these Mongolians "new nomads" as opposed to "new herders" to identify the difficulties experienced by these individuals, and the resulting movement from countryside to city and back again during the 1990's. Jorg Janzen, "Mobile Livestock-Keeping in Mongolia: Present Problems, Spatial Organization, Interactions between Mobile and Sedentary Population Groups and Perspectives for Pastoral Development," *Senri Ethnological Studies* 69 (2005): 88

lack the resources to gain employment and identity as non-herders.[227] This cycle of increased environmental pressures and settlement near *soum*s which creates idle herders continued until 1993 when a culmination of improved weather and stabilized social services supported herders and the stabilization of their herds.[228]

While herders moved towards *soums* to escape *dzud,* city dwellers moved to the countryside to find stable food supplies. These movements were a result of the discontinuation of food aid and favorable trade policies with the USSR. City dwellers did have some access to food aid and supplies from China, but often rejected this aid with arguments fueled by the government's narrative of Mongolian oppression at the hands of Han Chinese merchants during the Qing Empire. These movements from city to countryside embodied a rejection of the government's frame of disappearance. Settled communities were freely choosing to become herders.

Mongolian herders, regardless of their connections to cities or *negdel kolhoz* during the socialist period, were driven in the 1990's to find economically stable methods of herding. For many herders, this resulted in a preference to keep more goats to sheep. This preference is supported by biologist Ai Maekawa's 2013 calculations that a herder can make 25 times more pre goat than per sheep when both animals are used for cashmere or wool fibers.[229] Based on this transition to goat herding, Mongolia has become the second largest cashmere market in the

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[227] B. Enkhtuvshin, "New Challenges for Nomadic Civilization and Pastoral Nomadism in Mongolia," (unpublished manuscript), 9. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.112.488&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

[228] Ojima and Chuluun, "Policy Changes," 184.

[229] Focusing on wool vs. cashmere is critical as the differences in income fall dramatically when addressing the cost of meat. However, the western reader must remember that Mongolians, like many herder communities, only consume the meat of older animals that will not live through the winter. For more detail, see Maekawa, "The Cash in Cashmere," 238-9.

world. However this market might be short lived because goats eat the full grass plant – both roots and leaves – and quickly destroy Mongolia's steppe ecology.

Traditionally herders limited the ecological impact of goats by moving diverse herds over large swaths of land. However today the number sheep, yaks, cattle, camels, and horses has dropped to half of 1990 numbers. Beyond a preference for goats, economist Dorjbugedaa Lkhagvadorj's team attributes this shift in herd dynamics to herder's limited migrations. Because these herders are moving across ever-smaller swaths of land, they need fewer pack animals.[230] As a result of preferring goats to other herd animals, moving towards *soum* centers, and migrating over smaller swaths of land, Mongolian herders have been accused by international conservation organizations of overgrazing and overcrowding. Wang Xiaoli and Ronnie Vernooy, policy specialists for Biodiversity International, find that although herders are technically free to move towards *soum* centers, *soum* residents often use a frame of bounded land to reject new-arriving herders as trespassers.[231] For example, during ecologist Maria Fernandez-Gimenez and B. Batbuyan's interviews in Bayan-Ovoo, Mongolia, herders explained that while overgrazing was not caused by traditional residents, the arrival of new herders has resulted in overgrazing.

> In my opinion the space in Bayan-Ovoo is not enough for the current herds of over 100,000 animals and also the uncounted animals from other sums that graze here. Herdsmen want to be near the center of the aimag and the market. According to the Land Law, herdsmen can go anywhere. If there were a *khoshuun*, it would be easier to regulate. In one year 1,200 households came from other soum and the aimag center and all have their own livestock. This is the main reason for overgrazing.[232]

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[230] Dorjbugedaa Lkhagvadorj, Markus Hauck, Choimaa Dulamsuren, and Jamsran Tsogtbaatar, "Twenty Years after Decollectivization: Mobile Livestock Husbandry and Its Ecological Impact in the Mongolian Forest-Steppe," *Human Ecology* 41(2013): 726.

[231] Wang Xiaoli and Ronnie Vernooy, "Reading the Weather: Climate Risk Adaptation in Mongolia," in *Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management*, ed. W. Leal Filho (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013), 642.

[232] A *khoshuun* is a Mongolian traditional mechanism of regulating access to pasturelands. Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, "Law and Disorder," 153.

The arrival of herders that believe they can migrate from anywhere to already-occupied *soum* lands has resulted in conflicts over the future of herding and movement in Mongolia. In 2010 the governor of Bayan O'njuul *soum* told Tokyo University Professor of Foreign Studies Akira Kamimura, that these pressures are a threat to national stability.

> If a new pastureland law, which provides for exclusionary pastureland possession, does not allow outsiders to use possessed pastures any more, it will cause "civil war." They meant by "civil war" not only that it would increase disputes and conflicts between herders, but also that they would revolt to protest against the government.[233]

The risk of herder's revolt and protest against the government has been actualized several times since the 1991 democratic transition. At odds in these revolts is herder's desires for government remedies that create the potential for improved herding, and the government's preference for polices created through a frame of disappearance that encourage herder settlement.

The government's preference for a frame of disappearance is frequently bolstered by programs and funding from western NGOs and aid organizations. Attracted by Mongolia's humanitarian needs and democratic transition, western NGOs and aid agencies began operating in Mongolia and quickly advanced frames of disappearance through policy recommendations and programs that supported the settlement of herding communities.[234] These international organizations supported the privatization of herds and pressured the Mongolian government to also privatize land holdings. However, the Mongolian government rejected land-privatization

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[233] Kamimura, "Pastoral Mobility," 200.

[234] The significance of these increases in NGO presence in Mongolia is outlined by Dalaibuyan Byambajav, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Queensland, Australia in 2006. "A number of NGOs including The Asia Foundation, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Soros Foundation, and International Support Service began their assistance to Mongolia in 1990-91. Since then, the number of international NGOs in Mongolia has greatly increased: between 1991 and 1996, there were thirty-six international NGOs operational, while in 1997-2002 this number rose to ninety five. Today there are one hundred and sixteen international NGOs registered at the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs as well as national committees of international networks such as Rotary club and Amnesty International." Dalaibuyan Byambajav, "NGOs in Mongolia: A Crucial Factor in Mongolian Society and Politics," *The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs* 13 (2006): 133.

and today all land in Mongolia is owned by the government.[235] This rejection of land-privatization does not mean that the Mongolian government has foregone the concept of bounded land. Instead, the Mongolian government has maintained the socialist standard of government land ownership and determination of local boundaries.

As a result of government land ownership, all grazing, mining, and farming rights are determined by the central government. This means that herders are unable to negotiate directly with other land users, and the government often reassigns lands from one economic sector to another without consulting or informing current land users.[236] As such, herders are frequently unaware that their lands have been ceded to mining companies until miners arrive to begin mineral extraction, or that conservation reserves have been established until they are charged with trespass.[237]

Modern legislation, such as the national *Law on Land,* has been designed to grant herders the right to access specific lands and mediate conflicts between herders. Yet my interviews in Eastern Mongolia indicate that these mediations are seldom effective. For example, one of the families that I interviewed had petitioned the *soum* office for help when a new family arrived in the valley and moved into their winter stables. The *soum* sent an official to speak with the newly arriving family and gained a promise that the new family would soon leave the winter stables.

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[235] Maria Fernandez-Gimenez and B. Batbuyan, "Law and Disorder: Local Implementation of Mongolia's Land Law," *Development and Change* 35, no. 1 (2004): 146.

[236] Article 19 of the Mineral Law of Mongolia does require that both *soum* and *aimag* assemblies approve mining plans. However, Suzuki found that many *soum*s receive documentation too late to allow for proper deliberation. Additionally, this regulation only applies to extraction licenses – exploration, which creates the same holes, pollution, and displacement of herders, does not require *soum* and *aimag* approval. This is a significant problem because more than one half of Mongolia's land is already under exploration for mineral deposits. For more information, see Yukio Suzuki, "Conflict between Mining Development and Nomadism in Mongolia," in *The Mongolian Ecosystem Network*, eds. Norio Yamamura, Norboru Fujita, and Ai Maekawa (Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2013), 277. Also see the work of N. Tumenbayer, "Herder's Property Rights Vs. Mining in Mongolia," (lecture, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Spring 2002).

[237] Suzuki, "Conflict between Mining," 291.

However, the *soum* official quickly left without enforcing the agreement and the new family continues to occupy the stable.[238] Unfortunately, herder conflicts are not limited to determining family rights to winter pastures. Today, herders in Mongolia are also facing clashes with conservation organizations and mining companies.

While mediations between herders are not always effective, they are at least addressed in national legislation. The law is much murkier regarding clashes between herders, conservationists, and mining companies.[239] Mongolia's gold, copper, coal, and uranium deposits are ranked among the largest untapped resources in the world and political deliberation frequently focuses on how to extract these minerals. Rarely do deliberations address the interaction between herders and miners.

Conflict has emerged between herders and miners because mining companies often prefer to create open-pit mines that limit or prohibit herding. These open-pits are preferable to underground mining for both economic and worker safety reasons, but are also far more detrimental to the surrounding environment. While mining corporations are required to complete and file environmental impact assessments before mining begins, standards for those assessments are not always in alignment with the needs and practices of herding communities. Additionally, Yukio Suzuki of the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries reported in 2013 that environmental restoration plans for Mongolian mines are not always implemented. For example, in his interview with the Ministry of Nature and Environment of Mongolia, Suzuki

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[238] For similar discussions and failures of local law implementation, see Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, "Law and Disorder," 141-165.

[239] J. Addison, J. Davies, M. Friedel, and C. Brown "Do Pasture User Groups Lead to Improved Rangeland Condition in the Mongolian Gobi Desert?," *Journal of Arid Environments* 94 (2013): 37-78.; Robin Mearns, "Sustaining Livelihoods on Mongolia's Pastoral Commons: Insights from a Participatory Poverty Assessment," *Development and Change* 35, no. 1 (2004): 120-121.; Daniel Murphy, "Encountering the Franchise State: Dzud, Otor, and Transformations in Pastoral Risk," in *Mongolia after Socalism*, eds. Bruce Knauft and Richard Taupier (Ulaan Baatar: Admon, 2012).

learned that only twenty-six percent of open-pit mines have been filled, and only eight percent have had vegetation restored.[240] The 2012 World Bank Complaint filed by Mongolian herders clarifies that while free, prior, and informed consent is no longer possible, plans for these open-pit mines should not proceed until herder's rights and compensation are assured.[241]

Figure 7: Erdenet Copper Mine.[242]

The Mongolian government's response to these problems has been to emphasize the frame of disappearance, paying more attention to the settlement of herders than creating processes for informed consent regarding land use. This frame of disappearance was presented via proleptic elegy by President Nambariin Enkhbayar in 2001, "it is not my desire to destroy the

[240] Suzuki, "Conflict between Mining," 280.

[241] Oyu Tolgoi Watch, "Mining and Communities: Mongolian Herders Complain against Rio Tinto over Oyu Tolgoi Mines," *ESCR-Net,* October 12, 2012. http://www.escr-net.org/node/365339

[242] Mongolia's oldest and largest open-pit mine was built in 1974 to extract copper oar is a Mongolian and Russian joint venture. Allison Hahn, August 2010.

original Mongolian identity, but in order to survive we have to stop being nomads."[243] Diener notes that,

> This statement clearly establishes the belief that modernization is the key to Mongolia's future. It also implies that modernization will ultimately marginalize nomadic values and by consequence propagate new patterns of immobility.[244]

The (im)mobility and settlement of Mongolian herders apparent in Enkhbayar's statement is echoed by international organizations that report it is no longer possible for herders to exist in today's world and funding must be allocated to settlement projects.[245] The resulting policies are similar to the socialist and Qing governments' attempts to settle herders and break Mongolians away from nomadic traditions, heritage, and mentality.[246] In the next section I will investigate the ways that herders in Mongolia have explored the complexity of the term "herder" while arguing using the frame of movement-as-*otor* to respond to the government's frames of bounded land and disappearance.

4.3 MOVEMENT-AS-*OTOR*

The modernization of Mongolia through open-pit mining requires restriction of herders' movements across the Eurasian steppe. In the previous section I examined the ways that the Qing Empire, independent, socialist, and democratic governments of Mongolia have used frames of

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[243] Diener, "Will New Mobilities," 634.

[244] Diener, "Will New Mobilities," 634.

[245] Mashbat O. Sarlagtay, "Mongolia: Managing the Transition from Nomadic to Settled Culture," in *The Asia Pacific: A Region in Transition*, ed. Jim Rolfe, (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), 332.

[246] The rhetoric of this as the first break with Mongolian traditions is interesting because in the same paragraph Sarlagtay writes that Mongolian city-dwellers welcomed the change. If this is true, then changes had already occurred in Mongolia. This understanding allows us to better understand the ways that Nyam-Osor was able to gain support for his return of a "pure Mongol state." Sarlagtay, "Mongolia: Managing," 328.

bounded land and disappearance to encourage herder settlement. While the modern Mongolian government no longer censors the history of Chinghis Khan's Empire, the government still follows the socialist example of regulating those narratives to history rather than pathways to modern prosperity.

Mongolian herders and historians have challenged this view of modernization, arguing that Chinghis Khan's Empire can be used as a quilting point that aligns and defines both historic and modern understanding of herder lifestyles. For example, modern Mongolian historians have used Mongolia's 3000-year history of herding to argue against the government's frames of bounded land and disappearance by demonstrating the adaptability and sustainability of herding. These arguments, presented here by Mashbat Sarlagtay, a lawyer and researcher for the Institute for Strategic Studies in the Mongolian Ministry of Defense, explain herder's opposition to settlement.

> One reason for the Mongol Empire's greatness was the absence of any understanding of 'border,' of land limits. The nomads were just traveling and looking for good pastureland. When they saw a settled town or cultivated area, they did not understand the different culture and lifestyle. In the same way, the settled cultures too, usually described nomads as barbarians. Thus, the leader of the town would say, 'go away from our land', and the Mongols would get angry and destroy them. It was the clash of civilizations of the day.[247]

Sarlagtay's analysis points to a critical division between nomadic and settled communities which effects not only Mongolian herders' understanding of natural, geographical, and metrological features of the countryside, but also the creation of specifically nomadic technologies.[248] Similarly, Mongolian author G. Mend-Ovoo, quoted by Diener, argues that the Mongolian

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[247] Sarlagtay, "Mongolia: Managing," 324-5.

[248] While Enkhtuvshin 2007 chooses to focus on the effects on herding technology, the quest for nomadic or moveable technology also produced an array of weapons that were specifically designed for mobile warfare. Study of this history has contributed to Deleuze and Guattari's production of the metaphor of the *war machine* examined in Chapter Six.

government should encourage technological improvements to herder's lifestyles rather than encouraging herder settlement.

> It is obvious that nomadic civilization cannot remain as it was in the past. Why can't nomads have electricity thanks to wind generators? Why can't they have mobile phones? Why can't we improve the traditional ger, so it is comfortable in all seasons? Then nomads would not settle down. Rather, movement would flow from cities to the countryside and busy city life would stand in admiration of nomadic civilization.[249]

The technologies indicated by G. Mend-Ovoo are already available to herders and are frequently used by communities bridging the gap between traditional and modern herding practices. To an outside observer, the adaptation of modern technologies by herders might appear to indicate a desire to settle. However, many technological advances have been welcomed by herders as a way to embrace both modernity and herding traditions. For example, Mongolian nationalist Tseveendorj Nyam-Osor argues that Mongolia can only survive if it becomes a fully nomadic and decentralized state that returns to the values of Chinghis Khan.[250] This "pure Mongolian state" is not fundamentally opposed to the types of technology supported by Mend-Ovoo. Instead, the "pure Mongolian state" would reject settlements that encumber the ability of herders to adapt to ever changing environments.[251]

The use and use of new technologies to adapt to Mongolia's harsh climate is frequently traced back to Chinghis Khan and his adaptation of mobile technologies to invade Eurasia. From this history, Mongolians developed rhetoric of temperament, of the nimble as quick moving and

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[249] Diener, "Will New Mobilities," 634.

[250] Tseveendorj Nyam-Osor '*Minii medeh Chingesiin Mongol*' [The Chinggisid Mongols that I know] (Ulaanbaatar: Ongot Hevel, 1995), 19-22

[251] Nyam-Osor's supporters range from herders to philosophers and poets. The later two groups hold high esteem in Mongolia, particularly amongst Mongolian herders. Sarlagtay, "Mongolia: Managing," 329-30.

the meek as slow moving across the steppe.[252] Descriptions of Mongolian herder's movement across the steppe, and arguments made in support of this lifestyle, are advanced through a frame that I call movement-as-*otor*. Arguments made in this frame highlight the adaptability of Mongolian herders – including their use of modern technologies. This juxtaposition of modernity and tradition creates a complex argument that responds to the government's arguments that justify settlement based on access to modern conveniences.

Mongolian herder's frame of "movement-as-*otor"* is derived from the word *otor,* a modified form *otorlokh,* used to describe the traditional movement by herders from a frequently visited pasture to a new pasture with superior grasses. Traditionally, *otor* was used to fatten animals by grazing in the best pasturelands. Families would move between seven and eight times a year, covering a distance of thirty to forty kilometers.[253] Today, *otor* has taken on the form of a survival instinct – *otor* is a movement of herds to escape from environmental dangers. The chief danger comes from *dzud,* or harsh winters, that strike unexpectedly and require herds to move quickly to find warmer, more plentiful pastures.

The risks presented by *dzud* feature heavily in Mongolian deliberations about herders. Earlier in this chapter I discussed the ways that *dzud* inspired the movement toward *soum* centers and at times created idle herders. I also began to explore the ways that the government of Mongolia interprets *dzud* as a prominent symptom of climate change, separate from overgrazing but still evidence to support of settlement projects.

Herders have a more difficult time than government officials in classifying the cause and affects of *dzud.* In her long term analysis of herder land assessment, Fernandez-Gimenez noted

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[252] Enkhtuvshin, "New Challenges," 14.

[253] Enkhtuvshin, "New Challenges," 15-17.

that in 1994 and 1995 herders perceived changes to the pastures as temporary, reversible, or an inevitably process of earthly ageing. When she returned to Mongolia in 1999, Fernandez-Gimenez found that in addition to earthly ageing, herders had also began to attribute declining pasturelands to the dual increase in animal herds and declining mobility of herder families. Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan provide an excerpt from their interview in Jinst and Bayan-Ovoo from 1999 to explain these changes.

> The number of animals has increased a lot, the pasture has been used repeatedly, so the yield has been diminishing, the carrying capacity has declined and is seriously insufficient. It was all right when the sum had about 70,000 animals, but now it has over 100,000, therefore the pasture has been used repeatedly. This happens because some herdsmen do not have the means of transportation and their animals are fed from the same place where they stay in all four seasons, thus the pasture is degraded. No pasture is reserved out. This is the situation. In the past, when there was the collective, herdsmen moved a lot, even far away to Arkhangai *aimag* by truck. After the 1990s land started to deteriorate, pasture has been used a lot and pasture condition has worsened.
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> It is not correct for people to stay in one place for four seasons. The pasture is getting worse because of overgrazing, staying for all four seasons. Also in some places there is some desertification — sand. I think it is because of staying in one place. This problem of staying in one place for all four seasons is something the administration must regulate or organize.[254]

In this interview, herders reference transportation services available during the socialist period that allowed *negdel kohlz* members to quickly move between pasturelands. Today, herders lack state transportation between pasturelands, and they also lack the pack animals necessary to make the moves by themselves.[255] As such, even if they wanted to, poorer herders cannot practice traditional *otor.* Additionally, as discussed earlier in this chapter, traditional safety nets such as monasteries and kinship ties were destroyed during the socialist purges, leaving poorer herders without sufficient support during a *dzud*. Because of these limitations, Mongolian herders may

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[254] Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan, "Law and Disorder," 151-52.

[255] Maria Fernandez-Gimenez, "Sustaining the Steppes: A Geographical History of Pastoral Land Use in Mongolia," *Geographical Review* 89, no. 3 (1999): 338.

be utilizing arguments made from a frame of movement-as-*otor,* but not actually practicing *otor.* This difficult position becomes more egregious when the government's arguments, made from frames of bounded land and disappearance, utilize evidence of modern herder's difficulties – such as the inability to practice *otor* – to justify settlement projects.

The clash between Mongolian identity and actualized Mongolian policy is apparent in modern discourse and resistance. Sarlagty anticipates these resistances when he explains that all attempts to regulate herders will eventually fail because herders will not accept privatized lands or state authorized boundaries.

> Nomadic liberty is fundamental. Mongolians as a nomadic nation do not like boundaries or limits. The mentality and lifestyle determined by animal husbandry cannot simply recognize any limits in any dimensions, including time and space. Liberty for Mongolians means 'no limits'. Many Mongolian folk tales and myths conflate time and space as they ignore the artificial boundaries imposed by these constructs. Unlimited nomadic activity means that there can be no private ownership of land. Land in a nomadic society is like the air or the ocean, it is impossible to divide and possess. It is not even public property, but simply a limitless expanse where we live and move. Nomads want to travel everywhere and across everything, without any limit. Can you imagine their thoughts if a stranger appeared before them, saying 'This piece of land is mine' and prohibiting them to go across it? To own a little piece of landmass of the universe, saying 'It is mine', sounds to them like 'this cubic meter of air is mine, so, you cannot breath it!' It is impossible to imagine.[256]

Herders that reject state sponsored boundaries are likely to come into clash with government agents intent on enforcing and protecting bounded lands. Deiner explains that these clashes are predicated by misunderstandings by both herders and settled communities.

> Pastoral nomadic heritage is seen by many within Mongolia as the prime bonding agent of this unique society. Projecting the identity of "felt-tent dwellers" (*tuur-gatan*) to the entire society and positioning that identity against the sedentary "rest of the world", Ch. Sharavtseren contends that "the Mongols divide the world into those who live within earth walls and those who dwell within felt walls. From the nomads' point of view the sedentary lifestyle still appears rather miserable." …

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[256] Sarlagtay, "Mongolia: Managing," 324.

> Members of this faction often equate modernization with westernization and warn against an irreversible cultural concession to the ways of the "other" (that is, the sedentary – global – agricultural – industrial).[257]

The divisions between the government's preference for the frame of disappearance, international attention to the frame of bounded land, and herder communities' preference for a frame of movement-as-*otor* are demonstrated through an analysis of the Specially Protected Zones of Mongolia.

4.4 CASE STUDY: EASTERN MONGOLIA

Mongolian herders argue that traditional migration strategies such as *otor* are sufficient to maintain and protect the Mongolian steppe ecology. However, international conservation organizations have argued that the combined pressures of herder overgrazing and government investment in open-pit mining necessitate the creation and expansion of conservation zones. Using a frame of bounded land, these organizations support the same type of fortress conservation that I discussed in the Tanzanian and Kenyan chapters of this dissertation. The Mongolian government has responded to these arguments with a diversity of plans.[258] While the government commonly concedes that herders were able to protect natural resources in the past, it still argues that today natural resources are mismanaged and must be protected by policies

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[257] Diener, "Will New Mobilities," 633-4.

[258] These plans include the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) of 1996 updated in 2000, the State Environmental/Ecological Policy of 1997, the National Plan of Action to Combat Desertification (NPACD), the Biodiversity Conservation Action Plan (BAP), and the National Plan of Action for Protected Areas, all developed under MNE auspices, and Mongolian Action Program for the 21st Century (MAP-21), with subordinated *aimag* development plans, developed by the National Council for Sustainable Development (NCSD). This list was compiled by D. Batbold and P. Suvd, *Conservation of the Great Gobi Ecosystem and Its Umbrella Species Project* (Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Nature and Environment, 2007), 14.

advanced through a frame of bounded land.[259] These arguments are rooted in establishment of the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area to protect populations of Bactrian camel, Gobi bears, snow leopards, argali wild sheep, and Asiatic wild ass.[260] While herder communities are not allowed to live in the park Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area, they do herd at the borders and buffer zones and are frequently blamed for pressures on both land and water supplies of the park.

In Mongolia, the protection of camels and horses is difficult as both wild and domesticated herds live in close proximity. Each herd requires access to pasturelands and as those pasturelands shrink, so do herds. Threats also emerge from groundwater polluted by arsenic runoff from mining projects creating water shortages that affect human, wildlife, and mining populations.[261] Batbold and Suvd report that water reserves have decreased by as much as sixty percent in the last few decades.[262] Conservation organizations have then used these findings to justify the expansion of park boundaries and eviction of herding communities. While Mongolian legislation does provide protections for herders holding land contracts or leases, compensation is not provided for those occupying or moving through the land without a contract.[263]

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[259] Addison et al. "Do Pasture User Groups," 38.

[260] Batbold and Suvd, "Conservation of the Great Gobi," 7.

[261] Batbold and Suvd, "Conservation of the Great Gobi," 13.

[262] Batbold and Suvd, "Conservation of the Great Gobi," 7.

[263] Tim Hanstad and Jennifer Duncan, *Land Reform in Mongolia: Observations and Recommendations* (Seattle: Rural Development Institute, 2001), 64.

Figure 8: Parkland Border at Ikh Nart, June 2013.[264]

Despite extensive legal precedents and on-the-ground advocacy for specially protected areas, many Mongolian conservation zones are either unmarked or disregarded by herders. Recall Sarlagtay's discussion regarding herder movement. Herder communities don't see or respect borders, they always prefer to move across unmarked, open spaces. Even when faced with border-based disputes like those seen in Mongolia, herder communities have refused to concede their ontological position. However, organizations determining and regulating the parks utilize a frame of bounded land and attempt to regulate herder communities living within the buffer zones around the parks. Oftentimes these communities have a history of grazing in the

[264] This sign demarcates entry and exit to the Ikh Nart parkland. While this is technically a fortress conservation park, there are not any fences, walls, or rangers regulating entry or exit of humans, herds, or wildlife to and from the park. Allison Hahn, June 2013.

parks, but were displaced when park boundaries were set. Today, they continue to traverse park boundaries or engage in other activities such as hunting or holding herds larger than those approved by conservationists.[265] As the picture above indicates, these acts of trespass do not require the cutting of fences or transgression of marked boundaries that we saw the Maasai preforming in Chapters Two and Three.

Even though they do not have to cross fences, Mongolian herders are engaging in deliberations concerning the conflicting interpretations of the frame of movement-as-*otor* and bounded land. Batbold and Suvd utilize a frame of disappearance to suggest that herder communities can be encouraged to participate in conservation if they are involved in decision making, are aware of the reasons for conservation, graze animals communally, develop new groups, and create small enterprises that move them away from dependence on herding.[266] Many of these policies are reminiscent of the socialist era collectivization and modernization schemes, each prefaced by a frame of disappearance.

The expectation that herders will settle is reflected by the policies proposed by international conservation organizations that aim to radically expand the borders of their projects in Mongolia. For example, in 2001 conservation organizations announced a goal that by 2030 thirty percent of Mongolia would be classified as specially protected areas. Problematically, these classifications would result in displacement of many herding communities who without formal land contracts would not be compensated for their losses.[267] As a result of the clash

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[265] In the summer of 2013 I had lunch with and interviewed three Mongolian herders who engaged in frequent wolf hunting in an attempt to better protect their herds. These men indicated that they knew some of the land on which they grazed and hunted was considered conservation lands, but they were not concerned with those divisions. What would the conservationists do, they wondered, since there was not way for them to prove that these herders were the ones shooting wolves or crossing into the parklands to graze their herds.

[266] Batbold and Suvd, "Conservation of the Great Gobi," 15.

[267] Hanstad and Duncan, "Land Reform in Mongolia," 64.

between conservationist's arguments through a frame of disappearance, and herder's arguments through a frame of movement-as-otor, we can expect that herders will protest such a significant expansion of specially protected areas.

Reports from 1975 when the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area was established indicate that herders vacated park lands, but do not tell us if any resistance occurred during those evictions.[268] Later reports from the 1990s, when the Khustain Nuruu Nature Reserve was established to reintroduction of Przewalskii horse, indicate that conflicts occurred as the total area available for herders in Altanbulag *soum* was restricted and herders lost access to traditional winter and spring camps. While Mongolian responses to eviction due to the expansion of conservation grounds appear tame in comparison to evictions in Tanzania, Kenya, and China, it is unclear if this is a reflection of herder tradition, of if Mongolian herders have simply ignored eviction orders.

Conservationist's reports indicate that they are engaging displaced communities, or communities living in buffer zones, through a complex set of community building initiatives and associated terminology. For example, the Swiss Development Corporation uses the term "pastoral user groups" (PUG), to describe multiple herders from a geographical area that are encouraged to engage with collective action to meet pasture management and livelihood goals.[269] This term has had some traction with western groups who claim PUGs result in female empowerment and promote better communication between herders[270] However, it is important to note that while these development groups are keenly interested in the participation of local

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[268] Donald J. Bedunah and Sabine M. Schmidt, "Pastoralism and Protected Area Management in Mongolia's Gobi Gurvansaikhan National Park," *Development and Change* 35, no. 1 (2004): 167-191.

[269] Addison et al., "Do Pasture User Groups," 38.

[270] Addison et al., "Do Pasture User Groups," 38.

herders, the national government is less equipped to or interested in gathering information regarding local responses to national policies. Additionally, while local herders are encouraged to participate, it is unclear what end is desired from that participation and if all members of the herding community are invited. PUGs are legitimated through a frame of bounded land – they are user groups of specific pieces of land, and recalling the justification for development projects, the frame of disappearance may be active as communities are encouraged to be empowered, and through that empowerment decide that their family should settle. Yet, Addison's team from the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization of Australia has produced a body of interviews with PUG members that demonstrate the ways geographic boundaries, not family, community, or tradition, result in delayed in decision-making and unenforceable regulations.[271]

Addison et al. have argued that programs such as PUG fail due to their compartmentalization of Mongolian identity that blinds policymakers to the complexity of Mongolian herding practices.[272] One of the primary points of conflict is the herder's frame of movement-as-*otor*. For Mongolian herders, *otor* addresses the physical, economic, and psychological need for movement across vast pastures as compared to international pressures for a transition from a herd based to economic based economy.

Conflicts have become increasingly complex as conservationists and herder communities encounter mining corporations who have designed extraction policies for the same areas. Often times the desires of all three groups overlap, as they do in the Onon-Balji Say National

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[271] For example, one herder reported, "I am the leader of [gobi-type PUG]. The group was founded in 2007 but most herders have left since then and moved to [another aimag]. We plan to build a new well but we're waiting until all herders are here." (Gobi-type PUG herder #14, 30 years herding). Addison et al., "Do Pasture User Groups," 41.

[272] Addison et al., "Do Pasture User Groups," 38.

Conservation Park that ranges through Khentii and Dornod *aimags* over 400,000 hectares. This park is known both for its taiga and arid steppes and gold deposits. Reports from the World Bank in 2006 indicated that the Russian Federation has begun either investigation or extraction in its section of the parklands.[273] It is expected that Mongolia will also begin investigation and extraction of these transnational gold deposits.

The intermingling of conservation and mining in Mongolia has produced a complex set of policies and experiments that aim to maximize benefits from both industries. As demonstrated by the following statement, a good deal of effort has gone into designing programs around mining industries and potentials. For example, example, Evan Girvetz's Nature Conservancy team argued in 2012 that,

> Although mining and oil and gas extraction constitute a real threat to the grassland ecosystems and the pastoralist herders, they also represent an opportunity. With a huge portion of Mongolia leased for exploration, these extractive activities will occur regardless of what conservation activities are established on the ground. The Nature Conservancy is applying a "Development by Design" approach that blends landscape conservation planning with the mitigation hierarchy ("avoid, minimize, restore, or offset") to identify areas where mining should be avoided, and to design sites for compensatory mitigation, or offsets, for those mining and development projects that proceed.[274]

While programs such as "Development by Design" are indeed better than open-pit mining, they still provide little space for herder input, let alone herding communities' rejection of mining projects. Instead, most attention is turned to ensuring that Mongolia's mineral wealth is well spent. International participants in these deliberations acknowledge that mining might be at odds with herding traditions, yet they also indicate that it is neither their place nor their desire to

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[273] World Bank, *Mongolia: A Review of Environmental and Social Impacts of the Mining Sector* (Washington D.C.:World Bank 2006), 18.

[274] Evan H. Girvetz, Robert McDonald, Michael Heiner, Joseph Kiesecker, Galbadrakh Davaa, Chris Pague, Matthew Durnin, and Enkhtuya Oidov, "Eastern Mongolian Grassland Steppe." In *Climate and Conservation: Landscape and Seascape Science, Planning, and Action*, edited by. Jodi A. Hilty, Charles C. Chester, and Molly S. Cross, 92-103. (Washington, D.C.: Island press, 2012), 102.

determine the future of herding in Mongolia.

For example, in a 2010 exchange between Director of the United Nations Development Program, Helen Clark, and geographer Troy Sternberg, Clark stated: "Mongolia is not poor. How it decides to use its mineral wealth is the question. The decision as to whether to strengthen, and perhaps salvage, pastoralism or let it retreat is in appropriate hands – the elected representatives of the Mongolian people."[275] Clark's statement embraces the democratic transition in Mongolia while implying that Mongolian herders are able to voice their opinions regarding the stability and future of herding. Problematically, many herders report that they are unable to participate in deliberative forums regarding the future of their communities.

The question in response to statements such as Clark's is if herding families have spoken in a democratic way indicating that they no longer wish to participate in herding, or if herding families lack the pathways to maintain their traditional lifestyles. A complaint filed in the European Parliament, indicates that herders are now settling for lack of any other alternatives.

> Ms. Ts. Tsetsegmaa, Chair of Shuteen Gaviluut NGO, said on behalf of the group of complainants, "companies do not recognize the fact that reducing the size of pastures, as well as fracturing and contaminating them with dust and noise, is having a negative impact on our livelihoods and health. Internal parts of animals we raise are no longer consumable, meaning we have lost a significant part of our traditional diet. Soon animals will completely lose their commercial value. Most herding families are forced to reduce the number of livestock bringing it down to less than the number needed for subsistence. We have nowhere to turn now… The grievances of the herders are a result of inadequate public consultations and impact assessments for the two projects: the Ukhaa Khudag Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) focused on the advantages of the railroad over the road infrastructure, while the Oyu Tolgoi assessment is retroactive, lacking operational plans, and focusing on mine construction at the time when construction is almost completed and production is beginning.[276]

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[275] Troy Sternberg, "Unravelling Mongolia's Extreme Winter Disaster of 2010," *Nomadic Peoples* 14, no. 1 (2010): 83-84.

[276] Indigenous Peoples Issues and Resources, "Mongolia: Mongolian Herders Submit Complaint to European Public Bank," http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/index.php?option=com_content&vie…-to-european-public-bank&catid=31:asia-indigenous-peoples&Itemid=64.

Today, Mongolia is focused on ecological sustainability rather than land privatization. However, Kamimura argues that the underlying assumption of the tragedy of the commons still directs international policy making[277] Scholars and development planners frequently cite threats against Mongolia from both climate and herding changes to justify inventive new strategies.[278]

Some local communities have attempted to utilize national legislation to preserve traditional lifestyles. For example, Article 16 of the Land Law and Articles 17 and 24 of the Minerals Law allow for *soums* to designate "land for special needs." After receiving this designation, good pasturelands, water reserves, and forests will be protected from both mining licenses and conservation restrictions. However, Suzuki's 2013 report indicates that only one *soum* attempted to designate a "land for special needs," and in the year following that designation the *aimag* assembly canceled the *soum's* designation.[279] Other attempts to protect land, such as upgrading reserves to National Park status have produced conflicts between officials, herders, and conservation workers. In their 2001 report for Landesa Rural Development Institute, legal scholars Tim Hanstad and Jennifer Duncan indicate that conflicts are occurring in central, southern, and northern Mongolian *aimags*.[280] Part of the problem emerging in these conflicts is that citizen training in public deliberation has yet to catch up with Mongolia's democratic transition. In the last section of this chapter, I examine an attempt to model and develop public deliberation in Mongolia by analyzing the Soros Foundation Forum, a nationally televised program that attempted to encourage public deliberation.

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[277] Kamimura, "Pastoral Mobility," 189.

[278] Girvetz et al., "Eastern Mongolian Grassland Steppe," 97.

[279] Recall that an *aimag* is similar to a providence and holds control over the more local *soum.* Suzuki, "Conflict between Mining."

[280] Hanstad and Duncan, "Land Reform in Mongolia," 88-89.

4.5 A LOT TO THINK ABOUT: DELIBERATION IN MONGOLIA

The first Mongolian televised public deliberations were funded by the Soros Foundation's Open Society Institute (OSI). Called the OSI Forum debates, these programs, filmed in 2005 and 2006, sought to establish a non-secular urban deliberation. This under-construction public sphere, imagined by the OSI and authenticated by participants, worked to incorporate rural participants who are labeled as by profession, advocacy organization, or location of their herds. The types of speech encouraged in these deliberations indicated a transition from socialist to democratic norms of public argument, and an absence of many of the hallmarks of Mongolian traditional speechmaking. For example, Mongolian Fulbright Fellow and Professor of English, J. Munkhbileg indicates that the hallmarks of a good Mongolian public speaker include the use of quotations from famous Mongolian poets and religious texts.[281] Instead of quotations or religious texts, participants in the OSI debates present personal narratives, statistical findings, and policy analysis. The role and effect of these deliberations on Mongolian arguments regarding identity, conservation, and land, are apparent in the 2005 episode, *Mongolian Gold*.

The OSI Forum *Mongolian Gold* begins with the moderator's introduction:

> Today, at the "Forum" we'll talk about Mongolian gold. We'll talk about bright and dark sides of gold production and mining sector. We'll be addressing the impact of development of this sector on Mongolia's growth and our lives. As usual, before we begin let's see what our editors have to say.[282]

While the journalist has been tasked with presenting both the "bright and dark" sides of mining, the predominant images are of environmental destruction. The accompanying narration adheres to Nyam-Osor's explanation that Mongolia is experiencing problems due to the

[281] J. Munkhbileg, in discussion with the author, December 2011.

[282] All transcripts used in this analysis were created and translated from Mongolian to English by the OSI Forum. Open Society Forum, *Mongolian Gold* (Ulaanbaatar: Open Society Institute, 2005).

government's emphasis on settlement. In this introduction, the Forum's journalists compare Mongolian mining with a prolonged war.

> Now the sacred land looks like this. Watching this one might think of consequences of war and bombs. Local people say, now it looks like the surface of the moon. They say, before it was a land of *stupas* and green grass with a wind blowing cool through the valleys. Ten years ago, gold seekers arrived at the river valley with heavy machinery, just out of the blue.[283]

While the use of deposit and placer mining are discussed, viewers of the televised *Forum* are told that both are dangerous and that these mining activities, not herders, are to blame for the drying up of Mongolian lakes and waterways. This discussion, presented using a frame of bounded land, invites community members to narrate the lack of water, mining companies' refusal to follow rehabilitation plans, protests at mining sites, and complaints against company directors that have bought Hummers while exploiting local communities. Herders then narrate their protest activities in March 2002 against mining companies:

> We had a sit-in here when the gold miners came over from their diggings in Nahiatin in March, 2002. The miners poured earth on the heads of women. Men were beaten with truncheon on this very spot…Then we decided to put small gers and did so. Security personnel of the mining company equipped with guns and truncheons demolished our gers and were almost about to shoot people in case they resisted. We were fighting against digging here in this place the same way as we did before. They didn't care about our resistance and kept digging until there were no ground squirrels and marmots left, at all. If you think about this it is really hard to believe. It's a real disaster and it just tempts you into crying.[284]

The inclusion of protest narratives without providing equal time to Mining companies indicates a bias amongst the journalistic team producing the introduction to the *Mongolian Gold Forum*. This introduction demonstrates one of many attempts to mold the debate surrounding Mongolian mining and environmental health, creating an expectation for deliberation about the

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[283] Open Society Forum, *Mongolian Gold.*

[284] Open Society Forum, *Mongolian Gold.*

role of protest, environmental effects, or community deliberation concerning mining policy. Yet, the moderator's response to this introduction illustrates the difficulties involved in creating deliberative forums. Instead of exploring the depiction of mining as war presented in the introduction, the moderator apologizes, "Our editor may have touched too much the dark side of the issue. Now, let's start with the bright side of the matter."[285] At this point, discussion turns to the President and Vice President of Boroo Gold who are asked how gold mining will benefit Mongolians. The response, given by Paul Corpi, President of Boroo Gold, is that gold mining creates jobs and bolsters the Mongolian economy through an expected output of 7.5 tons of gold in one year. Further, Mr. Corpi indicates that his company has spent 32 billion *tugrugs* (23 million USD) to exploit this gold deposit, he admits that his company has also not paid any taxes to the Mongolian State Budget as a result of their stability contract.[286]

All of Mr. Corpi's arguments are based on economic gain and only consider the role of urban Mongolians in decision-making processes. It is my argument that President Enkhbayar's reliance on arguments made using a frame of disappearance have opened space for arguments such as Mr. Corpi's. Recall that President Enkhbayar argues "in order to survive, we have to stop being nomads." Mr. Corpi's proposals give a warrant to this argument, demonstrating how Mongolians can survive after they have settled and are now welcomed mining projects. While some deliberation does occur around the validity of the mining contract, much of that is concerned with the payment of royalties to the Mongolian government – an argument that assumes that utilizes a frame of bounded land to deliberate on the proper payment for mineral extraction. The limitations created by these arguments are apparent when the moderator invites

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[285] Open Society Forum, *Mongolian Gold.*

[286] Open Society Forum, *Mongolian Gold.*

countryside participants to join the deliberation.

NGO representatives and citizens of local areas work quickly in an attempt to challenge the terms of the debate. For example, Ts. Munkhbayar, a member of an unnamed NGO introduces the need to highlight environmental over economic concerns in the mining debate.

> I am glad to be part of the Forum because I also have things to say. We heard repeatedly that incomes and profits from gold are very useful. I would like to approach the issue from another point of view. Why? Because we think we are taking much more losses then benefits - the consequences of which we are simply not aware of and not able to imagine. Don't we see the bad consequences every day?[287]

While Munkhbayar successfully calls for a more complex deliberation, he falls short of expanding the deliberation beyond alternatives already suggested by the moderator. Specifically, when asked how he would change the mining debate, Munkhbayar proposes changes in mining technology. In this response, Munkhbayar reaffirms the government's use of arguments from a frame of bounded land, as well as a frame of disappearance, because he accepts and anticipates that mining will continue to occur in Mongolia. While the moderator does invite discussion of compensation from herders who have lost lands, water supplies, and herds due to mining exploration, all of these remedies are also predicated by the government's arguments. Herder's arguments, such as those made through a frame of movement-as-*otor* which were explored earlier in this chapter, are absent from this deliberation.

Throughout the *Mongolian Gold Forum* attention is paid to the destruction of the environment. However, herders are not given space to make similar claims regarding their culture and traditions. While the *Mongolian Gold Forum* begins with an expectation that herder's arguments are valuable to the debate regarding mining in Mongolia, their experiences and

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[287] Open Society Forum, *Mongolian Gold.*

arguments quickly give way to questions of jobs, revenue, and environmental management.

We might better understand the way that environmental hazards are deliberated about in Mongolia by focusing on environmental risks in Mongolia. The *Mongolian Gold Forum* begins with a herder's narration of environmental destruction, which is quickly forgotten by the moderator when he invites Paul Corpi to speak about the benefits of mining. However, when environmental damages are again addressed, this time by Deputy Chairman of the Mineral Resource and Oil Authority, D. Jargalsaikhan, the moderator encourages discussion about the environment. Jargalsaikhan begins this discussion when he stated,

> Today, we face many cases of ignoring environmental protection issues, entities that are not following their duties and feel no responsibility for damaging nature. This situation is likely to become a normal thing. Ironically, we have our own control and inspection system which no one cares about. In reality, inspectors go around and fine directors of those entities who neglect protection of nature but as soon as the inspectors leave the entities start their wrong doings as before. I hope the State Professional Inspection Department will join us in this effort and improve the system.[288]

In this statement, Jargalsaikhan discusses the same environmental destruction as presented in the introduction narrative. However, his argument is made from a governmental frame of disappearance and does not address the effects on both herders and the environment. This division of human and environmental problems is similar to the division that I investigated in the Tanzanian and Kenyan chapters when government programs are produced to protect specific locations, but through a frame of bounded land, the human communities also living on those lands are absent from the deliberations. When herders are considered in these deliberations, it is from an expectation of poverty, which is then solved when the government or corporations such as Boro Gold promise to train and hire local community members to work

[288] Open Society Forum, *Mongolian Gold.*

in their mines. Sociologist John Thomson explains this difference in attention and voice when he states,

> we are aware that individuals speak with differing degrees of authority, that words are loaded with unequal weights, depending on who utters them and how they are said, such that some words uttered in certain circumstances have a force and a conviction that they would not have elsewhere.[289]

Following Thompson's analysis of linguistic productions, the unequal weights apparent in the *Mongolian Gold Forum* are apparent when herder's arguments about the environment are ignored, but Deputy Chairman of the Mineral Resource and Oil Authority is given airtime and deliberation. Herder's difficulty participating in deliberative spaces such as the *Mongolian Gold Forum* reflect the dominance of the government's argument based on a frame of disappearance. Instead of discussing a return to herding, these deliberations focus on the need for economic wealth and stability.

[289] John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Berkley: University of California, 1984), 42.

Figure 9: Mongolian *Ger* District.[290]

Those arguments are bolstered by the appearance of "ger districts" around cities, in which recently settled herders live in traditional homes, without herds, while they attempt to find jobs and acquire social services. Diener argues that while *ger* district residents might return to the countryside in the summer, "true knowledge of mobile pastoralist ways is waning among the growing number of urban dwellers."[291] Based on the frame of disappearance, it is understandable that the OSI Forum moderator includes some herders in the deliberation but concludes the debate by focusing on economic gains for Mongolia.

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[290] Mongolian families move to *ger* districts with their traditional tents known as *gers*, and sometimes small herds. Then, if they choose to stay in this districts alongside the city, families begin to build fences, permanent structures, and attempt to acquire electrical and water lines to support their family. Allison Hahn, December 2007.

[291] Diener, "Will New Mobilities," 631.

> Mining is, indeed, one of the most important sectors for Mongolian economy. Therefore, I don't think we should limit ourselves with critiques only. There is a lot to think about. As we live in a civil society we have to come to a resolution, anyway. Otherwise, our next generation might say: our ancestors didn't get things strait. I am sure, they would not say: this was right or that was wrong.[292]

While the importance of deliberation is noted, and a future-based perspective encouraged, the inclusion of herder's arguments, which was possible at the beginning of the deliberation, is absent at the end of the one-hour *Forum*.

The limitation placed on arguments made from a frame of movement-as-*otor* points to serious limitations in Mongolian deliberation. Civic engagement has increased as Mongolian journalists harshly criticize international corporations, yet many Mongolians also allege that foreigners are interfering with parliamentary decisions over mineral policy. One of these many interferences is a solidification of the frame of bounded land which has moved to a prominent position in Mongolian deliberations as the frame of disappearance is not only accepted but assumed to have already occurred.

Although the OSI *Forums* only aired from 2005 to 2006, the norms established in these deliberations have emerged in other public deliberation events. In 2009 The Citizen's Hall (*irgenii tanhim*) was established with assistance from the German Embassy and the OSI. The resulting deliberations have focused on government policies and annual "town hall" meetings with the Mongolian president. Attendance is limited to a government-approved board of government officials and outside experts and the resulting decisions are transferred directly to the president.[293] While the public is invited to participate by sending a letter or email to the coordinators, their direct participation is limited to open discussion meetings in Ulaan Baatar,

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[292] Open Society Forum, *Mongolian Gold*.

[293] Tsakhai Elbegdorj, "Procedures for the Citizens' Hall under the President of Mongolia," *Office of the President of Mongolia*, August 31, 2009, http://www.president.mn/eng/civilHall/civil-hall-procedures.php.

and therefor limited to only urban residents.

Later, in 2010 the television program *Bi Irgen* (Citizen) began to air on an educational television channel. While the earliest episodes of *Bi Irgen* closely followed the OSI *Forums* by beginning with journalist reports and then moving to deliberation, they now move immediately into deliberation. The model of deliberation has also changed, from a large body of invited guests to the current *Bi Irgen* format where a presenter moderates questions from the audience to a panel of experts. While this audience includes a greater diversity of individuals than those attending the OSI *Forums*, it also reinforces a division between the expert and the audience. *Bi Irgen* audiences do include herders and monks, easily identified by *del*s (traditional clothing of Mongolian herders) or religious robes, yet none of the experts are monks or herders. Indeed, these visual markers of difference serve to reinforce the norm of expertise by allowing the viewer to identify the expert (in a suit) and the non-expert (in a *del).* This division between herder and expert further supports the government's arguments from the frame of disappearance. We can see that herders still exist in Mongolia, but we are also informed that they are not experts or equal participants in deliberations about countryside policy.

The development and modeling of deliberative forums in Mongolia has the potential to produce new arguments and equal part deliberation between herders and settled communities. The need for these deliberations has been examined in this chapter as I examined the historic divisions between herders and the Qing, socialist, independent and modern democratic government of Mongolia. From this examination, I have investigated the ways that modern Mongolians, who intend to continue living as herders, have used a frame of movement-as-*otor* to advance arguments about Mongolian herder identity. From this study, quilting points between the experiences of the Maasai and Mongolians become apparent. Each community is faced with

pressures from government, development, and conservation organizations to settle and modernize. These similar arguments, made from a frame of disappearance, argue that there is no place for herders in the modern world. However, as this chapter has illustrated, Mongolian herders intend to continue their traditional lifestyles. Today they are using tools ranging from illegal hunting to participation in televised deliberations to advance arguments from a frame of movement-as-*otor*. In the next chapter I will examine the cross-border efficacy of these rhetorical moves by examining the arguments and protests occurring in Inner Mongolia, China.

5.0 INNER MONGOLIA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

As the frontier zone between China and Mongolia, the homeland of Chinghis Khan, and site the most northern fragments of the Great Wall, Inner Mongolia is both the most rural frontier and the most fought over grassland in Central Asia. Today, the historic and cultural narrative used by the People's Republic of China (PRC) depicts a continual history of Han Chinese control of Inner Mongolia with two exceptions, when foreigners invaded China during the Yuan and Qing dynasties. In the previous chapter I discussed the Qing dynasty's division of Mongolia and Inner Mongolia and how this legacy has worked to stabilize the frames of bounded land and disappearance. That same history is also relevant to this chapter's analysis of Inner Mongolia. Additionally, in Inner Mongolia the Qing division of land produced a rhetoric of annexation, colonization, segregation, assimilation, and integration for Mongolian lands and peoples into the larger People's Republic of China.

In this chapter I investigate how the demarcation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in 1947 signaled the government's preference for arguments made using a frame of bounded land. Then, tracing the path of argumentation during the Cultural Revolution, I assess how visual proleptic elegies in artifacts such as propaganda posters help illustrate the ways that the frame of disappearance has been articulated and presented to Mongolian herders in Inner

Mongolia. As in the previous chapter, I explore how the frame of movement-as-*otor* competes rhetorically with these official propaganda efforts, to explore Mongolian acts of resistance to People's Republic of China programs, and examine how the government has so entrenched its frame of bounded land that government policy makers and environmental scientists have limited success reconciling their projects with herder's arguments. Finally, I analyze the ways that Inner Mongolian herders have turned to social media to organize and report on their protests against the People's Republic of China. By focusing on one such incident, the death of a herder named Mergen in 2011, I explore the ways that the government's frames of bounded land and disappearance have influenced the development of new protest tactics that articulate and demonstrate the herder's frame of movement-as-*otor*.

5.2 MINZU

According to Gabriel Lafitte, Australian academic and development policy consultant to the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the PRC holds a deep-seated mistrust of nomadic communities.

> [Governments of China have] long mistrusted the mobility of the nomads of its northern and western edges. The mobility of the nomads was always the core of imperial fears and strategies. Mobility was an ever-present problem for successive dynasties facing their nomadic neighbors so closely to the north, and so far away in the west. Centuries of managing the risks arising from mobility left a deep imprint on Chinese minds, and a major repertoire of governmentalities to deal with it.[294]

According to this analysis, which connects the modern PRC with earlier Chinese governments, the mobility of herders prompted emperors to build walled palaces, raise armies, and attempt to

[294] Gabriel Lafitte, "Modern Freedoms, Nomadic Freedoms," *Rukor* weblog, accessed February 2, 2014, http://rukor.org/modern-freedoms-nomadic-freedoms/.

settle herder communities. One of the longest lasting monuments to these pressures, the Great Wall of China, demonstrates the historic clash between the government's frame of bounded land and herder's frame of movement-as-*otor*. This wall simultaneously divides and demarcates the space that herders continually breach by traversing pathways around, below, and in spite of the wall. In the past, Chinese courts paid tribute to herder and nomadic communities such as Mongolians and Tibetans in exchange for protection or regulation of herder and nomadic movements across state spaces.[295] However, these networks of exchange that were developed in the Yuan dynasty in 1271 experienced radical revisions at the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.

Writing in 1935, Owen Lattimore, professor of Chinese Studies at Leeds, considered the popular characterizations of Inner Mongolian identity in his essay, *On the Wickedness of Being Nomads:*

> The Mongols live under a form of society that was established as a compromise between the political requirements of the Manchu empire, and the social and economic traditions of the Mongols themselves. Each Mongol tribal group occupies a territory with well-defined frontiers. Within this territory, all of the land belongs to all of the tribe. People move about freely, because in an arid climate it is not practical to keep animals grazing always on the same fields. Most families in Inner Mongolia have one summer camping-place, to which they return year after year, and one winter place, which is even more permanent, because it is convenient to accumulate a store of fuel for the winter. These two camps are often only a few miles apart. No individual holds any property in land. There being no 'capitalist' monopoly of land, wealth and social advancement depend primarily on the energy and competence of the individual. If he manages his livestock with skill, the natural increase of every year is a clear increase in wealth; he does not have to lay out capital for the purchase of pastureland on which to feed his herds. Nor can the rich man, by asserting private ownership of land, prevent the poor man from grazing his flocks on it. Under such conditions a prince can be poor and ignorant (and often is) and a commoner can be rich and educated.[296]

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[295] Lafitte, "Modern Freedoms."

[296] Owen Lattimore, "On the Wickedness of Being Nomads," *T'ien Hsai Monthly* 1, no. 1 (1935), http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/articles.php?searchterm=019_nomads.inc&issue=019.

The well-defined frontiers of Mongolians described by Lattimore in 1935 were officially named as the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), the first autonomous region of the People's Republic of China. Anthropologist Uradyn Erden Bulag notes that as the first Autonomous Region, IMAR policy became a model for policies applied to other non-Han Chinese peoples in Tibet, Xinjiang, Guanxi, and Ningxia. Today, Tibetans and Uyghurs use Inner Mongolia as a reference point to predict future policies in their regions.[297] The boundaries set for the IMAR in May 1947 marked a division from both the independent Mongolia and historical Qing policies. Prior to 1912, the Qing Empire encouraged migration and settlement in Mongolian regions and developed railways to move both colonists and supplies.[298] This influx of non-Mongolian ethnicities resulted in ethnic tensions which were negotiated both at the emergence of the PRC and with the development of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

As an autonomous region of China, the IMAR is designed to grant specific decision-making powers to local nationalities. As anthropologist Michael Zukosky indicates, "one of the last lines of the National Grassland Law states that, according to 'local special characteristics,' autonomous regions should create and implement by-laws."[299] These provisions enact a bounded land argument frame – it is the region that is autonomous, not the Mongolian people. As such, the local special characteristics of the IMAR are tied to locations, not ethnic traditions such as nomadic or seminomadic movement of herders. The resulting division of this land, coupled with the Chinese Cultural Revolution has produced multiple modern conflicts over identity, culture, and land tenure.

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[297] Uradyn Erden Bulag, "Alter/Native Mongolian Identity," in *To the Courts or to the Barricades? Can New Political Institutions Manage Rural Conflict?*, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Seldon (New York: Routledge, 2010), 263.

[298] Owen Lattimore, "Inner Mongolia-Chinese, Japanese or Mongol?," *Pacific Affairs* 10, no. 1 (1937): 67.

[299] Michael Zukosky, "Reconsidering Governmental Effects of Grassland Science and Policy in China," *Journal of Political Ecology* 15 (2008): 46.

Modern conflicts are traced to the Cultural Revolutions' Red Guards – Han Chinese youth sent from cities to learn from peasants – that arrived in the IMAR in August 1966 from Beijing and Shanghai and immediately began attacking Mongolian traditions. Clashes between Mongolians and the Red Guards on August 10, 1966 when in addition to violent protest, Mongolians began to secretly organize cultural and religious resistances. To ease mounting tensions, the Red Guards were ordered to assist in the Mongolians' harvest. However, many left the harvests and instead turned their attention toward attacking Buddhist Lamas and the pre-revolutionary leadership in an attempt to root out underground resistance organizations. Conflicts between the Red Guards and Mongolian nationalists continued as Mongolians were accused of supporting isolationism and aligning with both Mongolia and the USSR. Mongolians with higher education or positions of high status in Buddhist temples were specially targeted for persecution including forced confessions and public trials. At this time, all ties with international organizations, media, and publications to be considered capitalist were cut.[300]

In April 1969, as a response to ethnic clashes and reorganization of the central government, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was sub-divided and land was distributed to Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Gansu, and Ningxia providences. These subdivisions made Mongolians ethnic minorities in their traditional lands. The result was not only an upset in the balance of power of local governments, but also the creation of an opportunity for the PRC to send national troops to Inner Mongolia under the auspices of building new government offices and networks.

During this period of Cultural Revolution, between 350,000 and 790,000 Inner Mongolians were arrested. Anthropologist William Jankowiak contextualizes the effects of these

[300] Barbara Mittler, "Popular Propaganda? Art and Culture in Revolutionary China," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* 152, no. 4 (December 2008): 466-489.

arrests in his interview with a Mongolian informant who noted, "there was not a single Mongol who did not lose a close relative or friend during the Cultural Revolution."[301] Based on his own survey, Jankowiak estimates that one out of every four Mongolians in IMAR was arrested during the Cultural Revolution.

The Cultural Revolution officially ended in 1976 with the death of Chairman Mao. At that time, the PRC admitted to the deaths of 9.32 million citizens. Later, in 1995 President Jiang Zemin increased the official number of deaths during the Cultural Revolution to 35 million.[302] International estimates have maintained that the true number is closer to 100 million. Journalist Jasper Becker indicates that an investigation into the true number of deaths and related persecutions has not occurred because the numbers would be too embarrassing for the current PRC leadership. Embarrassment could occur because many members of the National People's Congress served as Red Guards, and top officials began their careers as regional propaganda officers.[303] While quantifying the number of deaths and arrests during this period may be impossible, artifacts such as propaganda posters can provide a lens into the ideology at play in IMAR during the Cultural Revolution.

Whereas the other chapters of this dissertation have focused on archival documents and historical narratives of the critical period of transition between herding communities and colonizing forces, to analyze the IMAR I will include a brief analysis of the role of propaganda posters in public deliberation. This discussion is necessary as many of the archival documents regarding the Cultural Revolution are still sealed. Photography of and foreign travel were

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[301] William Jankowiak, "The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* no. 19/20 (January – July 1988): 276.

[302] For a detailed account of these deaths, and the discrepancy in reporting the number of arrests, injuries, and deaths during the Cultural Revolution, see Yang Su, *Collective Killings in Rural China During the Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[303] Jasper Becker, "The Big Lie," *Index of Censorship* 2 (2004): 85-90.

prohibited to Inner Mongolia so there are few independent accounts from this time. Additionally, as discussed previously in this chapter, many Mongolians either did not survive or still will not give interviews about this period of transition.[304]

Propaganda posters were used during the Cultural Revolution to make long-term, complex arguments about the disappearance of Mongolian herder identity. In each poster, the PRC assumes that settlement is the best option for herder communities. These images map the progression of herder communities' encounters with the PRC, unity of Inner Mongolian and Chinese territory, the influx of industrial and agricultural goods in to Inner Mongolia, the establishment of schools and militias, and finally Inner Mongolians living in modern, industrial cities. Reading these images as evidence of a planned trajectory of development and modernization identifies the ways the PRC used visual proleptic elegies to communicate expectations of settlement within Inner Mongolia, communicative practices that resulted in reinforcement of the frame of disappearance for structuring public argument surrounding the herder controversy.

Propaganda posters have been used by the PRC as tools of political discourse that reproduce, deploy, and relay the expected power hierarchies, political representations, and new social norms. These posters served as weather vanes for illiterate audiences who interpreted pictorial spaces to measure political climates and trends. Although posters can be used to represent the desires of the state, viewers can also use these images to understand both dominant

[304] Even examples of this narrative can be seen in the Inner Mongolian History Museum, housed in Hohhot, which includes dinosaurs, ancient Mongolian history, and modern Inner Mongolia, but makes no mention of the period from 1966 to 1976.

and suppressed narratives. Or as sociologist Xing-Hua Lu suggests, viewers read these posters as a double agency that betrays itself as attempting to hide behind an ideological screen.[305]

While much work has been done on the role of political posters during the Cultural Revolution, little attention has been turned to the ways herding communities were portrayed, affected, or persuaded by these posters.[306] Visual productions from the Cultural Revolution provide information not only about a specific period in history, but also contextualize clashes in modern China. While the PRC contends that Inner Mongolia and Tibet have always been a part of China, these propaganda posters indicate that Mongolians and Tibetans have not always identified with Han Chinese culture and traditions. By mapping the subtle changes in symbols and framing in these images it is possible to understand how the PRC has wanted to persuade Mongolians to identify as ethnicities of the PRC.

To further explore this issue, the following analysis considers one illustrative propaganda poster, the 1975 image "Let Good News Spread Across the Grassland." This poster was produced by the Inner Mongolian Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, a subsidiary branch of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing. The Central Propaganda Department oversees both propaganda and education and is divided into internal (domestic) and external (foreign) branches. Within each branch, propaganda productions are further divided into political, economic, cultural, and social propaganda. Staff

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[305] Xing-Hua Lu, "Political Representation within the Libidinal Economy of a Pictorial Space: A Political-Semiotic Reading of the Three Propaganda Posters of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," *Semiotica* 157, no. 1/4 (2005): 214.

[306] For a discussion of Chinese propaganda posters' effects on changing clothing, sanitization, and public exercise norms, see Tina Mai Chen, "Proletarian White and Working Bodies in Mao's China," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 11, no. 2 (2003): 361-393. Additionally, a discussion of working bodies and the transition to modernization is provided by Patricia Powell and Joseph Wong, "Propaganda Posters from the Chinese Cultural Revolution," *Historian* 59, no. 4 (1997): 776-793.

are selected from academic party members trained in the newest political ideology.[307] In 1975 the division of the Central Propaganda Department insured that the poster "Let Good News Spread Over the Grassland" was out of view from foreigners. However, Internet and international archives such as the Institute for Social History and the Ann Tompkins and Lincoln Cushing China Poster Archive at the University of California Berkeley have made these images available to international researchers and promise to provide a rich body of primary documents.[308]

This poster is one of the few artifacts remaining from the Inner Mongolian Cultural Revolution and a critical hallmark for mapping the changes and negotiations occurring in state sponsored and outsider Mongolian culture. The viewer's gaze is drawn to the young Mongolian woman in the poster foreground. Dressed in a pink *del* (Mongolian traditional robe), she is riding a Chinese Post Office motorcycle and displaying a copy of a Mandarin language newspaper. In the background power cables cut across the once smooth steppe and lead in the same direction of the path she is traveling with the motorcycle. In the distance are two herders on horseback and beyond them a herd of white animals. The image is captioned, in small print, using both Mandarin characters and Mongolian classical script, both translating in English as "Let the Good News Spread Over the Grasslands," the title of this poster. The inclusion of both Mandarin characters and Mongolian text follows PRC policy of including both the national and local languages in propaganda publications. However, the use of Mandarin characters, without

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[307] Anne-Marie Brady, "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era," *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 3, no. 1 (2006): 58-77.

[308] Special collections of Chinese Propaganda posters can be found at the Institute of Social History: http://www.iisg.nl/exhibitions/chairman/ and Ann Tompkins and Lincoln Cushing China Poster Archive at the University of California Berkeley: http://www.docspopuli.org/ChinaPosters.html For a copy of the poster, "Let Good News Spread Over the Grasslands," please visit the International Institute of Social History's archives, print no. M8089.97, http://search.socialhistory.org/Record/1072718.

accompanying Mongolian script, on the newspaper may indicate the states' preference for monolingual communication.

For Inner Mongolian audiences in 1975 this image endorses the use of modernized Mongolian traditional clothing, a puzzling style choice given living conditions in the Mongolian steppe. A Mongolian woman, tasked with milking cows, cleaning, cooking, caring for children, and collecting dung for cooking fires, would never select a pink *del*. The garment would be instantly damaged and impossible to return to the desired color. Additionally, a woman riding motorcycle through the steppe would risk being covered in dust, equally difficult to clean from pink clothing. Finally, traditional Mongolian colors include red, blue, green, and yellow, but not pink. Nevertheless, pink, the color commonly worn by Han and Manchu women during the Qing Dynasty, is the color that early PRC artists selected for the character of this poster and almost every other poster featuring a Mongolian woman. Further inquiry, beyond the scope of the present study, may well be warranted to determine whether these portrayals indeed reflect changing fashion trends in Inner Mongolia or instead constitute an attempt by poster producers to map their own cultural norms onto Mongolian herder communities.

In either case, the poster clearly enacts the frame of disappearance, depicting as the new normal a Mongolian woman leaving the home, being able to travel further than her herds, and returning with Chinese language publications. This woman's attire, luggage, motorcycle, and path all point to the dramatic transition from herder to settled life ways – yielding a visual proleptic elegy.

This visual proleptic elegy sheds light on the ways the Chinese Communist Party worked to standardize Mongolian race, culture, and gender. The information conveyed in these images pertained to both Mongolians, who were informed of state approved Mongolian norms, and non-

Mongolians who could define themselves in opposition to the image. Posters such as "Let the Good News Spread Over the Grasslands" provide a window into one of the most contentious questions during this time, the identity of Mongols within the Chinese nation state. These conflicts centered on the emergence of Marxist and Maoist literature in China. Marxist and Maoist scholars have had difficulty classifying Mongols as pastoralists, peasants, or land-owners while simultaneously deliberating on questions of ownership of land by individuals, communities, and the state. To contend with the ethnic complexities of the modern Chinese state, the central government developed a concept of *minzu* or ethnicity.[309] Uradyn Bulag, professor of Social Anthropology at Cambridge, argues that *minzu* has been used to construct Chinese ethnic policy through a hierarchy of minority and majority ethnicity. When the Chinese Communist Party came to power, more than 400 *minzu* where identified, but that number was quickly reduced to fifty-five recognized ethnic groups. The process of identifying, grouping, and reducing ethnicities has a long history and criticism extends beyond the scope of this dissertation. In this text, I am primarily concerned with the way in which *minzu* were identified and tied to specific pieces of land, and then associated with a specific cultural composition. This predication of culture to landedness highlights the government's tendency to refract Mongolian identity through a frame of bounded land. These arguments eschew traditional ties to migration patterns, herding patterns, or cross-cultural networks by tying communities to specific locations and then crafting policies based on those locations. This construction is similar to that used when creating the IMAR, however it is more surprising as the IMAR was a division of land into provinces, and this is a division of ethnicities by lands into ethnic groups.

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[309] For a detailed assessment of the construction of the term, *minzu,* see Zhang Huayang, "Wrestling with the Connotation of Chinese 'Minzu'," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32, no. 30 (1997): PE74-PE79.

The implications of *minzu* policy are apparent in modern PRC where minority ethnicities qualify for special privileges. Article 4 of the PRC constitution explains the interworking of these privileges alongside guaranteed equality amongst all nationalities;

> All ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority ethnic groups and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China's ethnic groups. Discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic group are prohibited; any act that undermines the unity of the ethnic groups or instigates division is prohibited.
>
> The state assists areas inhabited by minority ethnic groups in accelerating their economic and cultural development according to the characteristics and needs of the various minority ethnic groups.
>
> Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority ethnic groups live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established to exercise the power of autonomy. All ethnic autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China.
>
> All ethnic groups have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own folkways and customs.[310]

Ostensibly, the constitution permits Mongolian herders to continue practicing herding lifestyles, use Mongolian languages, and live in Mongolian style homes. However, activists in IMAR indicate that few of these rights are enforced. This disconnection between rights and reality led to student protests in 1980 that responded to the emergence of Han control in local government. As Jankowiak reports, at this time only fifty percent of high ranking officials in IMAR were Mongolian. In local offices, eighty percent of middle level officials, and ninety percent of junior level officials, were Han.[311] A student protester reflects on this period of troubled relations between Mongolians and Hans:

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[310] National People's Congress (China), *Constitution,* (Beijing, 2004). http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm

[311] Jankowiak, "The Last Hurrah?," 277-279.

> Inner Mongolia was given a lot of promises by the Han. We were told we would have power and rights over natural resources. We have never received them. Before liberation there were a lot of Mongol leaders in Inner Mongolia. Now there are only a few. Most leaders in Huhhot are Han; all the leaders in every county are Han; Mongols simply have no power.[312]

Today, Bulag argues that this disconnection between constitutional rights and modern reality is rooted in the Chinese conception of *minzu* policies that emphasize Han-specific knowledge. The history, traditions, skills, and sciences of non-Han communities, such as Mongolians, were either not recognized or given a lower status. Lafitte has argued that while outside of China local knowledge is deemed important for policy making decisions and biodiversity conservation, within China, local knowledge is commonly excluded from deliberations.[313] Similarly, Human Rights International has reported that groups that fall under multiple categories of minority face increased separation and risk of conflict. For example, Mongolian communities that are an ethnic minority, a religious minority, and do not live in settled communities are often excluded from political participation, socioeconomic development, and cultural expression.[314] In this way we can see that while the government is utilizing a frame of bounded land to discuss the ways ethnicity is rooted to specific spaces, policy statements also enact a frame of disappearance, elevating Han cultures and silencing Mongolian identities and arguments.

The lack of Mongolian participation is most prominent in deliberations concerning land and grazing. China has the second largest useable rangeland in the world, with 363 million hectares, representing twelve percent of the world's rangelands. Many of these lands are highly

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[312] Jankowiak, "The Last Hurrah?," 283.

[313] Lafitte, "Modern Freedoms."

[314] Human Rights in China, *China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions*, (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2007), 8.

degraded and the PRC blames that degradation on overgrazing by herders and climate change.[315] While accounts differ, Chad Futrell, PhD Candidate at Cornell University, presents compelling evidence that by 2008 more than seventy percent of Chinese grasslands had turned to desert, with projected losses continuing at an annual rate of 3,900 square kilometers.[316] This encroachment of the desert puts a heavy burden on herders attempting to continue grazing herds in smaller spaces. Additionally, as the Gobi spreads south through the IMAR, dust storms and soil erosion have increased in China and the North-Pacific region.[317] Anthropologist Dee Mack Williams suggests that the best way to understand the complexity of this land degradation in China is within the context of marginality as "both a cause and effect of ongoing geographic, cultural, political, and economic marginalization process in a national boundary setting."[318] She notes that before the People's Republic of China collectivized herders and grasslands, herders were free to graze their animals across the open steppe. While lands were technically under the control of feudal lords, customary law gave herders unlimited rights to graze wherever they pleased with the exception of special pastures reserved for nobility. Williams argues that the juxtaposition of technical divisions and customary law has disrupted these local lands. She notes,

> recent policy initiatives, explicitly implemented to increase productivity and to promote contact with an expanding world economy, have become the vehicle by which land is selectively degraded and residents are selectively exploited in a race to control community resources.[319]

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[315] Hua Limin and David Michalk, "Herders' Income and Expenditure: Perceptions and Expectations," in *Towards Sustainable Use of Rangelands in North-West China*, eds. Victor Squires, Limin Hua, Degang Zhang and G. Li, (New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2010), 234.

[316] W. Chad Futrell, "Inner Mongolia: Reign of Sand," *ChinaDialogue,* June 4, 2008, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/1876-Inner-Mongolia-reign-of-sand.

[317] Limin and Michalk, "Herders' Income," 234.

[318] Dee Mack Williams, "Grazing the Body: Violations of Land and Limb in Inner Mongolia," *American Ethnologist* 24, no. 4 (1997): 770.

[319] Williams, "Grazing the Body," 775.

As the previous chapter explored, similar arguments are made regarding land in Mongolia where herders are accused of overgrazing. However, due to political splits between Mongolia and China, it is uncommon for cross-border scientific research to occur.[320] Additionally, the differences in scientific methodologies and operative ideologies affect scientific and scholarly understanding of the severity of land degradation, culprits, causes, and public interpretation of findings.[321] Zukosky argues that in this way, the Han Chinese majority of the PRC and international scientific elite prefer technologies that monitor and surveil the grassland – recording both environmental and human data.[322] Following this line of analysis, grassland science is presented as a state control over minority communities.

This use of science as surveillance has created deep divisions between IMAR herders and scientists. When residents are included in these reports, passive participation usually comes in the form of being counted in statistical analyses of herd size and consumption levels.[323] As a result, western and Mongolian scholars have argued that these reports strengthen social control of Mongolian communities. My analysis here elucidates a specific rhetorical mechanism through which this takes place — reinforcement of the bounded land frame for public argument.

The PRC government and conservationist responses to land degradation also deploy the frame disappearance in these discussions. A primary tactic is "grazing exclusion" policies, which prohibit grazing in degraded grassland areas. These programs aim at increasing conservation by

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[320] Dee Mack Williams, "Representations of Nature on the Mongolian Steppe: An Investigation of Scientific Knowledge Construction," *American Anthropologist* 102, no. 3 (2000): 506-07.

[321] Williams, "Representations of Nature," 508.

[322] Zukosky, "Reconsidering Governmental," 45.

[323] Williams, "Representations of Nature," 507. While Williams makes this argument in 2000, it seems to still be true today.

removing herbivores from the environment.[324] While policy disputes in this area are technically about herding, government justifications for the policy are premised on demarcated geography, with official stipulations of what should and should not occur in specifically bounded spaces. Programs designed to regulate activities in specific spaces have targeted not only herds, but also herding communities under the title of "ecological migration." In use since the early 1980's ecological migration is a government-initiated method to permanently resettle herders away from fragile environments, thus protecting and rehabilitating degraded ecosystems.[325] By 1996 ecological migration had become one of the primary conservation measures in the IMAR.

Ecological migration is commonly supported by arguments utilizing a frame of bounded land in response to the tragedy of the commons.[326] Furtrell's 2008 report indicates that all supporting evidence for ecological migration depicts herders as the cause of desertification rather than victims of desertification that threatens their herds, families, and lifestyles.[327] It is my argument that the presentation of Mongolian herders as perpetual villains that destroy fragile environments has legitimated the use of a frame of disappearance resulting in a proleptic elegy that attempts to replace traditional herding lifestyles with farming and livestock grazing.[328]

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[324] Liping Qui, Xiaorong Wei, Xingchang Zhang, Jimin Cheng, "Ecosystem Carbon and Nitrogen Accumulation after Grazing Exclusion in Semiarid Grassland," *PLOS One* 8, no. 1 (2013): 55433. When Qui et al. discuss these programs, they use terms such as "removal of herbivores" but say nothing of the communities that live in those same areas. Squires takes note of this separation of herder and herds and indicates that rangeland destruction occurs at the hands of humans and their herds. Also see Victor Squires, Degang Zhang, and Limin Hua, "Ecological Restoration and Control of Rangeland Degradation: Rangeland Management Interventions," in *Towards Sustainable Use of Rangelands in North-West China*, eds. Victor Squires, Limin Hua, Degang Zhang and G. Li, (New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2010): 81-98.

[325] Jennifer West, *Perceptions of Ecological Migration in Inner Mongolia, China: Summary of Fieldwork and Relevance for Climate Adaptation* (Oslo: Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, 2009).

[326] Chengcheng Zhang, Wenjun Li, and Mingming Fan, "Adaptation of Herders to Droughts and Privatization of Rangeland-Use Rights in the Arid Alxa Left Banner of Inner Mongolia," *Journal of Environmental Management* 126 (2013): 183.

[327] Futrell, "Inner Mongolia: Reign of Sand."

[328] Jun Wang, Daniel G. Brown, and Jiquan Chen, "Drivers of the Dynamics in Net Primary Productivity Across Ecological Zones on the Mongolian Plateau," *Landscape Ecology* 28 (2013): 726.

Today, ecological migration policies call for 650,000 herders to move away from their grazing lands and replace traditional herding with state controlled grasslands management. These migrations have been accompanied by housing schemes, infrastructure development, and vocational training. Yet Inner Mongolian activists continue to resist ecological migrations. Some protesters are opposed to any movement of herders from traditional pastures. Other protesters and international human rights organizations argue that ecological migration is unacceptable because herders are not consulted prior to their migration.[329] As Enghebatu Togochog, director of the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center told Human Rights International,

> There is solid evidence of the involuntary nature of the Ecological Migration Project – that it is a highly coercive displacement process, evident in the human rights violations against the local Mongolian herders in Southern Mongolia. During relocation, thousands of local herders lost their livestock, homes, and other property without adequate compensation. Further, the government has arrested, detained, and imprisoned those who resist. At issue is not whether traditional pastoralism is detrimental to the environment; rather, to '[ensure] that the Mongols have meaningful voice in the nature of the modernization of their own communities.[330]

Due to ecological migration, many Inner Mongolian herders have settled in government-designed apartment complexes. To many western viewers, this act seemingly embraces modernity. According to *The Guardian* (Canada),

> what had defined Mongolian culture for outsiders have long been swapped for leather outfits, motorbikes, cellphones and tourism…The old storybook nomad life has dwindled, with most nomads now farming, living in compact brick huts, tending to tourists, or working in nearby cities.[331]

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[329] For a detailed analysis of government provisions and costs, such as 7.5 billion Yuan investment in Qinghai, see Andreas Gruschke, "Tibetan Pastoralists in Transition. Political Change and State Interventions in Nomad Societies," in *Pastoral Practices in High Asia*, ed. Herman Kreutzmann (New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2012), 284.

[330] Human Rights in China, *China: Minority Exclusion,* 14.

[331] "Nomadic Mongolian Lifestyle Fades but Yurts, Shepherds on Motorcycles, Remain," *Guardian* (Canada), September 27, 2010.

However, to IMAR residents, these encroachments on traditional ways of life are fodder for increased protests. The following subsections examine the ways that IMAR communities resist ecological migration and enact a frame of movement-as-*otor* when presenting arguments to the PRC.

5.3 THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE ON THE BACKS OF CAMELS

The Chinese government argues that environmental degradation in IMAR is the direct result of herding and climate change. However, Inner Mongolian herders have continually produced a more nuanced narrative. Zhang encapsulates this narrative by highlighting how it frames herding practices as calculated, communal decisions by herders to grow, diversify, or shrink their herds to adapt to changing environmental conditions. This frame of movement-as-*otor* is apparent in IMAR community members, who refer to themselves as "the people who live on the backs of camels," or those that are always moving.[332]

Arguments based on the frame of movement-as-*otor* are not only confined to Mongolian communities. While the PRC has used *minzu* to classify ethnicities, Mongolian activists have rejected these classifications of foreigner and native to broaden discussions of migrations by both Mongolian and Han ethnicities. Then, activists such as Enghebatu Togochog have emphasized the migration of Han Chinese to IMAR as the root of conflicts in IMAR.

> Chinese migration has always been, is still being, and will continue to be the root cause of all sorts of violence and human rights violations in Southern Mongolia. The very foundation of the Chinese colonial regime in Southern Mongolia is based on and supported by Chinese migration…Togochog said the CCP supported

[332] Zhang et al., "Adaptation of Herders," 185.

> migration of Chinese into Southern Mongolia as the foundation of a colonial regime that encourages the confiscation and development of Mongolian herders' lands. [333]

In this argument, Togochog Enkhebatu clearly differentiates between negative Han Chinese migrations and positive movements of Mongolian herders. These arguments are advanced through a frame of movement-as-*otor*, which functions in a similar manner to arguments made in Mongolia.

Just as in Mongolia, herders in IMAR use *otor* to respond to climate changes and environmental pressures. Xie and Li note that before land privatization, *otor* was easily used by all Mongolian herding communities. These movements continued in the 1980's when migration routes were negotiated between village leaders. However, after the 1996 privatizations, *otor* was only organized by individuals and met with limited success.[334] The diminished capacity to arrange *otor* has had dramatic effects not only on land, but also on networks and relationships amongst herding communities. Traditionally, *otor* strengthened reciprocal networks of support. Herders expected that they could migrate over long distances when faced with environmental pressures. And in turn, they expected to host herders who had migrated when their own lands were experiencing difficulties.[335] This created a self-sustaining network that operated beyond state control or view.[336]

Yet, as *otor* was constrained, herders began specializing their herds to adapt to smaller parcels of land. These radical changes in traditional adaptive strategies not only affected modern

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[333] Carol Wickenkamp, "Chinese Regime Protects Land Grabs and Abuses in Inner Mongolia," *Epoch Times*, December 25, 2013, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/417176-summary-chinese-land-grabs-in-mongolia-source-of-many-rights-abuses-and-violence-says-group-chinese-regime-protects-land-grabs-and-abuses-in-mongolia-by-carol-wickenkmap-epoch-times-staff-illegal-land/.

[334] Yina Xie and Wenjun Li, "Why Do Herders Insist on *Otor?* Maintaining Mobility in Inner Mongolia," *Nomadic Peoples* 12, no. 2 (2008): 39-40.

[335] Jean Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (London: Sage Publications, 1993).

[336] Xie and Li, "Why Do Herders," 49.

herd dynamics, but also inscribe these changes on herder communities that no longer have the pack animals needed for *otor*. Herders are well aware of the risks involved in these changes to the environment and herds.

> 20 years ago, grasses were so tall that you could not see a calf, but now they barely cover the soil. Animals cannot get enough grass to gain fat against the harsh winter. That makes livestock more vulnerable when heavy snow comes. The other reason is that they eat up all the short grasses during the dry summer. Then when winter comes, there is not enough grass left. Stuck in the heavy snow, many animals die.[337]

When faced with environmental pressures, herders have had to adopt high-cost strategies such as buying fodder or selling their herds.[338] The remaining herds are therefore smaller in number, but also genetically isolated as cross-breeding that occurred during *otor* is no longer possible.[339] These adaptations have entrenched Mongolian herders into the larger Chinese economy through systems of credit and exchange. Yet, as herder advocates advance arguments through a frame of movement-as-*otor* – which highlights both the practice and loss of *otor* – herders are forming new arguments about land rights. The continued preference of herders to use arguments made through a frame of movement-as-*otor,* despite access to other argumentative frames, reflects the importance of spatially and socially flexible adaptation to climate changes.[340]

As in Mongolia, today it is not possible for all IMAR herders to practice *otor*. Beyond governmental regulations, public works, open-pit mines, and infrastructure projects have divided the once open steppe. However, herders maintain that locations still exist where they can practice herding and migration. Using protest techniques such as road blockades, herders are working to express both their rejection of state projects and a demand that traditional practices be revised.

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[337] Xiaoli and Vernooy, "Reading the Weather," 643-644.
[338] Zhang et al., "Adaptation of Herders," 87.
[339] Xiaoli and Vernooy, "Reading the Weather," 642.
[340] Xie and Li, "Why Do Herders," 37.

5.4 CASE STUDY: RETURNING HERDS TO XILINGOL GRASSLANDS

The Chinese government has tried multiple strategies aimed at meeting community demands and expectations for herd and land (de)regulation. In the early 1980's animals and lands which had been collectivized were returned to herders.[341] This move reflected the government's understanding of Mongolian demands for privatized ownership of livestock, and a compartmentalized interpretation of the Mongolian herders' argument that herds and herding practices should be determined by herding communities. It is my argument that these projects failed because the PRC returned animals to herders while viewing deliberations from a frame of bounded land – which was demarcated and controlled by the state. Herders, who preferred to present arguments using a frame of movement-as-*otor*, were only more frustrated after the return of herds which they could now own but could not graze in the pasturelands that were still controlled by the government. In this misalignment of policy we see that the Chinese government attempted to respond to the Mongolian herder's arguments by accepting that Mongolian identity is always intrinsically linked to the owning of herds. However, because these policies were based in a frame of bounded land, which eschewed movement as critical to successful herding, the policies failed.

Later, in 1994 China signed the UN Convention to Combat Desertification which included plans for replanting ninety-five million acres of land. This legislation aimed at restoring grassland ecology and putting fewer controls on herding communities that lived in the same regions. These policies again originated from a frame of bounded land. However, we see

[341] Limin and Michalk, "Herders' Income," 239.

evidence that the government tried again to adapt to Mongolian arguments by replanting grasslands so that herders could graze and move their herds.

Problems began to occur when the government fenced off test-grasslands in preparation for these plantings. The exclusion of herds from these fenced projects enraged herders who were already contending with shrinking pasturelands. Additionally, government scientists used the frame of bounded land when crafting replanting schemes. These scientists viewed the steppe as *terra nullius* and then created plans that worked well in empty spaces but failed when the fences were brought down and herds entered the replanted areas.[342] Again, the government's reliance on a frame of bounded land and herder's preference for a frame of movement-as-*otor* prevented the creation of mutually acceptable policies.

[342] Futrell, "Inner Mongolia: Reign of Sand".

Figure 10: Herder in the Xilingol Grasslands.[343]

Today, the effect of these misaligned arguments is apparent as herders are accused of overgrazing. While the harm in these discussions – overgrazed land – has remained the same, the evidence and challenges made by the state in modern overgrazing debates are different than those made during collectivization campaigns. Recall that earlier in this chapter I considered the ways that overgrazing is used to legitimate the creation of "grazing exclusion" zones. When grazing exclusion zones were first established, herders were accused of being unaware of the effects of their herds on fragile environments. Herding groups were quick to protest, and express arguments using a frame of movement-as-*otor.* As a reflection of this process, today the Chinese

[343] Note the sparse landscape and limited fodder for the cow and her calf. Allison Hahn, May 2008

government and conservation organizations accuse herders of being aware of the effects of their herding practices and making calculated decisions to maintain their herds anyway.

> Despite this clear evidence herders seem to knowingly continue the pattern of the 'tragedy of the commons' by grazing rangelands at stocking rates well above those considered to be sustainable. In a sense herders are responding rationally to the combination of economic and political incentives by choosing the management system that generates the most benefit at least risk for themselves and their families… overgrazing is inevitable unless the income generating opportunities are improved.[344]

This analysis avoids the pitfalls of historic texts which suppose that herders are too illiterate, rural, or backwards to understand the implications of their actions. Yet, it signals the government's continual attempts to respond to Mongolian arguments while missing the mark by not considering the complex interplay between ethnicity, policy making, and civic participation in IMAR. As such, the recommendation that income-generating opportunities be developed for herders is still constructed to support government arguments based on a frame of bounded land. Herders have reflected that these types of policy revisions are ineffective. For example, when discussing policy changes regarding land allocation aimed at income generating opportunities, a herder from IMAR indicated:

> The "real change" from the collective period until the contemporary moment was; "on paper. It was a kind of writing. The reality of land use did not change." This was particularly interesting as the paper certificates issued to each household at decollectivization were supposed to index the household allocations of pasture that were provided to them. As he referred directly to the land use contract in his hand, another resident chimed in, "It has absolutely no *use*. It is only a kind of form." [345]

A plethora of recommendations have been submitted in international and domestic forums to produce change that is visible and accepted by herders. Many recommendations

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[344] Limin and Michalk, "Herders' Income," 250.

[345] Zukosky, "Reconsidering Governmental," 44.

include predicating all policies with a more nuanced understanding of herder's needs, technologies and finances before creating new policies.[346] For example, Meipong argues that policymakers must understand how,

> traditional herding exploits natural processes rather than attempting to control them, as is the case in cropping or intensive animal husbandry it favors flexible and communal land rights rather than private land tenure and it requires some "fuzzy logic" and site-specific investigation and planning.[347]

These policies misunderstand herders' needs to access specific grasslands at specific times of the year. As Zhang's team from the College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering at Peking University indicates, herder access to grasslands is a type of natural capital, one that is critical to herders and the ability of herders to move freely.[348] The government has spent much time grappling with privatizing, collectivizing, and decentralizing the ownership of herds and lands in Inner Mongolia. Yet, all of these programs are based on the government's establishment of borders and boundaries, the types of legislation that Mongolians are attempting to avoid. As a result of these frequently misaligned policies, protests have continued to occur in IMAR.

5.5 GRAB ON AND NOT LET GO IN INNER MONGOLIA

Conflicts have been increasing amongst and between Mongolian and Han Chinese residents in Inner Mongolia. While these protests are less violent, vocal, or militant than those in Xinjiang or

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[346] Limin and Michalk, "Herders' Income," 235.

[347] Wang Meipong, Zhao Cheng-Zhang, Hua Limin, Victor Squires, "Land Tenure: Problems, Prospects and Reform," in *Towards Sustainable Use of Rangelands in North-West China*, eds. Victor Squires, Limin Hua, Degang Zhang and G. Li, (New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2010): 256.

[348] Zhang et al., "Adaptation of Herders," 186.

Tibet, evidence exists that they are increasing.[349] Yet, much of the information received about these protests is regulated by the PRC government that controls the movement of foreigners, operation of international NGOS and reporting via social media. Minority Rights Group International reports that

> although minorities enjoy the right to assembly stipulated in both the Constitution and the LREA, the realization of this right is virtually non-existent due to the lack of respect for individuals' civil and political rights.[350]

Because of a lack of results from constitutional methods of deliberation, complaint, and protests, herders in IMAR have been moving toward new protest tactics.

The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center reports that protesters are in a process of changing tactics, shifting away from petitions to protests.[351] This transition matches University of Hong Kong Science and Technology scholar David Zewig's research regarding rural protests in China. In his interviews, protesters stated;

> We knew that petitioning was of no use, but we also knew that we had to go through that process or else we could not justify using other tactics. So we went to the Administrative Litigation office of the city government. But we also knew that we needed to "grab on and not let go" or else they would not give in.[352]

The petitions and protests used in IMAR target three complaints, (1) illegal land expropriation and land sale by local government officials to the Chinese, (2) destruction of

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[349] For example, according to the PRC government sources, between January and March 2004 there were seventy-two instances of social unrest, involving 10,476 participants. Thirty-six percent of these instances were attributed to land use conflicts. For a discussion of these protests, see Yongshun Cai, *Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 56.

[350] Human Rights in China, *China: Minority Exclusion, 15.*

[351] Reflecting on the recent arrest of Tulguur; "For years, the ordinary people have been disputing the land: they have petitioned and complained but there's been no solutions given," said Long Mei, the sister of one of the accused called Tulguur. Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "100 Days and Counting, Six Mongolian Herders in Detention for Defending Their Grazing Land." *Southern Human Rights Information Center Website,* September 16, 2013, http://www.smhric.org/news_498.htm.

[352] David Zweig, "To the Courts or to the Barricades? Can New Political Institutions Manage Rural Conflict?," in *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict, and Resistance*, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Seldon (New York: Routledge, 2010), 138.

grazing land by Chinese miners and military bases, and (3) the government's failure to provide adequate redress and compensation to the affected herders.[353] Many of these protests are couched in Mongolian herders' preference for the frame of movement-as-*otor* - the frame that the Chinese government has so much difficulty grappling with. In these arguments, Mongolians claim that Han Chinese are both others and outsiders. Yet, in official documents, it is Mongolians who are now considered "other" in IMAR. A herder, Mr. Gansukh, explained to SMHRIC in 2013,

> This is our land. We have lived here for generations and generations as herders. Now all of sudden, our ancestral lands are taken away by outsiders…What is most outrageous is that many of our herders have been changed to "others" on their household registration cards, becoming neither urban nor rural population, but outsiders on our own lands.[354]

The rhetorical construction of Han Chinese as both other and a threat to Mongolian livelihood has increased conflicts throughout IMAR. For example, in 2010 a herder who protested against grazing restrictions was stabbed to death by Han Chinese officials from the "Livestock Grazing Prohibition Team." Then, in May 2011 a herder named Mergen set up a roadblock protest to prohibit the transportation of coal across his grazing lands. Mergen was run over by a Han Chinese truck driver who drove through the roadblock, crushing Mergen's skull beneath his tires. Similarly, in October 2011 a herder named Zorigt constructed a roadblock and was run over by an oil transport truck. More recently, in July 2013, a herder committed suicide after stabbing and killing the head of the Livestock Grazing Prohibition Team and seriously injuring another official while defending his right to graze his livestock on his grazing land.[355]

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[353] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Protesting Mongolian Herders Expelled from Beijing," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website,* December 7, 2013, http://www.smhric.org/news_510.htm.

[354] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Protesting Mongolian Herders."

[355] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "One More Mongolian Herder Killed by the Chinese Defending His Grazing Land," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website,* August 20, 2013, http://www.smhric.org/news_494.htm.

Reports of these deaths and images of the resulting protests have been distributed through multiple social networking sites. Among the most popular sites, Boljoo uses the traditional Mongolian script, reaching tens of thousands of users who must have an education in Mongolian language and script to participate in deliberations. SHMRIC reports that these deliberations are not bounded by China's borders, but instead include Mongolian speakers from Mongolia, Russia, and diaspora communities.[356] Protesters also used Chinese bulletin board systems such as QQ and Renren. Through these mediums, protesters have been able to organize simultaneous protests in IMAR as well as in Europe, North America, and Australia.[357] Then, during protests, social media has been used to record and distribute images of police carriers, riot police, and confrontations between herders and PRC officials.[358]

In my analysis of these protests, I will pay particular attention to the use of roadblocks as a protest methodology by IMAR herders, and role of social media in both reporting and moderating the resulting deliberations. Specifically, I am interested in Mergen's protest and death, both of which have served as rallying points for IMAR protest and social media reporting. Mergen's death under the tires of a coal truck was immediately recorded and reported through global social media. The bloody images of Mergen's death called attention to both the brutality and senselessness of his death.[359] In these images, the path that Mergen was blocking is difficult

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[356] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Popular Mongolian Sites Shut Down," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website,* October 27, 2011, http://www.smhric.org/news_419.htm.

[357] Coordinating Committee for May 29/30 Protest, "Worldwide Call to Protest the Killing of Mergen," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website*, May 29, 2011. http://www.smhric.org/news_384.htm.

[358] The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Protests Continued Tuesday under Heavy Police and Military Presence (More New Photos Below)," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website,* June 1, 2011, http://www.smhric.org/news_387.htm.

[359] These images have been archived by the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center. The images are exceptionally graphic and show the bloodied corpse of Mergen laying in the grassland. Today Mergen's

to see because the surrounding steppe is just as smooth. It is clear from these images that the driver intentionally hit Mergen because ample space to swerve around Mergen was available yet not used. Reporting on Mergen's death, Zorigt, an Inner Mongolian blogger, connects the use of herders' lands and coal transport roads with these protests.

> In order to take a shortcut, these coal hauling trucks have randomly run over local herders' grazing lands, not only killing numerous heads of livestock but also further damaging the already-weakened fragile grassland…after exhaustively petitioning various levels of local governments, helpless Mongolian herders of Bayanbulag, Saruul, Davshilt and Hongor Gachaa organized themselves since April 26, 2011 to block the coal haulers from trespassing on their grazing lands.[360]

Due to the increases in social media access, including digital recording devices, Mergen's death was immediately photographed and the driver interviewed. Reporters and bloggers reflecting on Mergen's death were quick to quote the truck driver, who stated "my truck is fully insured, and the life of a smelly Mongolian herder costs me no more than 40,000 Yuan (approx. 8,000 USD)."[361] Although the driver was eventually tried and executed for his part in Mergen's death, his arrest only occurred after weeks of protest in Inner Mongolia. In press statements prior to his execution he continually emphasized that his victim was both a Mongolian and a herder. To the driver, this ethnic and lifestyle classification legitimized his dehumanizing rhetoric. This example illustrates the need to understand how Han Chinese living in IMAR have come to see herders as "smelly" and quantify their lives as worth less than a truck repair. Further, why did this "traffic accident" as it was labeled by the Chinese media spark months of protest against the presence of Han Chinese workers and families in Inner Mongolia?

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crushed skull is pixilated, but that pixilation is a recent addition, the originally circulated images were uncensored. Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Mongolian Herder Brutally Killed."

[360] The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Mongolian Herder Brutally Killed."

[361] The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Mongolian Herder Brutally Killed."

In Chapter Three I analyzed the Kenyan government's response to MP Waitatu's hate speech, including the immediate arrests and censor of the speaker. In the example of hate speech directed at herding communities in IMAR, we see that the PRC first attempted to silence Mergen's family. As SMHRIC reports, the local government attempted to prevent Mergen's death from inspiring future protests by providing a payment to his family. However, this strategy backfired, as reported by SMHRIC,

> The Chinese authorities' bribery-like handling of the case not only failed to calm the Mongolian herders but also further angered them, inciting them to take to the streets to demand their rights and dignity be respected.[362]

When payments to the family failed, and online attention to Mergen's death increased, Mongolian students were confined to university campuses, herders were prohibited from traveling to urban areas, and Internet access was controlled. However, despite these efforts, protests were organized in Hohhot, the capital of IMAR. Photos sent by protesters to SMHRIC indicate that armed vehicles and riot police were brought into Hohhot to control crowds and police were assigned to follow known activists.[363]

The Coordinating Committee for the May 29/30 [2011] Protest indicate the roots of these protests are found in a distrust of the Chinese government.

> Mongols have good reasons to doubt the intentions of the government. For the past six decades, the destruction of the grassland ecology, cultural assimilation, political oppression and economic exploitation have characterized the policies of the Chinese government in Southern Mongolia. More recently, "protection" of the ecology has been turned into a pretext to further eliminate the last remaining areas where the traditional Mongolian nomadic lifestyle and culture are practiced because vast deposits of natural resources have been found...Those herders who

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[362] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Herders Take to the Street, Four Arrested," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website,* May 23, 2011, http://www.smhric.org/news_378.htm.

[363] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "May 29: Protests Spread in China's Mongolian Region, More Cities under Martial Law (New Photos)," *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website,* May 29, 2011, http://www.smhric.org/news_385.htm.

> are still allowed to practice animal husbandry are faced with numerous obstacles and challenges such as the truckers and corporations who have little regard for their lands or lifestyle.[364]

Similarly, the *Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands,* which was both published and banned on May 29, 2011, called forth a broad audience of Mongolians, even those that had settled and primarily communicate in Mandarin. In this song, the author identifies as Mongolian, focusing on bloodlines rather than the government's use of bounded land and special ethnic characteristics such as language. The implications of this identify is to explode the definition of "Mongolian" and link with communities living as, and identifying as, herders.

> I am a Mongol even if I sing my rap in Chinese
> No matter what you say I am a Mongol
> Mongol blood flows in my veins
> The vast Mongolian steppe is my homeland.[365]

Across the Mongolian steppe, herders and settled Mongolians rallied together in online and in-street protests. SMHRIC reported that at least one hundred protesters were arrested, detained, and beaten, and social media cites such as Boljoo and QQ were closed by the government. Yet, these government controls were not fast enough to prevent circulation of media, such as the *Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands*, which was picked up by websites such as SMHRIC, which the PRC cannot censor. This process of publication and censorship was predicted in the song's text:

> No single word is mentioned in CCAV[1]
> "Social harmony" (he xie in Chinese) flooded the Internet, but no one knows what the exact situation is
> Internet sites in China are damn shit
> Mother f**king Ren Ren Site (www.renren.com) deletes all Mongolians posts
> Mother f**king micro blog (www.weibo.com) removes my blog

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[364] Coordinating Committee for May 29/30 Protest, "Worldwide Call."

[365] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Rap Song Dedicated to Mergen Banned," *Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center Website,* June 13, 2011, http://www.smhric.org/news_390.htm.

> Mother f**king the State Security, mother f**king "tea invitation" (meaning detention, "bei he cha" in Chinese)
> Mother f**kers, I will say whatever I want to say
> I want freedom, yeah, return my freedom.[366]

As the PRC scrambled to censor the *Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands,* Internet police and government paid bloggers attempted to repair the state's reputation. SMHRIC reported that

> Internet police or a possible member of the "50 Cent Party," a group of Chinese netizens who get paid 50 Chinese cents for posting a message on the Internet in favor of the authorities, have been sending out the following statement via a popular Mongolian QQ instant messenger group with a fake name of "a Mongolian brother who worked in Uushin Banner and is familiar with the situation.[367]

These netziens tell readers that Mergen's death was "just a traffic accident. Some people who have hidden intentions are interpreting it as an ethnic problem or a conflict with the oil and natural gas development."[368] In response, the PRC again utilizes the frame of bounded land by referencing a traffic accident. Both traffic and roads are predicated on the production of boundaries and regulation of herders to specific, confined spaces.

In an attempt to better control the 2011 protest and prevent future conflicts, the PRC has confiscated herder's new media equipment, as well as tightened government control of micro blogs. In its statements regarding these protests, the Public Security Bureau indicates a preference for officially sanctioned petitions as opposed to protests.

> Although declining to give out the details of the case, the Ongniud Banner Public Security Bureau stated on its Tengxun Weibo official micro blog that "the case is under review in accordance with the law." The facts are clear and the evidence is ample. Whoever has a disagreement can express his or her opinion through

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[366] Spelling and emphasis added by SMHRIC which translated the *Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grassland.* Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Rap Song Dedicated."

[367] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Protests Continued."

[368] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Protests Continued."

> acceptable means. Whoever spread information inconsistent with the facts must be held accountable for the consequences.[369]

In this statement from the Public Security Bureau, it is critical to note that not only are petitions preferred, but the government also threatens legal action against anyone spreading false information regarding the situation in Inner Mongolia. Yet, Inner Mongolian activists have identified the use of social media and micro blogging as a critical feature in gaining international attention. For example, in 2013 when Mr. Bayanbaatar was beaten to death by a Chinese Railway worker, images of his death and assailant spread quickly via sites such as Renren, QQ, Tencent Webo, Webchat, and Sina Weibo before they were deleted or censored by the government.[370] Writing in 2008, Zukosky outlined this method of censorship as the "Strike Hard" campaign, aimed at suppressing Internet rumors and surveilling Inner Mongolians through the auspices of conservation.[371] Yet, herders have not given up their attempts to defend Mongolian herder identity. As one herder told SMHRIC,

> The herders are not afraid of the police, and ready to continue the protest anytime… they will see if the Ongniud Banner Public Security Detention Center is large enough to detain all of the hundreds of herders.[372]

As I write this dissertation, protests continue in Inner Mongolia. In April 2013 new clashes erupted in the Shuang He Forestry when herders attempted to dismantle forestry company tents. Three hundred herders began the protest, aiming to petition the local government, and the government responded by arresting the protest leaders, and their lawyer. This protest reemerged again a month later resulting in the police confiscation of protesters' cars, motorcycles and cell phones. While their equipment was confiscated, the herders were not

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[369] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "100 Days."
[370] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "One More."
[371] Zukosky, "Reconsidering Governmental," 45.
[372] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "100 Days.".

arrested and continued their protest by walking the last 15 miles to the government offices. Upon arrival, they were rounded up and transported by the police back to their homes.[373]

As demonstrated in this chapter, Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, China are engaged in a complex set of violent and non-violent arguments aiming to maintain Mongolian herder identity. Their protests, which include roadblocks, street protest, and social media organizing, are designed to both confront the Chinese government's attempts to define herder identity and gain international attention and collaboration. Quilting points have emerged from these protests as international organizations such as the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC) have joined with Inner Mongolian protesters to produce continual updates regarding herders' lives. Yet, divisions are still present as state sponsored conservation science is used to surveil the Inner Mongolian grasslands, prevent connections between Mongolian and Inner Mongolian herders, and settle herders in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

In the final chapter of this dissertation I will investigate the ways that Maasai and Mongolian herders' arguments complicate our understanding of Deleuze and Guattari's figure of the nomad and the application of *nomadology* as a metaphor to understand the space for both herders and settled communities in late-modern capitalism.

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[373] Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "100 Days."

6.0 NOMADOLOGY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter connects the intrinsic study of Maasai and Mongolian communities to Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of *nomadology*. In doing so, I argue that the double function of education and reality construction is critical to understanding the use and utility of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's text *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. I begin by considering the common threads emerging from the case studies of herding communities in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China, and comparing these findings to Deleuze and Guattari's portrayal of "nomads." Then I introduce the concepts of *territorialization, deterritorialization,* and *reterritorialization* to understand the ways that herders and governments interact and create new forms of argument and protest. This analysis provides a gateway to understand Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of *nomadology,* which they argue is a "line of flight" marking avenues for escape from the hierarchical structure of the state.

To contextualize my study of *nomadology,* I consult scholarship pertaining to metaphors, focusing on the ways that metaphors are understood to have meaning and create new realities, and differ from other linguistic structures such as metonymies. Then, I examine the ways that Deleuze and Guattari have entered this body of scholarship, via their metaphor of *nomadology* that differentiates between "smooth" and "striated" space. I examine the ways that they extract

narratives from ethnographic studies of herder and nomadic communities to construct their understanding of *nomadology* and the ways that herders prefer the smooth space of the steppe as opposed to the striated space of a city. I ask if this metaphor has functioned as a mechanism to silence or exclude nomadic communities, or if the metaphor illustrates rhetorical tools that nomadic communities can leverage in resistance to the state. I argue that because the Maasai and Mongolian herders are among the people that Deleuze and Guattari cite specifically in their work, modern Maasai and Mongolian experiences offer fruitful reference points from which to explore *nomadology.* I conclude by asking how modern herding communities, such as the Maasai and Mongolians examined in this dissertation, might inform our understanding of Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of *nomadology* and the lines of flight used by modern herding communities.

6.2 INTERSECTIONS OF HERDERS AND NOMADOLOGY

The preceding case studies of Maasai and Mongolian herders have examined the ways that modern herders are producing arguments and engaging in protest activity that contests dominant argument frames. These communities are determined to both participate in the modern world and technologies – as demonstrated by the Maasais' use of YouTube to publicize their protests and the Inner Mongolians' use of online message boards to coordinate and distribute information across national borders. Yet, they are also determined to continue their traditions of owning and migrating with herds across wide swaths of land. The interaction of these desires has resulted in an unsettling and (re)staging of modern identity, yielding new and complex patterns of

identification – today, herders can become global citizens, and according to Deleuze and Guattari, members of modern, settled communities can become nomads.

The dissertation's opening chapter examined the use of multiple terms to refer to communities such the Maasai and Mongolians, and I argued that it was best to maintain those communities' term of identification – herder – throughout the study. I still maintain that this is the best way to speak of Maasai and Mongolian communities. However, a murkiness appears at this stage because when Deleuze and Guattari address Maasai and Mongolian herders, they use the terms "nomad" and *nomadology.* To point to both the connections between these terms, and the problems entailed in using the term nomad to describe Maasai and Mongolian communities, I have used herder/nomad throughout this chapter.

To understand and analyze this process of articulation, Deleuze and Guattari have proposed the metaphor of *nomadology,* best explained in *1227: Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine*.[374] In this text, nomads are distinguished by their *nomos* of pastoral flock distribution, an occupation held on a smooth space that allows nomad societies to avoid the coding of territorial assemblages and striated space of the state. To support this differentiation, Deleuze and Guattari draw from ethnographic texts with special attention given to nomads that have overturned and/or opposed the state. In several of these instances, Deleuze and Guattari directly cite Mongolia, often gesturing toward Genghis [Chinghis] Khan. This representation of Mongolian herder/nomads as intentionally living alongside but opposed to the state cuts against the narrative of salvation presented by the governments and development workers whereby nomadic populations have lived outside of the state because they were too impoverished, under-educated, or oppressed by class to create their own cities or complex civilizations.

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[374] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor, *nomadology,* has been used by scholars to explain the complex terrain of political struggle in hyper-globalized, internetworked society. The importance of this metaphor, and the significance of Deleuze and Guattari's *oeuvre,* was indicated by Foucault's statement in 1970 that, "one day, perhaps, this century will be called Deleuzian."[375] While Foucault did not live to verify his statement, his prediction has been supported by Ronald Bogue who writes that Deleuze and Guattari's "notion of the 'nomadic'… has been emerging as the concept of choice for theorists of various stripes."[376] Emory psychologist James Williams calls Deleuze's work "one of the key reference points in Continental philosophy, literary theory, film theory, aesthetics and politics."[377] Today, a plethora of scholars ranging from Jean Baudriallard to Rosi Braidotti, Manuel De Landa to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, to Edward Said, use nomadism and *nomadology* as critical figures to assess critical consciousness, post-colonialism, and resistance movements.[378] As a result, a rich, vibrant, and significant body of academic and political work has arisen about and around *nomadology.*

However, Deleuze and Guattari's work has also drawn criticism. Anthropologists have argued that that Deleuze and Guattari's production of the metaphor of *nomadology* to resist late modern capitalism has misappropriated ethnographic texts. For example, professor of French and African studies, Christopher Miller, argues that *nomadology* is prefaced on sanitized

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[375] Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," *Critique* 282 (1970): 888-908. Accessed on March 3, 2014 via *Generation Online,* http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault5.htm.

[376] Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze's Way: Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 126.

[377] James Williams, "Review of *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* by Jean Khalfa; *Deleuze on Literature* by Robert Bogue; *Between Deleuze and Derrida* by Paul Patton; John Protevi," *Philosophical Quarterly* 55, no. 219 (April 2009): 363-367.

[378] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Rosi Braidottie, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia, 2011; Manuel De Landa, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002), 47; Micheal Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2001), 217, 342, and 448; Edweard Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1993), 331.

ethnographic representations that have produced a romanticized and subjugated depiction of real nomadic communities:

> The persistence of representation and ethnographic authority within Deleuze and Guattari's nomadology is not shocking, nor does it invalidate the entire project of *A Thousand Plateaus*. But it should serve as a caution to those that would turn to nomadology as a wholly "free" and new perspective on cultural construction, as a description for moving "beyond identity."[379]

According to Miller, a better approach would be to produce a "less utopian, less contradictory, less arrogant, and less messianic theorization of movement, a positive cosmopolitanism that remains meticulously aware of localities and differences."[380] While anthropologists and cultural studies scholars have embraced this call, many of their works investigate ethnographic depictions of people not discussed by Deleuze and Guattari. For example, Stephen Muecke, professor of writing at the University of New South Wales, contributes an excellent study of representational clash between Aboriginal tradition and Australian policymakers.[381] Although Muecke proves that the Aboriginal experience provides a single exception to *nomadology,* that exception is found by mixing sources and drawing between types of nomadic lifestyles. It is my argument that a more complete study would investigate the nomadic communities used by Deleuze and Guattari as the vehicle in the metaphor of *nomadology* to address the complexity of nomadic experience, and to investigate the transformation of those complexities into a sign of *nomadology.*

From this metaphorical analysis, it is possible to understand both the current application of *nomadology*, and Miller's call to move away from "smooth space, flow, and negotiated

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[379] Christopher L. Miller, "The Posidentitarian Predicament in the Footnotes of a Thousand Plateaus: Nomadology, Anthology, and Authority," *Diacritics* 23, no. 3 (1993): 32.

[380] Miller, "The Posidentitarian Predicament," 33.

[381] Stephen Muecke, "The Discourse of Nomadology: Phylums in Flux," in *Deleuze and Guattari Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, ed. Gary Genosko (London: Routledge, 2001): 1164-1182.

assemblage that remains based on fantasies of the non-Western world as a realm beyond representation and division."[382] Miller accuses Deleuze and Guattari of moving too quickly through heavy-handed cultural representations. What happens then, if we slow down and dwell more carefully on the experiences of Mongolian and Maasai people in their struggles with the state?

To pursue this question, I couple my reading of Deleuze and Guattari's *nomadology* with texts from communication and philosophy regarding the ways that metaphors produce both reality and truth. This cross-reading seeks to better understand how *nomadology* may have produced a new reality for nomads, one perhaps at odds with the textured and layered experience emerging from earlier chapters of this dissertation, but instead restricted to only the characteristics outlined by Deleuze and Guattari.

This analysis includes philosopher Michel Foucault's linguistic determinism, which I will use to examine the dominant tropes (such as metaphors) that regulate what can be known during a specific period of time, creating the episteme of an age. Foucault argues that what can be discussed is regulated by anonymous historical rules specific to social, economic, geographic, or linguistic conditions.[383] While it is appealing to use Deleuze and Guattari's nomadology as a method for academics to encounter this process of rhizome-as-metaphor; I am concerned about what this strategy might leave behind, in terms of meaning and understanding, and what it might foretell, especially in terms of implications for living nomad/herder communities. In short, perhaps one of the best ways to explore the *nomadology* metaphor is to return to its primary ground, the complex lived experience of Maasai and Mongolian herders.

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[382] Miller, *Nationalists and Nomads.*

[383] Michel Foucault, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Modern Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1977).

6.3 DEFINITIONAL ARGUMENTS

As this dissertation's analysis progressed through case studies of Maasai and Mongolian herders, we saw the push and pull of the relative primacy of four frames of argument, bounded land, movement-as-wandering or movement-as-*otor,* and disappearance. There is a connection between the application and utility of these frames with the work of Deleuze and Guattari regarding the concepts of *territorialization, deterritorialization,* and *reterritorialization.* In this subsection I investigate the relationship of these concepts — *territorialization, deterritorialization,* and *reterritorialization* to this dissertation's case studies and the field of communication writ large. I begin with an assessment of scholarship pertaining to definitional arguments. Then, I assess how the process of *territorialization, deterritorialization,* and *reterritorialization* functions to illuminate the modern position of Maasai and Mongolian herders as they confront the state. Deleuze and Guattari propose that we must always find "lines of flight" to escape attempts of hierarchical structures, such as governments, to over code our experiences and lives. By analyzing the process of *territorialization, deterritorialization,* and *reterritorialization,* this subsection links Deleuze and Guattari's primary line – *nomadology* – with Maasai and Mongolian herder protests.

Definitional argument has been widely discussed in the field of communication by scholars such as Edward Schiappa and David Zarefsky, who examine the use of persuasive definitions and the dramatic implications of those definitions in regard to argumentative analysis.[384] Pragmatically, these studies have been used by legal communication scholars such as

[384] Edward Schiappa, "Arguing About Definitions," *Argumentation,* no. 7 (1993): 403-417, David Zarefsky, "Strategic Maneuvering in Political Argumentation," in *Examining Argumentation in Context: Fifteen Studies on Strategic Maneuvering*, ed. Frans H. van Eemeren (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company,

Kenneth Broda-Bahm to understand environmental security and land development.[385] In each instance, definitional scholarship has been used to mark tangible spaces – territories – that create authoritative terminologies that bind deliberations by inclusion and exclusion.

The resulting *territorialization*-by-definition supports coherent argumentative analysis, yet it stops short of explaining those communities, spaces, and arguments that transcend or resist demarcated territory. The figure of "nomad," commonly employed by development and conservation programs, is one such metaphor that moves between demarcated spaces, between both the "is" and "is not." Yet, to approach the figure of the "nomad" requires a disturbance in the process of definition, resulting in the creation of definitions that I will call "disturbing definitions." These are definitions that open space for multiple possible understandings, embodiments and entailments. Disturbing definitions have much in common with the process of *deterritorialization* introduced by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guarttari in *Anti-Oedipus*.[386] Here, *deterritorialization* is used to describe processes of de-contextualizing sets of relationships, creating origami-like folds in the paper of meaning, by finding new points of meeting and departure – distant actualizations – that previously eluded perception.

Many deliberations are premised on *territorialization,* the process of definition that uses a key word to mark territory and to understand contexts that inform argumentative possibilities and deliberative analysis. These demarcations function to limit deliberation, but also limit the connections that deliberators can draw between multiple views and theories. The process of argumentative *territorialization*-by-definition excludes many perspectives, including those of

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2009): 125-140, and David Zarefsky, "Strategic Maneuvering Through Persuasive Definitions: Implications for Dialectic and Rhetoric," *Argumentation,* no. 20 (2006): 381-392.

[385] Broda-Bahm, "Finding Protection in Definitions: A Quest for Environmental Security," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 15 (Spring 1999): 159-170.

[386] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

herders who reject such boundaries. A process of *deterritorialization* recontextualizes and resists these argumentative territories and boundaries. In these moments, connections and positions that had previously been considered beyond the scope of a deliberation, labeled as "is not" and "ought not," again become possible. The new connections uncovered by *deterritorialization* may then lead to *reterritorialization,* the marking of territory in new ways where the argumentative definition is radically expanded or rearticulated. Or, the definition may remain permanently *deterritorialized*, resulting in an expectation of multiple competing understandings in deliberation.

This process is illustrated by the case studies presented in this dissertation. In each case study I have demonstrated the process whereby herders have participated in a process of *territorialization*, *deterritorialization*, and *reterritorialization* as they navigate the complex terrain of political struggle in hyper-globalized, internetworked society. For example, in Tanzania the colonial administration attempted to *territorialize* Maasai identity by using a frame of movement-as-wandering and then formed settlement projects that responded to this compartmentalized – or *territorialized* definition. Maasai activists such as Parkipuny respond to this *territorialization* with a complex blend of ethnographic terminology and Maasai community history to *deterritorialize* Maasai identity, revealing in the process the complexities of herding, migration, semi-permanent dwellings, and sacred spaces. In this way, Parkipuny reflects Maasai traditions, but he also folds colonial texts and vocabulary into his discourse, resulting in an articulation of Maasai identity that includes both historical and modern narratives. In doing so, Parkipuny transgresses the colonial, *territorialized,* definition of "Maasai" to create new – *deterritorialized* – definitions. Finally, in contemporary acts of protest, such as the 2012 NCA Resident's protest in the Ngorongoro, we see a *reterritorialization* of Maasai identity. In this

maneuver, Maasai community members build on *deterritorialized* elements of Maasai identity to create new articulations – *reterritorialized* definitions that Deleuze and Guattari would call "new assemblages."

This process of *territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization* of Maasai identity occurs through a process of negotiation, deliberation, and refinement that at first glance may seem rather murky. Let's look at a second example from Inner Mongolia and Mongolia to clarify Deleuze and Guattari's terminology. In Chapter Five I examined the work of the Mongolian government to *territorialize* herding lands. In this analysis I examined the concept of empty land, *terra nullis,* which government officials use to justify new development projects. This is a process that could be articulated as *territorialization* (government parcels land and defines it as *terra nullis*), *deterritorialization* (herders articulate land use in response to *terra nullis* by using a frame of movement-as-*otor*), and *reterritorialization* (herders produce new assemblages to participate in public forums while maintaining herding traditions). Today, foreign mining companies are attracted to the "open spaces" of the Eurasian Steppe that they are told can be easily strip-mined. Yet, by exploring this land through Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual triptych of *territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization,* we can better understand both how this land came to be known as empty and why protests are occurring. The concepts of *deterritorialization* and *reterritorialization* help us to understand the ways in which this land can be understood as neither empty nor full, but instead a "rhizomatic mechanic assemblage." Thinking about the Mongolian steppe as a mechanic assemblage incorporates the complex body of interpretations, connections, and dimensions that can be joined together in multiplicitious ways to create new understandings of the Mongolian steppe. These new connections create a realm of multiplicities that herders can use to resist the attempts of states

and governments to "over code" herder identity or privilege a singular, government authored, definition of what it is to be a herder.

The concept of multiplicities was demonstrated in Chapter Five's treatment of protests in Inner Mongolia. In that analysis it was impossible for me to identity one single speaker, organization, or protest on which to base my analysis. Instead, many points of resistance emerged. The protests that I focused on surrounding Mergen's death in 2011 were but one entry point to understand the assemblage of multiplicities in Inner Mongolia. What Mergen's death does for this analysis is provide a quilting point that binds together both Inner Mongolian herders and Chinese modernization. When we analyze these events we see the emergence of new forms of protest and identity. For example, the *Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands* articulates neither traditional herding culture nor the Han Chinese idealized Mongolian culture portrayed in the propaganda posters examined in Chapter Five. Instead, the *Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands* exemplifies *reterritorialization* in a realm of multiplicities where the song's author has provided a connection between two completely different multiplicities. This connection forms a parallel evolution – or *deterritorialization* and *reterritorialization* – so that the protesters *deterritorialize* the Chinese definition of Mongolian identity by making that definition part of their own. This process demonstrates the way that Deleuze and Guattari think of many connections producing multiplicities, which then connect together to create rhizomatic mechanic assemblage.

Rhizomatic mechanic assemblages are critical to this study because Deleuze and Guattari identify them as "lines of flight." Lines of flight are the pathways that Deleuze and Guattari suggest we follow to escape the hierarchical modes of control and emphasis on a center and

periphery that characterize modern governments. According to Deleuze and Guattari, one of the primary lines of flight is *nomadology*.

Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor – *nomadology* – was created by drawing from the lived and historical experiences of herder communities. While Deleuze and Guattari suggest that *nomadology* is a useful line of flight for settled communities, my study asks if *nomadology* is also useful to understand lines of flight utilized by Maasai and Mongolian herders. Through this study, I aim to integrate the case studies of herders in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China with academic dialogue about Deleuze and Guattari's *nomadology* as a mode of critical inquiry. In what follows, I ask if this juxtaposition can create a quilting point of herder/nomad and *nomadology* in ways that awaken new understandings of both specific definitions of "nomad" and argumentative scholarship. This juxtaposition is foregrounded with a contextualization of Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of *nomadology* within the larger body of communicative study of metaphors as meaning making, differentiated from metonymies, and utilized to create *nomadology*. Then I examine the ways that Deleuze and Guattari have constructed a rhetoric of *smooth* and *striated space* and used of ethnographic definitions to produce *nomadology*. Finally, I assess the juxtaposition of herder/nomads and *nomadology*.

6.4 METAPHOR

Scholars who have attempted to reject or critique the factual accuracy of *nomadology* have been frustrated by Deleuze and Guattari's reminder that their text is largely metaphorical and therefore not subject to strict evaluative standards that often flow from the distinction between fact and fiction. As such, it will be useful to preface my engagement with Deleuze and Guattari's

nomadology project with an excursus on the rhetorical dynamics of metaphors, beginning with a survey of how metaphors have been understood variously as educational tools, parlor tricks, truth-producing vehicles, and meaning making devices.[387] This conceptual scaffolding will then support my reflection on how findings from the earlier content chapters reflect on Deleuze and Guattari's suggestions regarding *nomadology.*

While study and production of metaphors can be traced through history to the earliest myths, legends, and oral histories, my sample begins with Plato's *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. Plato cautions that while metaphors are instructional tools, as demonstrated by the metaphor of the sun in the Allegory of the Cave, metaphors should be used with caution and only by those that understand both their origins and application. The hazard in the uncritical appropriation of metaphor by uneducated poets is outlined in the *Phaedrus* as making trifles seem important and important points seem to be trifles through their force of language. Aristotle praises those that create metaphors, indicating that metaphors are signs of genius that imply an eye for resemblance. He expands the study of metaphor in the *Poetics,* defining metaphor as "the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion."[388] In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle is clear that while metaphors are useful for learning, to be effective, the metaphor must pinpoint a commonality between the speaker and audience.[389] This audience adaptation hones the metaphor as a heuristic tool, while simultaneously risking an over adaptation to the audience that

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[387] Specifically, this sample has been organized to highlight the double-bind in metaphorical studies. If a scholar is to follow the approach to metaphors as decoration, then metaphors can be beautiful, but have little relevance to argument. Conversely, if metaphors are a way of knowing, making, and conveying information (Richards, Nietzsche, Lakoff and Johnson) then they have a critical location in the study and application of argument. These metaphors should be adapted to the audience, but studied and emulated not only for their beauty but also for their implications on the bounds of though, the ways of knowing, the 'truth', and reality.

[388] Aristotle, *Poetics 21, 1457 b9-16.*

[389] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* III. 10, 1410b14f.

reduces the attributes of the metaphor and produces unknowable or misrepresented arguments. Cicero continues this study of metaphor, tracking its use from a time of necessity to one of entertainment. As such, Cicero warns students away from borrowing complex metaphors as they suggest a poverty of individual thought. By pointing to the ethical considerations of metaphor, Cicero both attempts to shape civic discourse and inspire Quintilian's study of the metaphor via tropes.

Quintilian approaches the study of metaphor by classifying it as one of many tropes, placing metaphor on the same level as metonymy and figures such as repetitions, antithesis, and periphrasis. While Quintilian's study highlights the educational possibilities of metaphor, he does not match the excitement found in Aristotle's statement, "the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor."[390] Quintilian thus sets the stage for scholars in the middle ages to utilize Aristotle's work while downplaying the importance of metaphor to the creation of meaning or education. While exceptions to this trend did occur, such as St. Thomas Aquinas's position that metaphors were useful for interpreting sacred doctrine, his studies were limited to understanding divine texts.[391] According to philosopher Mark Johnson, metaphorical analysis reached an all-time-low when Thomas Hobbes argued in the *Leviathan,* "metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt."[392]

Johnson interprets Hobbes' concern regarding metaphors through three assumptions, (1) that metaphors are essentially literal, (2) metaphors are deviant, and (3) the meaning and truth of

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[390] Aristotle, *Poetics,* 22.

[391] Mark Johnson, "Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition," in *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1981), 10-11.

[392] Hobbes, *Leviathan,* pt. 1 ch. 5.

a metaphor, if it exists at all, is only that of literal paraphrasing.[393] Modern scholars might be more apt to accept linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson's study of metaphor presented in *Metaphors We Live By* over Hobbes' analysis. However, Hobbes' concern regarding the use of metaphors in a "common-wealth" helps us to understand the arguments made against Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of *nomadology.* Many retractors of *nomadology* voice concerns similar to Hobbes - that to be a useful tool, *nomadology* must be a literal paraphrasing nomadic communities' experiences. Then, finding that Deleuze and Guattari's *nomadology* is not a literal paraphrasing, these retractors argue that *nomadology* is deviant or deceptive.

It is my argument that Hobbes and retractors of *nomadology* have a sound argument regarding the application of metaphors, particularly those drawn from the lived experiences of communities with long histories of resistance and oppression with the state. However, I am also concerned that *nomadology* has already become a term of art in critical and cultural studies. I find it difficult to declare *nomadology* an invalid tool and as such ignore the many studies regarding the application of *nomadology*. Therefore, in the next section I analyze the intellectual split between Hobbes and modern study of metaphor to understand the ways that metaphors such as *nomadology* may have meaning and create new realities. Then, I ask if and what space exists for Maasai and Mongolian herders in these new rhetorical and terrestrial worlds.

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[393] Johnson, "Introduction: Metaphor," 12.

6.5 METAPHORS HAVE MEANING

The modern break from Hobbes' rejection of metaphor was made by literary critic I.A. Richards during a lecture series at Bryn Mawr College in February and March 1936. These lectures were premised on the position that 18th and 19th century rhetorical study was useless. The fifth and sixth lectures in the series assess the history of metaphor and the incoherent, contradictory terms used for metaphorical analysis. Richards believes that a standard set of terms is necessary to spark interest and study of the metaphor and proposed a trinity of metaphorical terms: *tenor, vehicle*, and *ground. Tenor* and *vehicle* are defined as meaningless when presented alone, but when in "co-operation give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either."[394] This co-operation, however, is not zero-sum. Metaphors may be *tenor* heavy, where the *vehicle* is only used to color the *tenor*. Or, they may be *vehicle* heavy, where the *tenor* is only an excuse for the introduction of the *vehicle*. In this case, the *vehicle* ceases being the principle subject and as attention is focused on the tenor, the accuracy, portrayal or appropriateness of the tenor is significantly diminished. *Tenor* and *vehicle* can be analyzed through ground or tensions. G*round* is used to highlight the similarities or resemblances between the tenor and vehicle. When the vehicle does not relate to the tenor, the resulting metaphor if judged to have *tension* or dissimilarities.

While Richards's terminology (*tenor*, *vehicle, and ground)* structures modern rhetorical study of metaphor, his lectures also make the influential argument, reflecting back to Aristotle, that metaphors have meaning which effects our understanding of philosophy. This statement

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[394] I.A. Richards, "The Philosophy of Rhetoric," in *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1981), 55.

exploded the field of metaphor analysis, leading to additions, retractions, and alterations of Richard's proposal. One of the earliest respondents was philosopher Max Black who expands Richards's study by arguing that metaphors are a screen on which we can organize our thoughts. To facilitate the understanding of this screen, Black encourages an *interaction view* of metaphor that we can use to look for indirect messages conveyed by the *vehicle* of a metaphor. Using an interaction view the *vehicle* acquires a new meaning, which is similar, but not the same as the literal meaning. This means that academics studying a metaphor need to attend to both the vehicle and the literal meaning of metaphors.[395] For my study of *nomadology,* Black's argument is critical because it indicates that to understand *nomadology* we must study both nomad/herders and Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor.

6.6 METAPHORS CREATE (NEW) REALITY

Following Black's methodology, a study of *nomadology* which integrates both lived experiences of herder/nomads and *nomadology,* has the potential to create either new ways of seeing reality, or all together new realities. These new potentials appear because metaphors resonate with the human experiences encountered in the flesh. As political scientist Michael Marks suggests in his study of metaphors in international relations, it is not enough that a metaphor provides an internal logic to furnish a coherent set of understandings. To have their greatest impact, these understanding must accord with the *experiences* of real people.[396]

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[395] Max Black, "Metaphor," in *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1981), 48-62.

[396] Michael P Marks, *The Prison as Metaphor: Re-Imagining International Relations* (New York: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2004), 18.

Regarding herder/nomads, these understandings empower or disempower fact, truth, and experiences of communities such as the Maasai and Mongolian herders studied in this dissertation. Studies of the metaphor of *nomadology* are therefore complicated by scholars that do not interaction with, or even acknowledge the existence of, modern herder/nomads. This complication is expounded by the attempt to understand the metaphor *nomadology* because Deleuze and Guattari frequently reference and build upon Nietzsche. According to philologist Friedrich Nietzsche, all facts and truth are metaphorical, and any truth is simply a new interpretation of an old metaphor. Nietzsche explains:

> What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and when after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are, metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power, coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.[397]

I am concerned that while Deleuze and Guattari have defended *nomadology* as a "mere metaphor," Nietzsche makes a compelling argument that metaphors – even mere metaphors – produce both reality and the truth. If Nietzsche is correct, Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of *nomadology* has produced a new reality and truth of herder/nomads, one which renders the ways of being herder/nomad as not among the many characteristics outlined in the ethnographic texts cited in *A Thousand Plateaus* but restricted to only the characteristics highlighted by Deleuze and Guattari. The implication of this new reality for herder/nomads like the Maasai and Mongolians may include the acceptance of the *proleptic elegy* advanced by Deleuze and Guattari when they indicate that Mongolians have already succumbed to the state. The implication here is that while *nomadology* might help me to escape the confines of late-modern capitalism, the same

[397] Friedrich Nietzsche, *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873)* in *The Portable Nietzsche,* (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 42-47.

metaphor might simultaneously inscribe the herder/nomads who illuminate my line of flight into the same striations from which I am escaping.

The potential of a metaphor such as *nomadology* is in the illumination of new ways of understanding both herder/nomad communities such as Maasai and Mongolian herders, and understanding the position of settled communities in late modern capitalism. The multitude that emerges from this potential breaks apart the historic dualism of nomad/herders vs. settled communities to find new ways of living in the modern world. Following this line of thought, Lakoff and Johnson argue that:

> new metaphors have the power to create a new reality…[and] alter that conceptual system and the perception and actions that the system gives rise to. Much cultural change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss of old ones.[398]

In this argument, Lakoff and Johnson go a step beyond Nietzsche by arguing that these new metaphors arise and are used not only by academics, but all humans in everyday communication.

When focusing on the production and experimentation involved in the creation of new metaphors, such as *nomadology,* Lakoff and Johnson differentiate between metaphors and metonymies. They define metaphors as sign generators and argue that those signs are then transferred to new metaphors via enlightenment linkages. This definition makes sense when we think of the production of *nomadology* as an act of extraction. Extraction is the type of process and resulting criticism introduced by media scholars such as Lauren Fenton who writes, "Deleuze's and Guattari's nomadology subtracts the historical and economic substance of the nomad to extract an elegant and poetic ontology of postmodern society as a utopia structured by

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[398] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 145.

no-structure or freedom of movement." [399] According to Fenton, the production of the metaphor of *nomadology* demonstrates the production of new meanings and possibilities while ignoring, and eventually silencing, the source domain by creating and giving new meanings to signs. Is there an alternative to Fenton's criticism? In the next section I will consider the differentiation between metaphor and metonym and the entailments of holding *nomadology* more closely to the lived experiences of herder/nomads such as Maasai and Mongolian communities examined in this dissertation.

6.7 *NOMADOLOGY:* METAPHOR OR METONYMY?

The essential caveat to the juxtaposition of *nomadology* and herder/nomads is that while *nomadology* is a metaphor, the comparison between nomad and *nomadology* might be a metonymy. Metonymies are described by Lakoff and Johnson as more closely related to the subject, more grounded in our experience than metaphors and driven by direct associations.[400] Because they are so grounded, metonymies do not require transposition (or imaginative leaps) from one domain to another in the way that metaphors do. Linguists Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle make an interesting, and possible comparison, "whilst metonymy is associated with realism, metaphor is associated with romanticism and surrealism."[401] From this reasoning, it would seem that the articulations of governments about herder/nomads such as Maasai and

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[399] Lauren Fenton, "Nomadology: "They Arrive Like Destiny, Without Cause, Without Reason, Without Pretext," *Lauren Fenton* weblog, March 10, 2009, http://laurenfenton.com/?p=521.

[400] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By,* 266.

[401] Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, *Fundamentals of Language* (The Hague: Mouton & Co's Gravenhage, 1956), 81.

Mongolians, who are grounded in the real world and do not require imaginative leaps, are metonymies and fundamentally excluded from *nomadology*. However, I argue that this classification is inherently reductionist, focusing on the definitions provided by Eurocentric anthropologists and policy makers who have established definitions of who is and who is not a nomad, without the input, analysis, or capability of rejection by those defined. While this study leaves open the possibility that nomads are metonymies within Deleuze and Guattari's text, it also accepts the possibility that they are vehicles in a metaphor and by applying Richards's *interaction view* it is possible to understand the indirect messages and values conveyed by the *vehicle.*

The location, or possibility of the location, of herder/nomads as a vehicle in the metaphor of *nomadology* is best understood through sociologist Jean Baudrillard's discussions of signs. Baudrillard writes that society, knowledge, and discourse have been replaced by symbols and signs: human reality is now a simulation of reality. These signs exist on four vertical planes of simulacra. On the first level is the closest copy to reality (it might even be reality, though we have no way of knowing). The second level is a perversion of reality, a flawed copy that attempts to present itself as the first level, but gives clues of its deception. On the third level, the sign again pretends to be the first level, but it is a new creation, nothing has been copied and no representation is occurring. This is the "order of sorcery" or a conjuring of images out of thin air. The last level is the pure simulation; here the sign bares no relationship to reality. Signs can only reflect and relate to other signs (which also show no relation to reality). The fourth level is,

according to Baudrillard, the contemporary, post-modern condition.[402] This study of simulacra orders is complicated in Baudrillard's *Transparency of Evil* where he states:

> [for] there to be metaphor, differential fields and distinct objects must exist…perhaps our melancholy stems from this, for metaphor still had its beauty, it was aesthetic, playing as it did upon difference, and upon the illusion of difference. Today, metonymy – replacing the whole as well as the components, and occasioning a general communality of terms – has built its house upon the dis-illusion of metaphor.[403]

While Baudrillard bemoans the end of metaphor, this dissertation takes a more hopeful stance, arguing that metaphor is possible within levels of the simulacra but complicated by intra-level metaphor production. At first, it may seem that I am arguing against Deleuze and Guattari's position that the levels of simulacra are irrelevant to their metaphor of *nomadology*. Yet, a brief review of this interaction of theory and reading of herder/nomad as the vehicle will clarify my argument.

Deleuze and Guattari contend that *nomadology* is a plane of consistency, rhizomatic thought that is non-linear, anarchic, and nomadic. This thought is horizontal, as opposed to Baudrillard's vertical. Rhizomes create smooth spaces that are able to cut across boundaries of hierarchy and order by producing multiplicities thinking, acting and being. "A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggle."[404] This multiplicity of being and definition encourages the breaking of dichotomies by making new connections between layers of

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[402] "The possibility of metaphor is disappearing in every sphere…for there to be metaphor, differential fields and distinct objects must exist…Perhaps our melancholy stems from this, for metaphor still had its beauty, it was aesthetic, playing as it did upon difference, and upon the illusion of difference. Today, metonymy – replacing the whole as well as the components, and occasioning a general commutability of terms – has built its house upon the dis-illusion of metaphor." Jean Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena* (New York City: Verso, 2009), 8.

[403] Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil,* 7-8.

[404] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 7.

meaning, and producing strands that cannot be broken or re-inscribed into old lines, it can only produce "nomadic thought."[405] The appropriation of nomadic thought, and thereby *nomadology* and the war machine, by academics is where the metaphorical review finds unique utility. Deleuze and Guattari's translator, Brian Massumi indicates that

> the space of nomad thought is qualitatively different from State space. Air against earth. State space is "striated," or gridded. Movement in it is confined as by gravity to a horizontal plane, and limited by the order of that plane to present paths between fixed and identifiable points. Nomad space is "smooth," or open ended.[406]

This call for nomadic thought is what allows Deleuze and Guattari to produce a text that moves freely through history, formulating plateaus of meaning. To Deleuze and Guattari, metaphor is produced via a reality principle that is no longer under production. "All that consists is Real…the plane knows nothing of difference of level, orders of magnitude or distances. It knows nothing of the distinction between artificial and natural."[407]

This transition away from planes to rhizomatic/nomadic thought and the (mis)appropriation of this process fuels my analysis at two levels. First, I read Deleuze and Guattari's out-casting of metaphor as occurring at the moment when nomadic thought is achieved. This is possible for herder/nomads as defined by Deleuze and Guattari, but impossible and/or dangerous for herder/nomads inscribed within the power of the state. Second, while this process of rhizome-as-metaphor is appealing for those inscribed in the state, such as students, feminists, and bus drivers; I am concerned with the reading of nomad as *exclusively* or even primarily metaphor on real-world herder/nomads. As Burke would ask, when nomads become a

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[405] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 9.

[406] Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari* (Boston: MIT Press, 1992), 6.

[407] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 69.

metaphor, what is the process and entailments of rendering their identity through metonymy and synecdoche? Is the process one that produces a war-machine for the students, feminist, and bus drivers at the expense of an irony or dialectic of herder/nomads? If so, what are the real and rhetorical implications of using the metaphor of *nomadology*? First this concern should be evaluated by considering herder/nomads who are inscribed through metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. But second, it should also be considered that once herder/nomads are reduced to irony, and if the student has become the new nomad, is she too at risk of inscription into the process of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony? Would this not be an instance of the nomad's inscription (back) into the state?

Put another way, international relations scholar Nicholas Onuf warns that this reduction of signs is at work in metaphors: "metaphors are representational, yet they misrepresent. They always want us to construct something in doubt as partaking of the reality of something that we are confident about."[408] Onuf's warning is strikingly similar to those made by Aristotle and Plato presented earlier in this chapter - metaphors are dangerous, used to hide facts, and distort reality. This concern points to the questions at heart of my analysis: does modern academic scholarship hide facts and distort the reality of modern-day herder/nomads? If so, what is the effect of this action? Even if this distortion has been avoided, does the potential still exist and what warnings should be headed to avoid such pitfalls? Finally, but most importantly, how have herder/nomad communities responded to metaphors and the resulting synecdoche of themselves? In what follows, I look for the answers of these questions through Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of *nomadology* as premised on the division between smooth and striated space.

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[408] Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making; Rules and Rule in Soical Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 156.

6.8 NOMADOLOGY IN SMOOTH AND STRIATED SPACE

According to Deleuze and Guattari, herder/nomad societies occupy smooth spaces that are organized by counter-signifying regimes of signs and/or intensive numeration. Such organization prevents coding of territorial assemblages as well as over coding of the state by maintaining internal tensions and power struggles.[409] These societies are based on ethnographic studies from which Deleuze and Guattari extract narratives of nomadic communities in Eurasia, the Sahara, and the Americas. From these examples, Deleuze and Guattari propose that herder/nomads are able to overturn and/or oppose Western settlement. This theory opposes evolutionary theories that map humans from primal to nomadic to settled communities (nomads always lived alongside the state). Further, nomads are distinguished from migrants, transhumants, and interants.

Striated space is the location of the settled population, marked by metrics or measured space.[410] Deleuze and Guattari indicate that striation "results from stratification, the over coding, centralization, hierarchization, binarization, and segmentation of the free movement of signs, particles, bodies."[411] Striation is critical to state control as is imparts a

> "truth" that "place" is an immobile point, and that immobility (dwelling) is always better than 'aimless' voyaging, wandering, itinerancy, and of course nomadism, which at best are either temporary vacations, but if insisted upon, pose grave threats to striated space.[412]

Working from the concept of striation, Deleuze and Guattari map the progression of striation from the forest to agriculture to modern settled societies.

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[409] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 392.

[410] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 385 and 441.

[411] Mark Bonta and John Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary* (Edienburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 153.

[412] Bonta and Protevi, Deleuze and Geophilosophy, 154.

Deleuze and Guattari call striation one of the "fundamental tasks" of the state, a transformation of the earth as understood by primitive societies to the land as understood by the settled.[413] When or if the state fails to striate a space, that space returns to smoothness that inhibits state communication and transportation of capitalist war machines. Resistance to the state occurs through a decentered multiplicity – a rhizome or a war-machine – creates a counterforce to the state's striation.

> The war machine's form of exteriority is such that it exists only in its on metamorphoses; it exits in an industrial innovation as well as in a technological innovation, in a commercial circuit as well in a religious creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State.[414]

It is critical to remember Deleuze and Guattari's war machine is used to effectuate change, not to pillage and burn. Deleuze and Guattari note the worst war machine is that which becomes a state apparatus only capable of destruction, such as the Nazi regime.[415]

As with *nomadology*, the war machine is brought into being when Deleuze and Guattari consider herder/nomads in Eurasia, such as the Mongolians.

> These invading forces brought to near 'perfection' by the almost entirely anti-state, counter-signifying destruction of the Mongol hordes, burning, raping, and looting their way across striated spaces. The nomadic war machines were captured by states and one way or another many settled down.[416]

The impact of a war machine is often the identification of a suite of weapons/tools that allow the machine to maintain speed, occupying a smooth space and moving in an ever-quickening speed. War machines are formed in a connection of flows, which "has as its object not war but the drawing of creative line of flight…and aims at a revolutionary moment, becoming-minoritarian

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[413] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 441.
[414] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 360.
[415] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 230.
[416] Bonta and Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*, 166.

of everybody/ everything."[417] Thinking back to the case studies presented in this dissertation, war machines can be seen when Maasai and Mongolian communities find new lines of flight as they embrace new communicative technologies to create new argumentative pathways.

The smooth space, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is inhabited by nomad societ(ies) organized by counter-signifying regimes of signs and/or intensive numeration, an organization that prevents coding of territorial assemblages as well as over coding of the state by maintaining internal tension and power struggles.[418] Following the Tanzanian Maasai example presented in Chapter Two, the 2012 Maasai protest transmitted via YouTube prevents the coding of territorial assemblages by using a media that cannot be controlled by the Tanzanian government, and combining a complexity of languages, argumentative structures, visual and verbal articulations that cannot be misconstrued by state translators or interpreters.

In *A Thousand Plateaus,* Deleuze and Guattari highlight the ways that herder/nomads have overturned and/or opposed Western settlement by retelling the history of Chinghis [Genghis] Khan and the Mongol horde.

> Genghis Khan and his followers were able to hold out for a long time by partially integrating themselves into the conquered empires, while at the same time maintaining a smooth space on the steppes to which the imperial centers were subordinated. That was their genius, the *Pax Mongolica.* It remains the case that the integration of the nomads into the conquered empires was one of the most powerful factors of appropriation of the war machine by the State apparatus: the inevitable danger to which the nomads succumbed.[419]

The construction of this representation of herder/nomads such as Mongolians always living alongside but opposed to the state radically opposes evolutionary ethnographic representations of

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[417] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 472-3.

[418] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 392.

[419] Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Nomadology: The War Machine* (Seattle: Wormwood Distribution, 2010), 97.

herder/nomads as a lower class of humans that have not yet evolved to civilized existence. Recall the Eliot's descriptions of Maasai as a "lesser race" in Chapter Three, and the Soviet movement to create *Homo Sovieticus* in Chapter Four. Deleuze and Guattari challenge these articulations of herders/nomads as less civilized and instead praise herder/nomads as always already challengers to the state. Further, Deleuze and Guattari highlight the risk taken by the state in attempting to settle nomadic peoples; "turning the war machine back against the nomads may constitute for the state a danger as great as that presented by nomads directing the war machine against the States."[420] In my analysis, Chapter Five examined Inner Mongolian protests against the Peoples' Republic of China and the ways Inner Mongolians affect policy in Tibet and Xinjiang. This affect, in which we see Inner Mongolia producing new connections and flows, such as spreading songs throughout multiple media that escape state censorship, demonstrate the potential inscribed by the *war machine.*

Yet, my analysis of Kenyan deliberation, specifically regarding Alain Zecchini's description of Maasai herder communities as always already at odds with wildlife populations, identifies the difficulty of the state in finding alternatives to the state / nomad binary. Even when Zecchini attempts to relate the positions and arguments of Maasai communities, he is only able to do so using the terminology and ideology of late modern capitalism – "the herdsman can no longer bear the additional costs associated with the presence of wildlife."[421] In this misconstrued representation of Maasai community arguments, Zecchini attempts to articulate the striation of Maasai space, and through that striation, views wildlife as trespassers on Maasai lands.

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[420] Deleuze and Guattari, *Nomadology, 97*.

[421] Alain Zecchini, "Kenya's Battle for Biodiversity," *Le Monde Diplomatique,* November 11, 2000, English Edition, http://mondediplo.com/2000/11/21masai.

The discussion of smooth and striated spaces affects this analysis in two ways. First, it provides a delineating criteria, packed full of second and third-order signs for adaptation and replication by academics appropriating the metaphor of *nomadology*. Second, the discussion of smooth and striated space creates the foundation for the entailment linkage between *nomadology* and the war machine. *Nomadology* is defined as the geography, geohistory, or logos of the rhizome and war machine, as opposed to the history and logos of the state. According to Deleuze and Guattari, "nomads have no history; they only have geography."[422] We saw the illumination of herder/nomad history in Chapter Three when Kenyan Maasai were unable to substantiate their land claims because they had not established permanent dwellings. The resulting anti-historicization of herder/nomads blinds both state and academic analysts to the sites of resistance of herder/nomads.

Resistance to the state by these herder/nomads occurs through a decentered multiplicity of a war-machine. The war machine is the counterforce to the state's striation,

> it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exits in an industrial innovation as well as in a technological innovation, in a commercial circuit as well in a religious creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State.[423]

While some scholars indicate that the *war machine* is only another metaphor, Deleuze and Guattari point to the potentials of this metaphor, "the more mechanisms of projection a tool has, the more it behaves like a weapon, potentially or simply metaphorically."[424] Here it is apparent that while Deleuze and Guattari are calling for a metaphorical reading, they are also indicating the potentially for literal reading of the war machine via *nomadology*.

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[422] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 393.
[423] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 360.
[424] Deleuze and Guattari, *Nomadology* 65.

In my analysis of social media, I have examined the potential for Maasai and Mongolian herders to form war machines and challenge the state. Examples such as the Maasai use of YouTube highlight the literal reading of this metaphor as Maasai communities sidestep the Tanzanian state's network of power. Instead of presenting petitions directly to government officers, a method that has never succeeded, the Maasai have begun using social media to record and present their arguments on a global platform. Then, utilizing the dual force of visual and verbal argumentation, they have joined with international organizations, protesters, and potential tourists to place pressure on the Tanzanian government to revise and humanize its policies towards the Maasai.

This resistance by the Maasai fits well into the first level of the simulacra through which Deleuze and Guattari seem to be calling for herder/nomads to utilize the war machine as a tool encountering resistance. Yet, the outside observer might question why the Maasai utilize primarily non-violent tactics in their protests. By interpreting Deleuze and Guattari's *nomadology* through the third and fourth levels of the simulacra – the production of appearances that creates illusions of reality and/or the virtual which invents reality – we are reminded that Deleuze and Guattari are not literally calling for war, and might not even be calling for violence but rather symbolic resistance to the state. Instead, they call for war machines as suites of weapons/tools that allows mechanic assemblages to maintain speed, occupying a smooth space and yet moving in a flash.[425] These war machines are formed in the connection of flows, which "has as its object not war but the drawing of creative line of flight, and aims at a revolutionary moment, becoming-minoritarian of everybody/everything."[426] Such lines of flight are identified

[425] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 381.
[426] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 422, 72-3.

in Maasai and Mongolian herder communities' use of social media, a set of tools that like the war-machine occupy the holey space between the smooth and striated. This holey space is necessary for Deleuze and Guattari because they fear that state surveillance will destroy the capabilities and potentials found in smooth space. As Deleuze and Guattari remind the reader, "never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us."[427] We see the same fear in Inner Mongolia as the state develops dual conservation / surveillance programs.

Just as the genius of *Pax Mongolica* was a partial integration into the state while maintaining the smooth space of the steppe, today, herder/nomads such as the Maasai and Mongolians are attempting to deliberately negotiate and regulate their positions in both smooth and striated space. These new articulations of Maasai and Mongolian identities – *deterritorializations* that have produced mechanic assemblages, are very different from the ethnographic texts from which Deleuze and Guattari created *nomadology*. This is a fascinating result, but also points to the potential for academic disconnections and retractions by scholars who claim that Deleuze and Guattari have misrepresented herder/nomad communities.

6.9 ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROPRIATION OF *NOMADOLOGY*

Anthropologists entered debates about *nomadology* via a fact-checking methodology concerned with the application of nomads as a vehicle in the metaphor of *nomadology*. These scholars claim that while Deleuze and Guattari attempt to represent ethnographic texts as proof of a metaphor from the first level of the simulacra, what they have actually created is a synecdoche of nomads

[427] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 500.

that operates at the second and sometimes third level of the simulacra. As such, these anthropologists argue that *nomadology* must be reconsidered or discarded due to its (mis)appropriation of ethnographic texts. These arguments are led by Christopher Miller's question "does Deleuze and Guattari's war machine actually kill people?"[428] Miller notes that this death is not supposed to be of any importance because *nomadology* is a metaphor. However, he argues that Deleuze and Guattari have not provided an honest discussion of the ethics of *nomadology*.

> He confronts the violence and death that "the" nomad war machine causes in a way that Deleuze and Guattari fail to do…Deleuze and Guattari want to keep their concept pure; they want us to believe in one kind of war machine that has not been appropriated by the State…the source material as it enters *A Thousand Plateaus* is at once evacuated for its representational force and, in effect, sanitized for the benefit of Deleuze and Guattari's "happy" *nomadology*.[429]

The resulting argument is that Deleuze and Guattari have romanticized, and thereby subjugated, nomadic communities. This is a serious claim and I will argue that it limits the applicability of both philosophical and anthropological depictions of nomadic communities, thereby necessitating future investigation of identity construction and argument from identity used by modern nomads. While Miller does not completely reject *nomadology,* he calls for "a less utopian, less contradictory, less arrogant, and less messianic theorization of movement, a positive cosmopolitanism that remains meticulously aware of localities and differences."[430] In this analysis, I have investigated the production of the metaphor of *nomadology* by attending to the communities used by Deleuze and Guattari as the vehicle which includes Maasai and

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[428] Miller, "The Posidentitarian Predicament," 30.
[429] Miller, "The Posidentitarian Predicament," 30.
[430] Miller, "The Posidentitarian Predicament," 30.

Mongolian herder/nomads to address the complexity of nomadic experience, and to investigate the transformation of those complexities into a sign of *nomadology.*

My analysis agrees with comparative literature scholar Ronald Bogue's argument that Deleuze and Guattari have not erred in their appropriation of the anthropological texts, but rather *nomadology* has been used in contexts not in alignment with Deleuze and Guattari's intentions.[431] Bogue's analysis is intriguing because it returns to the *vehicle* of the *nomadology* metaphor by referencing Maasai communities in response to Miller's arguments. Bogue argues that Deleuze and Guattari would have no problem with the frequent observation that no mobile populations wander aimlessly and randomly. They would simply argue that "the restricted circulation of Masai [sic] herders around a village center…represent so many mixtures of nomadic and sedentary tendencies, each a particular *de facto* composite of differences in nature."[432] This articulation of Maasai movement is strikingly similar to those articulated by Maasai herders in Kenya and Tanzania who explain the interactions between traditional herding and modern connections.

From this analysis, Bogue contends that a better understanding of the vehicle of *nomadology* will contextualize and broaden the metaphor, illuminating its full potential. This is an intriguing, but difficult suggestion to adopt. For example, Professor of German John Noyes argues that it is possible to re-interpret *nomadology* via the methodology of *transition reading.* His preferred method is to stop "speaking about nomadism as if it were an anthropological question, and rephrase it as the question of the so-called 'terrorism.'"[433] Rephrasing the metaphor

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[431] Ronald Bogue, "Apology for Nomadology," *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 6, no. 2 (2004): 170.

[432] Bogue, "Apology for Nomadology," 173.

[433] John K. Noyes, "Nomadism, Nomadology, Postcolonialism: By Way of Introduction," *Interventions: Internatioanl Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 6, no. 2 (2004): 161.

of *nomadology* from anthropological to so-called terrorism contexts may seem a radical step. As I have indicated throughout this analysis, herder communities such as the Maasai and Mongolians signal a move towards protest via social media that records, but does not always create, movements of violence. Yet, Noyes' recommendation is not fully out of place. What he does when recommending the transition from anthropological to terrorist questions is draw this dissertation into the late-capitalist milieu of herders as disruptors to national unity, progress, development and growth. Recall President Kikwete's statement, "we cannot move forward with this type of pastoralism in the twenty first century," and Prime Minister Enkhbayer's "in order to survive we have to stop being nomads." These state directives indicate that herder determination to maintain traditional livelihoods are a direct act – perhaps terrorism – against the state.

Already we can see the way that the Peoples' Republic of China has inscribed this logic onto Uighurs in Xingjing and Tibetans in Tibet, communities of herders that have been classified as herder/nomads when they are passive, and terrorists when they act as herder/nomads that traverse the once-smooth space of the steppe with their herds. By following Noyes' suggested transition reading, this dissertation highlights one of the largest challenges facing the study of both *nomadology* and herders, the plethora of visions, whereby the same location is viewed by nomads as smooth and the state as striated.

6.10 "REAL NOMADS"

A contribution of this dissertation to scholarship regarding *nomadology* is the juxtaposition of Deleuze and Guattari's text to the lived experiences and protests of Maasai and Mongolian communities. While the expansive body of literature regarding the anthropological, feminist, and

technological criticisms of *nomadology* are informative, none of these texts directly investigates or discusses Mongolians, Maasai, or other groups of herders. This is a critically important gap because it necessitates an act of metonymic synecdoche (reduction and representation) of singular, out of context parts of historical herder/nomadic identity while simultaneously increasing the entry barrier of modern nomads attempting to engage, embrace, negotiate, or reject modernity. Each body of literature demonstrates this metonymic synecdoche differently. For example, fact checking anthropologists have scoured Deleuze and Guattari's footnotes and found that the experiences of nomadic peoples have been essentialized by the production of *nomadology*.

Feminist philosophers, such as Rosi Braidottie have revived and reshaped the figure of the nomad into a "nomadic subject" which, "though the image of 'nomadic subjects' is inspired by the experience of peoples or cultures that are literally nomadic, the nomadism in question here refers to the kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes of thoughts and behavior."[434] Similarly, professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, Edward Said reflects the positionality of *nomadology* when he states,

> the nomadism metaphor establishes between critical theory and the politics of dislocation, referring to the nomadology concept in *A Thousand Plateaus* as a metaphor about a disciplined kind of intellectual mobility in an age of institutionalization, regimentation, co-operation.[435]

My concern is in the entailments, specifically western privilege, apparent in the intellectual mobility pointed to by Said. Many readings and interpretations of *nomadology* as a process of thought that celebrates multiplicity and plurality as the best way to break through unitary, binary, and totalizing methods of Western thought. These readings are particularly helpful in finding

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[434] Rosi Braidottie, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia, 2011), 5.

[435] Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1993), 331.

lines of flight, or developing rhizomatic departures from late-modern capitalism. These lines of flight have given rise to a body of literature by Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars who embrace Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of *nomadology.* For example, STS scholars have used *nomadology* to analyze William Gibson's *Neuromancer.* In these analyses, future smooth and striated spaces are present and analyzed via their points of departure, resistance, and re-inscription of the state. Yet, the experiences of modern herder communities, such as Maasai and Mongolians, fade from view and presumably existence in Gibson's future. While this body of scholarship is fascinating, it is also worrying because it illuminates what might happen when arguments made through frames of disappearance become dominant.

Throughout this dissertation I have looked for lines of flight available to modern herder communities. In each case study I assessed the ways that governments in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China have utilized proleptic elegies through a frame of disappearance to lament, yet advance, the settlement and disappearance of herding communities. Then, in this chapter I assessed these elegies and asked if Mongolian and Maasai herders have already become metaphors of themselves and if so, are they still capable of engaging the war machine called forth in their name? From this metaphorical analysis, I hope to both understand the current application of *nomadology*, and Miller's call to move away from the

> smooth space, flow, and negotiated assemblage [that] remains based on fantasies of the non-Western world as a realm beyond representation and division to, heighten rather than diminish our capacity to understand divisions of world space, even as those divisions shift, dissolve, and reform. We must enable ourselves to think through borders without simply pretending that they don't exist: when faced with a forest, we should not simply declare that we don't "believe in trees.[436]

[436] Miller, "The Posidentitarian Predicament," 33.

Miller's biggest fault is that Deleuze and Guattari have moved too quickly through heavy handed cultural representations. So what is to be made of my analysis, which has attempted to slow down, and investigate the interaction between the Mongolian and Maasai people and development rhetoric?

Can Maasai and Mongolian protests be understood as emergences of war machines? Future study is needed to examine the ways that the war machines identified in this dissertation inspire cross-border collaboration between herders in Inner Mongolian and Mongolia. Additionally, attention should turn to the ways that Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai communities have organized protests via posting sites and Internet facilities, resulting in new identifications that their respective states cannot to censor. In Chapter Two I discussed the Tanzanian government's accusation that Maasai protesters are actually Kenyan NGO members. Similarly, in Chapter Three I discussed Kenyan MP Waitatu's declaration that all protesting Maasai herders are foreigners from Tanzania. These statements are evidence of the state's attempts to define, and control, or as Deleuze and Guattari would indicate, over code, Maasai identity. Future scholarship should address the ways that Maasai communities anticipate and subvert this over coding, and the new ways that Tanzanian and Kenyan government officials respond to Maasai protesters.

The processes of identity, protest, and response discussed in this dissertation illuminate the many ways that states attempt to control herder communities. From turning off Internet connections, inhibiting border crossings, and employing netziens to post pro-government statements to protester's message boards, each case study has presented a new government tactic. Yet, through processes of *deterritorialization* and *reterritorialization,* Maasai and Mongolian herding communities have stayed one step ahead of their governments, reflecting on YouTube

that "herders are not lying" and preempting government censorship in their banned songs. Future research is needed to better understand the progression of these connections, to ask if Maasai and Mongolian herders have traversed the holey spaces between smooth and striated space, or if they are succumbing to the integration of nomads and their war machine into the state apparatus.

6.11 CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I have examined four argumentative frames – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as- *otor*, and disappearance. I found that while all of these frames are at play in modern deliberations regarding herding communities, the governments of Kenya, Tanzania, Mongolia, and China have each demonstrated a preference for the frame of disappearance and used proleptic elegies to convey their arguments in public controversies regarding herding communities. Recall Tanzania's president Kikwete's statement: "We must abandon altogether nomadic pastoralism which makes the whole country pastureland."[437] Echoing these comments, Kenyan MP Waitatu argued, "I want all Maasais chased away from here."[438] In Mongolia, President Enkhbayar is on record saying: "In order to survive we have to stop being nomads."[439] And in China I argued that the government propaganda poster, "Let the Good News Spread Over the Grasslands," depicts Mongolian identity in a way that frames herding as an obsolete, retrograde tradition.

[437] Joshua Hammer, "Last Days of the Masai?," *Conde Nast Traveler,* November 2010, http://www.cntraveler.com/features/2010/11/Last-Days-of-the-Masai.

[438] Dominic Wabala, "Kenya: Uhuru Disowns Waititu," *The Star* (Nairobi), September 26 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201209261353.html.

[439] Andrei Marin, "Between Cash Cows and Golden Calves: Adaptations of Mongolian Pastoralism in the 'Age of the Market'" *Nomadic Peoples* 12, no. 2 (2008): 75-101.

Herders have responded to proleptic elegies with arguments, petitions, and protests. Using new and social media, international organizations have recorded, narrated, and responded to these protests. In the cases of Tanzania and China, I have presented evidence that texts are produced explicitly for online communities that link herders and settled communities in new argumentative frames and protests. These protests differ between each community, and each herding community has produced unique articulations, narrations, and entailments for their arguments and protests. However, a connecting thread – a quilting point – runs through all of these communities. Each resists government arguments presented through frames of disappearance. These conflicts, occurring in both texts and streets, between herders and governments are likely to continue as long as herders have herds, and even if they have lost their herds but continue to identify as herders. From the perspectives of Maasai and Mongolian herders, this means that conflicts identified in this dissertation will be eternal.

Communicative scholars can identify multiple points of entry and analysis in these conflicts. Future research by communicative scholars might examine the use of new media by herders which facilitate trans-national connections not just between Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai but between Maasai and Mongolian herders who meet in herder-specific Facebook Groups, in United Nations Special Committees, and at forums organized by organizations such as Human Rights International. It is not yet clear how these links, new identities, and emergent protests will effect argumentative strategies of governments or herders. However, as evidenced by my analysis of links between modern herders and Deleuze and Guattari's *nomadology,* a study of these connections may identify new lines of flight for both herder and settled communities. Arguments presented through a frame of disappearance, be they by government officials or Deleuze and Guattari who argue that Mongols have succumbed to the state, create

significant barriers for herders to achieve argumentative engagement in public controversies regarding their future. This dissertation works to reconcile the distance between herders and settled communities, highlighting both points of entry and lines of flight to better understand arguments by, for, and about herders living in, alongside, and in spite of late modern capitalism. Maasai activist Eliamani Laltaika argued in 2009:

> The government is full of promises. It is not totally blind, it is not totally deaf. You always get promises that 'We understand the plight of the pastoralists, we promise to rectify this and this.' But these promises are not translated. What we are saying is now is the time to consider pastoralists as part and parcel of the economy of this country.[440]

In his demand that herders be considered as part and parcel of the Tanzanian economy, Laltaika signals the Maasai community's intention to continue herding while participating in national and international deliberations. Within the context of the multi-sited argumentative analysis presented in this dissertation, Laltaika's call could be interpreted as rejection of the Tanzanian government's arguments made from a frame of disappearance. But Laltaika is not calling for a violent form of protest. Instead, his statement could also be interpreted as opening up possibilities in terms of future understandings and new relationships between governments, conservation organizations, and herding communities. This is not an easy process, yet Laltaika concludes, "I'm positive that where we are heading, pastoralism will be recognized and pastoralists will be given their rights… It's certainly going to be very tough, but we will reach there. I'm positive. We are heading there."[441]

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[440] Eliamani Laltaika, interview by Lazarus Laisar, *Agfax: Reporting Science in Africa: Defending the Rights of Livestock Keepers*, April 2009, http://www.agfax.net/transcript/agfax241.pdf.

[441] Laltaika, *Agfax: Reporting Science.*

Figure 11: Young Herders.[442]

[442] Young Maasai herders in Arusha, Tanzania. Allison Hahn, 2012.

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